Tuesday, June 26, 2007

Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 2

Hari Aum

Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.

Nanu niravayavasya anthahkaranasya parinaamaathmikaa vritti katham?

Iththam na thaavad anthahkaranam niravayavam, saadhidrvyathvena saavayavathvaath saadhithvam cha ‘thanmano asrujatha’ ithyaadhi sruttheh vritti roopa jnaanasya manodharmthve cha ‘kaamah sankalpo vichikithsaa shradha ashradha Dhrithi aDhrithi hrih Dheeh Bheeh ithyethath sarvam mana eva’ ithi sruttirmaanam Dhee shabdhena vritti roopajnaanaaBhiDhaanam atha eva kaamaadherapi manoDharmathvam

Now, in the case of the partless, internal organ, how can there be psychosis, which is of the nature of a modification?

It is thus: The internal organ is not partless, since, being a substance with beginning, it has parts. And its having a beginning is known from such srutti as, ‘That created the mind’ ( Br. , I.2.2). And, in respect of cognition with a psychosis nature of being a property (dharma) of the mind, the evidence is the sruti: ‘Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, firmness, lack of firmness, modesty, cognition, fear, all these are but the mind’ (Brh., I.5.3). By the word ‘cognition (Dheeh)’, there is denotation of cognition with a psychosis-nature. For the same reason, even for desire, etc. there is the nature of being property of the mind.

Previously the authored answered the objection on what is knowledge by introducing the term Vritti Vishishta Chaitanyam or Consciousness qualified by the modification of the mind. Now here the author answers another question. Is Antah karanam with parts or without parts? If anthah karanam doesn’t have parts then how can there be modification of mind or vritti in the mind? The author answers that mind do have parts. When we perceive an object, there is association of mind with the object. When there is association with something that which is associated should have parts. Since mind is associated with the object that we perceive, mind should have parts in the form of thoughts in the mind. Therefore it is clear that mind has parts. Dharmaraja gives the reason that since mind is a thing which has a beginning, it should have parts. He also quotes from Brihadaranyaka Upanishad to show that anthah karanam has beginning. He also quotes Srutti, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad again, to show that the knowledge or Vritti is an attribute of the anthah karanam. Thus all the knowledge in the anthah karanam which is in the form vritti vishishta chaitanyam belong to the anthah karanam only.

Nanu kaamaadheh anthah karanadharmathve ‘aham ichchaami, aham jaanaami, aham bhiBhemi’ ithyaadhi anubhava aatmaDharmathvam avagaahamaanah kaTham upapadhyathe?

Uchayathe ayah pindasya dhagDhrithvaabhaave api dhagDhrutvaashrya vahni thaadhaathmya adhyaasaath yaTha ‘ayo dhahathi’ ithi vyavahaarah, thaTha suKhaadhi akaara parinaamyanthahkaranaikya adhyaasaath ‘aham suKhee, aham dhuKee’ ithyaadhi vyavahaaro jaayathe

Now, if for desire, etc. there be the nature of being property of the internal organ, how could experience like “I desire, I cognize, I fear”, apprehending the nature of properties of the Self, be intelligible?

It is said: Just as, though in a piece of iron there is no capacity to burn, yet because of superimposition of identity with fire, the locus of capacity to burn, there is the empirical usage ‘iron burns’, even so such empirical usage as ‘I am happy, I am miserable’ is originated, because of the superimposition of identity [of the Self] with the internal organ that undergoes change in the form of [psychoses such as] pleasure etc.

Now comes another question. If every experience belong to the anthah karanam then when during various moments of experience we say that “I am happy”, “I am sad”, “I fear” etc. we don’t say that “mind is happy”, “mind is sad” so on. How is this possible or why is this so? It is very true that all the experiences belong to the mind only. Self is ever pure and always stays as a witness. A witness is never affected by what it is witnessing, in the same way Self which is the witness of every experience is never affected by any experience. But still we claim that “I am happy” etc. This is because of superimposition of these mental modifications on the Self. This superimposition is because of the ignorance of the Self, as acharya tells in drig drishya viveka that

“ahamkaarasya thadhaathmyam chichayaa dheha saakshibhih

Sahajam karmajam bhraanthijanyam cha trividhim kramaath”

“The identification of ego with the reflection of consciousness, body and the witness is of three kinds: natural, born of past actions and born of ignorance respectively”

In the above sloka, the acharya clearly tells the identification of ego with the witness is because of the ignorance of the Self.

Dharmaraja gives an example to show how this identification happens. When there is ball of iron which is burning we say that “The iron burns”. Iron doesn’t have the quality of burning only fire has, but still because of false identification we say that iron is burning in the same way Self is never affected by any experience but because of the false identification with the anthah karanam we say that “I am happy”, “I am sad” and so on.

There is a very similar sloka in drig drishya viveka again

“chaayaahmkaarayoraikyam thapthaayah pindavanmatham

Thadhahamkaarathaadhaathmyath dhehashchethanathaamagaath”

“It is considered that the identify of the reflection of consciousness and the ego is like that of red hot iron ball. That ego in turn due to identification enlivens the body

Nanu anthah karanasya indriyathaa atheendriyathvaath kaTham pratyaksha vishayathethi?

Uchyathe na thaavath ‘anthah karanam indriyam’ ithyathra maanamasthi

‘manah shashTaani indriyaani’ ithi Bhagavadgeetha vachanam pramaanam ithi cheth, na; anindriyenaapi manasaa shatthvasankhyaapooranaavirodhaath na hi indriyagathsankhyaa poornamindriyenaivethi niyamah “yajamaanapanchamaa idaam bhkshayanthi” ithyathra rithvigatha panchathvasankhyaayaa anruthvijaapi yajamaanena pooranadharshanaath; “vedanadhyaapayaamaasa mahabhaarathapanchamaan” ithyaadhou vedagathapanchathvasankhyaayaa avedhenaapi bhaarathena pooranadharshanaath; ‘indhriyebhayah: paraa hyarThaa arTheBhyashcha param manah’ ithi sruthyaa manasonindriyathva avagamaathcha

Now, since the internal organ, being a sense organ, is super-sensuous, how can it be the object of Pratyaksha?

It is said [in reply]: There is no evidence for this, that the internal organ is a sense-organ.

If it be said that the evidence is the statement of Bhagavad-Gita, ‘The sense organs with the mind as the sixth’(XV. 7), [we say] ‘no’, since there is no contradiction in the mind making up the number six, even though not [itself] a sense-organ. There is, indeed, no restrictive rule that the completion of a number connected with the sense-organs must be only by [another] sense-organ; for in ‘Those [four rtviks] having the yajamaana (performer of the sacrifice) as the fifth eat the idaa’, it is seen the number five connected with the rtviks is completed by the yajamaana, though [he is] not a rtvik; again in ‘He taught the Vedas together with the Mahabharata as the fifth’, etc. completion by the Bharata of the number five connected with the Vedas is seen, though [the former is] not a veda, further, because of such sruti as ‘Objects are superior to the sense organs, the mind is superior even to objects’ (Katha, III.10), its not being a sense-organ is deduced of the mind.

The next question raised by the author is whether anthah karanam is also a sense organ or not? When sense organ perceive an object, that perception is caught in the anthah karanam. If anthan karanam is also a sense organ, how can there be any perception as it is imperceptible? We cannot assume another anthah karanam also as another question will be raised as to whether that anthah karanam is a sense organ or not which will go into infinite regression. Thus how can there be perception when anthah karanam is a sense organ is the question raised here. Bhamati school considers mind as an organ whereas vivarana school doesn’t accept mind as a sense organ. Dharamaraja follows the Vivarana school now gives reason as to why mind cannot considered as sense organ.

He starts his refutation of this statement by saying that there is no proof in the srutti to show that anthah karanam is a sense organ.

We can see that in Gita 15th chapter 7th sloka, which says “manah sasthani indriyaani – the sense organs and the mind as sixth”. But we cannot take this as a proof because the mind is sixth is told only to complete the count. Author here gives two examples to explain this reason.

Ida is something to eat by the four rtviks (one rivik for one veda) and the yajama which counts to 5. When we say “the four rtviks along with yajamana as fifth had ida”, it may seem to mean that yajamana is the fifth rtvik. Yajamana is one who conducts the yagas or yagnas and he is not a priest. Therefore here yajamana is taken as fifth only to complete the counting but he is not one among the rtvik. Similarly, when we say “He taught Vedas along with Mahabharata as fifth”, it doesn’t mean Mahabharata is a fifth veda other than the four Vedas. Maharabharata is joined with the four Vedas just to complete the counting which makes it to five.

In the same way, though Krishna says in the 15th chapter sense organs along with the mind as the sixth, it doesn’t mean that mind is the sixth sense organ. It is so told just to complete the counting. He also quotes from Srutti to show that mind is not a sense organ, but something higher than the sense organ. He quotes from Katha Upanishad which tells that sense objects are higher than the sense organs and the mind is higher than the sense objects which clearly shows that mind is not a sense organ.

Now a question may come. For a perception to be immediate or aparoksham, there should be a sense organ association. If mind is not considered as sense organ, how can there be immediate perception. We will see the answer in the next day.

Prostrations to All

Hari Aum


Monday, June 4, 2007

Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 1

Hari Aum

Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.

Thathra pratyakshapramaakaranam pratyaksha pramaanam pratyaksha pramaa thu athra chaitanyameva, “yad saakshaad aparokshaad” ithi srutheh ‘aparokshaath’ ithyasya aparoksham ithyarthah

Of these, that which is the distinctive cause (karana) of valid perceptual (pratyaksha) knowledge is the pratyaksha-pramaana. Here [in the definition], valid perception knowledge is but consciousness, because of the sruti, ‘That [Brahman] which is direct, immediate’ (Brh., III.4.1). Of the word aparokshaa, the meaning is aparoksham(immediate).

The first chapter of this work explains about the pratyaksha pramaanam. As we learned in the introduction, pramaa means valid knowledge and that which serves as the instrument to get this valid knowledge is called Pramaanam. Pratyaksha Pramaa means valid perceptual knowledge and Pratyaksha Pramaanam means that which serves as the instrument to get the Pratyaksha Pramaa or valid perceptual knowledge.
According to scriptures, there is only Brahman.
Mandukya says
“Sarvam hyethath brahma”
Everything is Brahman’
Brahman is of the nature of Sat-Chit-Anandam. So whatever seen in the world is only Brahman of the nature of Consciousness. Every object in the world has the essential nature of Brahman along with nama and roopa. When the nama and roopa are removed, what exists is only Sat Chit Ananda Brahman. So all experiences in the world are pervaded by Consciousness only and hence we can say the perceptual knowledge is also Consciousness only. The object which we perceive in front of us is immediate perception of Consciousness only, but because of adhyaasam or superimposition we perceive the object as nama and roopa. The underlying substratum of pot is clay only, therefore though we say “I am seeing a pot”, it is only clay we are seeing and pot is only a temporary name and form of clay. In the same way, whenever we see an object which is front of us though we say that “I am seeing this object”, but actually what is present is only Consciousness. Dharmaraja quotes from Brihadaranyaka Upanishad that Brahman is direct and immediate.

Lakshmidhara kavi says in Advaita Makaranda that
“abhaaroopasya vishvasya bhaanam bhaasathridhervinaa
Kadhaachith na avakalpeta bhaa chaaham tena sarvagah”
“The inert Universe can never be experienced without the proximity of Consciousness. I, the Consciousness, therefore, am present everywhere”

Nanu chaithanyam anaadhi, thath katham chakshuraadheh thath karanathvena pramaanathvamithi? Uchyathe chaithanyasyaanaadhithvepi thath abhivyanjaka anthah karana vrittih indriya sannikarshaadhinaa jaayathe, ithi vritti vishishtam chaithanyam aadhimadh ithyuchyathe, jnaana avachedhakathvaacha vrittau jnaanathvopachaarah thadhuktham vivarane, “anthah karanavrittau jnaanathvopachaaraath”

Objection: Is not Consciousness without a beginning? So how can the eye etc., as instruments of that, be the means of knowledge?
Reply: The answer is this. Although Consciousness is without a beginning, yet that mental state which reveals it arises through the contact of the organs etc. Hence consciousness qualified by the mental state is spoken of having a beginning. And as the mental state limits the (resulting) knowledge, it is figuratively designated as knowledge. So it has been said in the Vivarana, “On account of the mental state being figuratively spoken of as knowledge”

After giving a brief explanation of what is valid perceptual knowledge, the author then continues the work by raising the objection and answering them. It is very well known that Consciousness is without beginning and the author has explained that pratyaksha prama is Consciousness only. Since the Consciousness is always there, how can there be any knowledge through the organs of eyes etc. To this he answers, Consciousness is without beginning no doubt, but here we are not speaking about Consciousness in its pure sense. When an object is seen, the mind gets modified and takes the form of the object. The consciousness qualified by this modification of the mind is only said to have a beginning. How the modification of mind is produced? The modification of the mind is caused by the conjunction of sense organ and the object. When the sense organ like eye etc. gets in contact with the object, the mind gets modified and takes the form of the object. The consciousness which is qualified by this modification of the mind only gives the knowledge about the object. When we see a pot, the consciousness limited by the modification of mind, which is in the form of pot, gives knowledge about the pot. If there is no modification it means there is no conjunction of sense organs with any object and thus there is no perception. This consciousness qualified by the modification of the mind is figuratively called as the knowledge.

Prostrations to All

Hari Aum


Saturday, June 2, 2007

Vedanta Paribhasha - Introduction - 2

Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.

iha khalu dharmaarthakaamamokshaakyeshu chathurvidhapurushaartheshu
moksha eva parama purushaarthah, "na sa punaraavarthathe"
ithyaadhi sruthyaa tasyaiva nithyathva avagamaath, ithareshaam thrayaanaam pratyakshena,
"tadhyatheha karmajitho lokah ksheeyathe, evamevaamuthra punyajitho lokah ksheeyathe"
ithyaadhi sruthyaa cha anithyathva avagamaath cha| sa cha brahmajnaanaadh ithi
brahma thath jnaanam thath pramaanamcha saprapancha nirupyathe|

Here, verily, of the four kinds of human goals, called Dharma, Artha, Kaama and Moksha, Moksha alone is the supreme human goal; for its eternality is ascertained from such sruti as "He does not return again" (Chandogya VIII.15.1); whereas of the other three, non-eternality is understood both through perception and through such sruti as 'Therefore, just as the enjoyment here acquired through is consumed, even so is the enjoyment in a hereafter acquired by merit, consumed" (Chandogya,VIII.1.6). And since that results from Brahman Knowledge, Brahman, the knowledge thereof and the means to get the knowledge thereof are expounded in detail.

The actual text starts from this part after the self-introduction verses of the author. The Ultimate goal of every human beings in the world is only happiness but the object of happiness will vary from person to person and the objects of happiness are broadly classified as four purusharthas. The 4 purusharthas are Dharma (Righteousness), Artha (wealth), Kama (Sensual Pleasures) and Moksha(Liberation). The end product of all these four purusharthas is happiness only, but the happiness that is got from the first three purusharthas are temporary and whereas the happiness that is got from fourth purushartha is permanent. Though we seek happiness from various objects, our final aim is to get happiness which is permanent and since it is only Moksha which can give permanent happiness, the author here says that out of the four purusharthas Moksha is the Supreme human goal. When a person gets liberation, he will be happy ever and complete and hence there would not be any desire (as desire comes only when there is sense of incompleteness). Happiness that is got from any other object will never be permanent because, the world and its object in itself are temporary. Only that which is permanent can give permanent happiness and since the wordly objects are temporary, the other three purusharthas cannot give permanent happiness.
Moksham means liberation from the ocean of bondage. A person is liberated when he gets the Ultimate Knowlege that "I am Brahman". Therefore, the Ultimate goal is getting that knowledge that "I am Brahman". It is not a new knowledge to get as well, as we already are Brahman, but the Ultimate goal is ascertaining that we are Brahman only. Therefore, we should know about brahman and the means to get that knowledge and the author says that knowledge of Brahman and the means to get that knowledge is been cleary explained in this text.

thathra pramaakaranam pramaanam | thathra smritivyavruththam
pramaathvam anadhigata abaadhitha artha vishayaka jnaanathvam |
smritisaadhaarananthu abaadhitha artha vishayaka jnaanathvam |
neeroopasyaapi kaalasyendhriyavedhya vedhyathva abhyupagamena, dhaaraavaahikabudherapi
poorvapoorvajnaanaavishaya thaththath kshanavishesha vishayakathvena na
thathra avyaapthih | kincha sidhaanthe dhaaraavaahikabudhisthale na
jnaanabhedhah, kinthu yaavad ghata sphuranam
thaavadh ghata akaara anthah karana vrittih eka eva,
na thu naanaa, vritheh svavirodhi vritti uthpaththi paryantham
sthayithva abhupagamaath, thathaa cha thath prathiphalitha chaitanya roopam
ghataadhi jnaanamapi thathra thaavath kaaleenam ekameva ithi na avyaapthi shankaapi

Of these, the distinctive cause (karana) of valid knowledge is Pramaanam. Here, the nature of such valid knowledge, as excludes recollection, consists in being cognition having for content an entity that is not already known and is not sublated; whereas, that [nature of valid knowledge] which is common to recollection consists in being cognition having for content an unsublated entity. Since sense-cognition is admitted even for time, though it is colourless, even for [the second and subsequent cognition in] a continuous stream of cognition, there is as content what is not the content of earlier cognitions, namely the object qualifed by the particular [succeeding] instants; hence there is no non-pervasion in respect of that [continous stream of cognition, by the definition]. Further, in [our] final view, there is no break in a continous stream of cognition, rather is it that so long as there is presentation of pot, there is but a single psychosis of internal organ, having the form of pot, not many, since of a psychosis, persistence until the rise of [another] psychosis opposed to that [original] is admitted. And thus, even the cognition of pot, etc., which is of the nature of consciousness reflected in that, is but single, lasting for that period of time, hence there is not even the suspicion of non-pervasion.

Prama, in sanskrit, means valid knowledge and the means or way to get that valid knowledge or prama is called pramaanam. What exactly is Pramanam? When we see a real object which we do not know before, that cognition is called pramaanam. Pramaanam is different from recollection, as in recollection the object is already known. When we meet a new person the knowledge that we get is new and that means of getting the knowledge is Pramanam whereas when we meet our friend, though the knowledge is about a real object, since it is from recollection, it is not pramanam, it is called smriti. The only difference between smriti and pramanam is that, through pramanam there is new knowledge whereas in smriti, there is only recollection as knowledge is there in the memory.

After defining pramanam, the author anticipates a doubt, if the cognition is a continous cognition, how can it be pramanam? Suppose we see a new object for a long time, there is continuous cognition of that object. One may question, other than the first cognition, the rest cannot be considered as pramanam. To this he answers by analyzing through two angles. If we consider the cognition as discrete cognition, then at each interval of time it is a new cognition and thus it is pramanam only. In Vedanta, whenver there is a cognition, there will be corresponding vritti or modification of the mind. So as long as one object is percieved, so long the mind takes that particular form until we see a different object. Thus in both cases, it is new knowledge only and hence it Pramanam.

nanu sidhaanthe ghaadheh mithyaathvena bhaadhithathvaath katham thath jnaanam pramaanam?
uchyathe | brahmasaakshaathkaaraanantharam hi ghathaadheenaam bhaadhah, "yathra
thu asya sarvam atmaivaabhooth thath kena kam pashyeth"
ithi srutheh | na thu samsaaradhashaayaam bhaadhah, " yathra hi dvaithamiva bhavathi
thath ithara itharam pashyathi" ithi srutheh| thathaa cha " abhaadhitha" - padhena
samsaaradhashaayaam abhaadhithathvam
vivakshithvam, ithi na ghataadhi pramaayam avyaapthih | thath uktham
"dehaathma prathyato yadhvath pramaanathnena kalpithah |
lowkikam thadhvadhevedham pramaanaanthva athmanishchayaath|| " ithi |
"aa athamanishchayaath" - brahma saakshaathkaara paryantham ithyarthah
"lowkikam" ithi ghaadhi jnaanam ithyarthah |

'Now, since in final view, pot, etc., being illusory, are sublated, how can their cognition be valid knowledge?'
The reply is: There is indeed the sublation of pot, etc. after the intution of Brahman, because of the sruti, 'when, however, for him everything has become the Self, then, wherewith and what shall he see?'(brh, IV.5.15). But there is no sublation in the state of bondage (samsaara), because of the sruti, 'When indeed there is duality, as it were, then one sees the other' (Brh. IV.5.15). And thus since what is intended by the word 'unsublated' is 'not being sublated during the state of Samsaaram', there is no non-pervasion of the valid cognition of pot, etc. This has been said
"Just as the cognition of the body as the Self is assumed to be valid, even so is this worldly [cognition] valid till the ascertainment of the Self".
'Till the ascertainment of the Self' means till the intuition of Brahman
'Worldly[cognition]' means the cognition of pot etc.

Now an objection is raised. As per Vedanta, everything other than Self is an illusion. Therefore whenever we see an object of the world, the objector says, since the object is an illusion how can the means of that knowledge be pramanam? Yes the objects that are seen in the world are illusion only no doubt, but those are illusion only after a person realizes that there is only Brahman and nothing else. Paramarthika and Vyavahaarika level cannot be mixed. When a person gets liberated, there would be nothing to see at all, there would be no instrument to percieve the object. But till a person realizes his very nature of Brahman, he will see dualities. This is what is meant here, the cognition of objects before one realizes his own nature of Self. Therefore all the means for the cognition of the objects are Pramanam only in the Vyavaharika level. He further explains this that as long as one thinks that "I am body" till that time the cognition of the worldly objects are real. Therefore till the time one gets liberation, the world and the objects will be seen as real.

thaani cha pramaanaani shat - pratyaksham anumaana upamaana aagama arthapaththi anupalabdhi bhedhaath

These pramaanas are six, divided into Pratyaksha (perception), anumana (inference), upamaana (comparison), shabdha (verbal), arthapathi (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition).

Vedanta accepts six pramanams, which are Pratyaksha (perception), anumana (inference), upamaana (comparison), shabdha (verbal), arthapathi (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition).

With this the introduction part of Vedanta Paribhasha is over and after this starts the first chapter which is about the Pratyaksha pramanam. We will start with the first chapter the next day.

Prostrations to All.

Hari Aum


Vedanta Paribhasha - Introduction - 1

Hari Aum

Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All

Let us all offer our prostrations to Guru and start learning Vedanta Paribhasha of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra.

The Vedanta-Paribhasha is an epistemological work (Epistemology is the study of the origin, nature and validity of knowledge) on Advaita Vedanta following Vivarana school of Prakasatma Yati, the commentator on Padmapada’s Pachapadika. The name of the author of this work is Dharmaraja Adhvarindra. Dharmaraja Adhvarindra was a native of Kandramanikkam Village, Tanjavur district and seem to have flourished in seventeenth century. He was a scholar of Nyaya-Vaisheshika and Vedanta philosophy. His few works on Nyaya are Tarkachudaamani (a commentary on Gangesha's Tattvacintamani) which has a subcommentary by his son Ramakrishna Adhvarindra, Nyayaratna or Nyayasidhantadeepaprakaasha (a commentary on the Nyayasidhantadeepa of Mahamahopaadhyaaya shashadhara), in all these works of Nyaya Dharmaraja adopted Navya Nyaya introduced by Gangesha Upadhyaya in 14th century. The known Vedanta works of his are only two, Vedanta Paribhasha and Padayojanika or Padadipika, a commentary on Panchapadika.

Vedanta Paribhasha has few commentaries as well. The most notable commentary is by his son Ramakrishna Adhvarindra which has a sub-commentary called Maniprabha and another notable commentary is by his nephew Peddaa Dikshita. There is also a commentary by Narayanabhatta Sastrin called Bhushanam. There are two books with English translation one by Swami Madhavananda of Ramakrishna Mutt and other by Prof S.S.Suryanarayana Shastri. There are eight chapters in this work, and first 6 chapters explains each of 6 pramanams in the light of Vedanta.

Pramanam means valid knowledge.
Six pramanas:
Prathyaksham (Perception)
Anumanam (Inference)
Upamanam (Comparison)
Agama (Verbal testimony)
Arthapathi (presumption)
anupalabdhi (non-apprehension)
As regard to valid means of knowledge there is difference among different systems.
Charvakas – Only Prathyaksham
Buddhists and Vaiseshikas – Prathyaksha and Anumana
Sankhya and Yoga – Prathyaksham, anumanam, agama
Nyaya – prathyaksham, anumanam, agama, and upamana
Prabhakara Mimamsa – Prathyaksham, Anumanam, Agamam, Upamanam and Arthapathi
Vedanta and Bhatta Mimamsa - Prathyaksham, Anumanam, Agamam, Upamanam, Arthapathi and Anupalabdhi.
In this work, each of the six pramanams are explained in detail from Vedanta view point and also refutes other systems mainly Nyaya system. This work is in prose form except for the introduction part in which the author introduces himself.


Yadvidhyaavilaasena bhoothaBhouthikasrushtayah
Tam nowmi paramaathmaanam satchitaanandha vigraham

To that Supreme Self, the embodiment of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss Absolute, by the manifestation of the nescience (avidya) relating to which the projection of the (simple) elements and things made up of these elements takes place, I bow.

Any vedantic work will start by prostrating either Guru or Isvara or Brahman. Here, Dharmaraja prostartes to Brahman which is of the nature of Existence-Consciousness – Bliss Absolute. And it is because of ignorance of this Ultimate Reality, the world got manifested by the 5 elements. Avidya doesn’t have a separate existence other than Brahman, and yet it is different from Brahman. Here the author prostrates to that Ultimate Reality because of whose grace the entire manifestation of Universe is existing.

Yadhanthevaasipanchaasyairnirasthaa Bhedhivaaranaah
Tham pranaumi nrusimhaakyam yatheendhram paramam gurum

I salute that prince of monks, my teacher’s teacher, named Nrsimha, whose pupils have routed dualists, as lions do elephants

Shreemadh venkatanaaThaaKhyaan velaangudinivaasinah
Jagadhgurunaham vandhe sarvathanthrapravarthakaan

I salute the world-teacher named Srimad Venkatanaatha, resident of Velangudi, who was an expounder of all systems of philosophy.

Yena chinthaamanau teekaa dhashateekaaviBhanjinee
Tharkachoodaamanirnaama krthaa vidhvanmanoramaa

He who has written a commentary on the Chintamani, called Tarkacudamani, in which he has smashed ten commentaries and which has been appreciated by scholars

Tika shashaDharasyaapi baalavyuthpaththidhaayinee
Padhayojanayaa panchapaadhikaa vyaakrthaa thaThaa

Who has also written an illuminating commentary for the students on ShaShadhara (author of Nyaya-Siddhanta-dipa) and has besides expounded the Panchapadika by construing its words

Thena bhoDhaaya mandhaanaam vedaantharThaavalambinee
Dharmaraaja adhvarindrena paribhasha vithanyathe

That Dharmaraja Adhvarindra is composing this Paribhasha based on Vedantic teachings, for the enlightenment of backward students.

After these introduction verses about himself, Dharmaraja starts his explanation on what is valid knowledge, which we will see in the next day.

Prostrations to All

Hari Aum