Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
Nanu niravayavasya anthahkaranasya parinaamaathmikaa vritti katham?
Iththam na thaavad anthahkaranam niravayavam, saadhidrvyathvena saavayavathvaath saadhithvam cha ‘thanmano asrujatha’ ithyaadhi sruttheh vritti roopa jnaanasya manodharmthve cha ‘kaamah sankalpo vichikithsaa shradha ashradha Dhrithi aDhrithi hrih Dheeh Bheeh ithyethath sarvam mana eva’ ithi sruttirmaanam Dhee shabdhena vritti roopajnaanaaBhiDhaanam atha eva kaamaadherapi manoDharmathvam
Now, in the case of the partless, internal organ, how can there be psychosis, which is of the nature of a modification?
It is thus: The internal organ is not partless, since, being a substance with beginning, it has parts. And its having a beginning is known from such srutti as, ‘That created the mind’ ( Br. , I.2.2). And, in respect of cognition with a psychosis nature of being a property (dharma) of the mind, the evidence is the sruti: ‘Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, firmness, lack of firmness, modesty, cognition, fear, all these are but the mind’ (Brh., I.5.3). By the word ‘cognition (Dheeh)’, there is denotation of cognition with a psychosis-nature. For the same reason, even for desire, etc. there is the nature of being property of the mind.
Previously the authored answered the objection on what is knowledge by introducing the term Vritti Vishishta Chaitanyam or Consciousness qualified by the modification of the mind. Now here the author answers another question. Is Antah karanam with parts or without parts? If anthah karanam doesn’t have parts then how can there be modification of mind or vritti in the mind? The author answers that mind do have parts. When we perceive an object, there is association of mind with the object. When there is association with something that which is associated should have parts. Since mind is associated with the object that we perceive, mind should have parts in the form of thoughts in the mind. Therefore it is clear that mind has parts. Dharmaraja gives the reason that since mind is a thing which has a beginning, it should have parts. He also quotes from Brihadaranyaka Upanishad to show that anthah karanam has beginning. He also quotes Srutti, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad again, to show that the knowledge or Vritti is an attribute of the anthah karanam. Thus all the knowledge in the anthah karanam which is in the form vritti vishishta chaitanyam belong to the anthah karanam only.
Nanu kaamaadheh anthah karanadharmathve ‘aham ichchaami, aham jaanaami, aham bhiBhemi’ ithyaadhi anubhava aatmaDharmathvam avagaahamaanah kaTham upapadhyathe?
Uchayathe ayah pindasya dhagDhrithvaabhaave api dhagDhrutvaashrya vahni thaadhaathmya adhyaasaath yaTha ‘ayo dhahathi’ ithi vyavahaarah, thaTha suKhaadhi akaara parinaamyanthahkaranaikya adhyaasaath ‘aham suKhee, aham dhuKee’ ithyaadhi vyavahaaro jaayathe
Now, if for desire, etc. there be the nature of being property of the internal organ, how could experience like “I desire, I cognize, I fear”, apprehending the nature of properties of the Self, be intelligible?
It is said: Just as, though in a piece of iron there is no capacity to burn, yet because of superimposition of identity with fire, the locus of capacity to burn, there is the empirical usage ‘iron burns’, even so such empirical usage as ‘I am happy, I am miserable’ is originated, because of the superimposition of identity [of the Self] with the internal organ that undergoes change in the form of [psychoses such as] pleasure etc.
Now comes another question. If every experience belong to the anthah karanam then when during various moments of experience we say that “I am happy”, “I am sad”, “I fear” etc. we don’t say that “mind is happy”, “mind is sad” so on. How is this possible or why is this so? It is very true that all the experiences belong to the mind only. Self is ever pure and always stays as a witness. A witness is never affected by what it is witnessing, in the same way Self which is the witness of every experience is never affected by any experience. But still we claim that “I am happy” etc. This is because of superimposition of these mental modifications on the Self. This superimposition is because of the ignorance of the Self, as acharya tells in drig drishya viveka that
“ahamkaarasya thadhaathmyam chichayaa dheha saakshibhih
Sahajam karmajam bhraanthijanyam cha trividhim kramaath”
“The identification of ego with the reflection of consciousness, body and the witness is of three kinds: natural, born of past actions and born of ignorance respectively”
In the above sloka, the acharya clearly tells the identification of ego with the witness is because of the ignorance of the Self.
Dharmaraja gives an example to show how this identification happens. When there is ball of iron which is burning we say that “The iron burns”. Iron doesn’t have the quality of burning only fire has, but still because of false identification we say that iron is burning in the same way Self is never affected by any experience but because of the false identification with the anthah karanam we say that “I am happy”, “I am sad” and so on.
There is a very similar sloka in drig drishya viveka again
“chaayaahmkaarayoraikyam thapthaayah pindavanmatham
“It is considered that the identify of the reflection of consciousness and the ego is like that of red hot iron ball. That ego in turn due to identification enlivens the body
Nanu anthah karanasya indriyathaa atheendriyathvaath kaTham pratyaksha vishayathethi?
Uchyathe na thaavath ‘anthah karanam indriyam’ ithyathra maanamasthi
‘manah shashTaani indriyaani’ ithi Bhagavadgeetha vachanam pramaanam ithi cheth, na; anindriyenaapi manasaa shatthvasankhyaapooranaavirodhaath na hi indriyagathsankhyaa poornamindriyenaivethi niyamah “yajamaanapanchamaa idaam bhkshayanthi” ithyathra rithvigatha panchathvasankhyaayaa anruthvijaapi yajamaanena pooranadharshanaath; “vedanadhyaapayaamaasa mahabhaarathapanchamaan” ithyaadhou vedagathapanchathvasankhyaayaa avedhenaapi bhaarathena pooranadharshanaath; ‘indhriyebhayah: paraa hyarThaa arTheBhyashcha param manah’ ithi sruthyaa manasonindriyathva avagamaathcha
Now, since the internal organ, being a sense organ, is super-sensuous, how can it be the object of Pratyaksha?
It is said [in reply]: There is no evidence for this, that the internal organ is a sense-organ.
If it be said that the evidence is the statement of Bhagavad-Gita, ‘The sense organs with the mind as the sixth’(XV. 7), [we say] ‘no’, since there is no contradiction in the mind making up the number six, even though not [itself] a sense-organ. There is, indeed, no restrictive rule that the completion of a number connected with the sense-organs must be only by [another] sense-organ; for in ‘Those [four rtviks] having the yajamaana (performer of the sacrifice) as the fifth eat the idaa’, it is seen the number five connected with the rtviks is completed by the yajamaana, though [he is] not a rtvik; again in ‘He taught the Vedas together with the Mahabharata as the fifth’, etc. completion by the Bharata of the number five connected with the Vedas is seen, though [the former is] not a veda, further, because of such sruti as ‘Objects are superior to the sense organs, the mind is superior even to objects’ (Katha, III.10), its not being a sense-organ is deduced of the mind.
The next question raised by the author is whether anthah karanam is also a sense organ or not? When sense organ perceive an object, that perception is caught in the anthah karanam. If anthan karanam is also a sense organ, how can there be any perception as it is imperceptible? We cannot assume another anthah karanam also as another question will be raised as to whether that anthah karanam is a sense organ or not which will go into infinite regression. Thus how can there be perception when anthah karanam is a sense organ is the question raised here. Bhamati school considers mind as an organ whereas vivarana school doesn’t accept mind as a sense organ. Dharamaraja follows the Vivarana school now gives reason as to why mind cannot considered as sense organ.
He starts his refutation of this statement by saying that there is no proof in the srutti to show that anthah karanam is a sense organ.
We can see that in Gita 15th chapter 7th sloka, which says “manah sasthani indriyaani – the sense organs and the mind as sixth”. But we cannot take this as a proof because the mind is sixth is told only to complete the count. Author here gives two examples to explain this reason.
Ida is something to eat by the four rtviks (one rivik for one veda) and the yajama which counts to 5. When we say “the four rtviks along with yajamana as fifth had ida”, it may seem to mean that yajamana is the fifth rtvik. Yajamana is one who conducts the yagas or yagnas and he is not a priest. Therefore here yajamana is taken as fifth only to complete the counting but he is not one among the rtvik. Similarly, when we say “He taught Vedas along with Mahabharata as fifth”, it doesn’t mean Mahabharata is a fifth veda other than the four Vedas. Maharabharata is joined with the four Vedas just to complete the counting which makes it to five.
In the same way, though Krishna says in the 15th chapter sense organs along with the mind as the sixth, it doesn’t mean that mind is the sixth sense organ. It is so told just to complete the counting. He also quotes from Srutti to show that mind is not a sense organ, but something higher than the sense organ. He quotes from Katha Upanishad which tells that sense objects are higher than the sense organs and the mind is higher than the sense objects which clearly shows that mind is not a sense organ.
Now a question may come. For a perception to be immediate or aparoksham, there should be a sense organ association. If mind is not considered as sense organ, how can there be immediate perception. We will see the answer in the next day.
Prostrations to All