Hari aum
Prostrations to Amma
Objection: Since knowledge due to sentence apprehends the relation subsisting between the meanings of words, how can it be indeterminate?
Reply: The answer is this. For something to be an object of knowledge that is due to sentences, the criterion is not that it should apprehend the relation between the meanings of words – for in that case even something the relation of which is not intended may become an object of such knowledge – but that it should apprehend the intention. And in the passage under discussion, beginning with, “This universe, my dear, was but Existence in the beginning” and concluding with, “It is the truth, It is the Self, and thou art That, O Svetaketu” the intended purport of the Vedantic is held to be the Pure Brahman. So how can it express something that is not the intended meaning? That sentences like “Thou are That”, convey a simple notion of identity, only means that they produce valid knowledge that does not apprehend the relation (among the meanings of the words in them). So it has been said, “That words produce valid knowledge without reference to the (mutual) relation of their meanings, is what has been spoken of as their conveying a simple notion of identity. Or it is that which comprises only the meanings of their stems. The meaning of the last foot of the verse is: Or the conveying of a simple notion of identity (by words) consists in their denoting the meanings of their stems only.
Previously we learned that nirvikalpaka jnaanam or indeterminate knowledge is that knowledge which doesn’t have connection with any attributes. Dharmaraja also answered an objection by saying again that being perceived through the organs for perception is not the criterion for perception. The criterion is that Vritti avachinna chaitanyam should not be different form Vishaya avachinna chaitanyam in the present and the vishayam should have the capability to be perceived. In the case of “This is That Devadutta’, Consciousness limited by the Vritti of Devadutta is not different from the Consciousness limited by Devadutta and has the capability of being perceived. Thus the knowledge got from the sentence “This is That Devadutta” is perception.
Now another objection is raised. Whenever we listen to a sentence, the meaning of the sentence is understood by relating the words in the sentence. In that case the knowledge obtained by the sentence “Thou Art That” is not indeterminate as there are relations to get the knowledge. If a person says “Bring the pot”, there is an object, verb and a nominative in this sentence. The objection is that the meaning of the sentence is understood by relating the meaning of the words. As an answer to this objection Dharmaraja says relations between words are not the criterion for the knowledge about the sentence but the import of the sentence. The fault of considering knowledge from the relation of words is that it may lead to misunderstanding as something that is not intended may also be understood as the meaning of the sentence. Suppose when a cricketer says “Bring me a Bat”, and if we take relation of words alone as the criteria for the knowledge, then somebody might run to bring the bird Bat as it may also fit in this sentence. Thus what is to be understood is the import of the sentence. Thus in the sentence like “Thou Art That”, the main import is Brahman. Since the main import is only to point Brahman as ones own nature which can be comprehended without the connection of the words the knowledge got is only indeterminant and not determinant. Dharmaraja quotes from Chitsukhi of Chitsukhacharya to show that sentences are not understood by the relation of the words but by the import of the sentence or what is intended to be conveyed.
That perception is again two fold – that due to the witness in the individual self (jiva-sakshin) and that due to the witness of God (Isvara Sakshin). Now the individual self is the Consciousness limited by the mind, and the witness in that is the Consciousness that has the mind as its limiting adjunct. The difference between them is that in the former the mind is a qualifying attribute and in the latter a limiting adjunct. A qualifying attribute is that which differentiates, is present, and is connected with (what is predicated in respect of) something related to it while a limiting adjunct is that which differentiates and is present but is not connected with the predicate in respect of something related to it. In the sentence, “The colored jar is transitory”, the color is a qualifying attribute, and in the sentence, “The ether enclosed by the auditory passage is the ear”. The auditory passage is a limiting adjunct. It is this limiting adjunct that is called an indicator (paricayaka) by the logicians. In the topic under consideration, since the mind is insentient and hence incapable of revealing objects, it is a limiting adjunct of Consciousness, which reveals things. This witness in the individual self is different in each individual. For if it were one, what Chaitra has known, Maitra also would recollect.
Now Dharmaraja enters into next topic. Dharmaraja explains about perception by the witness in the jiva and Isvara. Jiva is Consciousness limited by the anthah karanam and Jiva sakshi is Consciousness which has anthah karanam as the limiting adjuncts. For jiva anthah karanam is the qualifying attribute whereas for Sakshi anthah karanam is the limiting adjunct. Here Dharmaraja gives the definition of qualifying attribute and limiting adjunct. Qualifying attribute is that which differentiates one object from another but it is closely associated with the object. The example he gives is “The colored jar is transitory”. Here the color is that which differentiates from the other jars and it is that jar which is transitory. In this case the color is that which is differentiating this jar from the other jar and it is closely associated or coexists with the jar. Such a jar is transitory. So here color is the qualifying attribute. Whereas in the case of “The ether enclosed by the auditory passage in the ear” the auditory passage is that which is differentiating the space enclosed within and outside but the walls of the passage is not associated or connected with the space. Thus we have passage differentiating the space inside and outside and not connected to the space and hence the passage is just a limiting adjunct and not the qualifying attribute.
As we have learned earlier, the mind goes out through the sense organs and through the Vritti formed outside in the same place, the objects are perceived by the perceiver. But mind doesn’t have the capability of revealing or perceiving the object on its own because of it being an insentient thing. Witness Consciousness which has mind has the limiting adjunct makes the mind sentient and thus the objects are revealed. Thus ultimately it is the witness which perceives the object but still remaining unaffected as there is no association with the mind. This witness Consciousness is different in different jivas, it varies depending on the limiting adjunct or the mind. If witness consciousness are same meaning the limiting adjunct of mind being the same in chaitra and maitra, then whatever chaitra knows maitra will also know which is not possible. Thus the limiting adjunct in each individual is different and hence the witness consciousness in each individual is different.
We shall learn about Isvara sakshi in the next day.
Thanks,
Rajesh
Wednesday, February 20, 2008
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 11
Hari aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Happy New Year to All.
Now the (various) connections of the organs viz., conjunction, identity with what is conjoined, and so on, are considered to produce mental states that reveal Consciousness.
As explained earlier, when an object is perceived, the mind goes out through the sense organs and takes the Vritti of the object. The Consciousness limited by the object and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the object occupy the same space and it doesn’t have the reality other than the Consciousness of the Pramata. The object thus becomes a perceivable and the knowledge is the Perceptual knowledge of the object. The mind which goes out through sense organs forming a Vritti can be for one of the following.
Samyoga – this is normal conjunction through which we perceive the object such as jar.
Samyukta tadatmya – this is when a particular attribute or quality of an object is perceived, say the color of an object.
Samyukta Abhinna tadatmya – when a particular attribute or quality of the same object which the mind is conjoined with is perceived.
That mental state is of four kinds: doubt, certitude, egoism and recollection. Owing to this diversity of states, the mind, though one, is designated as the manas, the intellect, the ego and the citta. So it has been said: “The manas, the intellect, the ego and the Chitta constitute the internal instrument. Doubt, certitude, egoism and recollection – these are their objects”.
Dharmaraja here explains about the Anthah karanam and its four kinds based on its functionality. We can divide the anthah karanam into four kinds based on its functions as we have learned from other works. The four kinds are Manas, bhuddhi, chittam and ahamkaram.
Manas – this part of the mind has all thoughts about the objects of the world in the form of doubts.
Bhuddi – the intellect part, which is involved at times of decision making.
Chittam – this is the store house of the mind or the memory.
Ahamkaram – the ego part of the mind
The perception spoken of above is of two kinds: Savikalpaka (determinate) and nirvikalpaka (indeterminate). Of these, the former is that knowledge which apprehends relatedness (of the substantive and qualifying attribute); for example, knowledte such as, “I know the jar”. Whereas indeterminate perception is that knowledge which does not apprehend this relatedness; for example, knowledge arising from sentence like, “This is that Devadutta” or “Thou art That”
After explaining about the perceptual knowledge, the conditions of perceptual knowledge and objects being subject to perception, he enters into the next topic about the kinds of perceptual knowledge. Perceptual knowledge can be of 2 kinds, determinate and indeterminate. When we see pot in front of us, we get the knowledge that “I know this jar”. Now here the jar is related to the perceiver.
In the case of the knowledge “This is That Devadutta”, we ignore all the relations and hence it is indeterminate knowledge. The use of the word ‘This’ means the present time and the use of ‘That’ means past time, we cannot relate those two contradictory time periods and hence ignoring all the relations we get the knowledge ‘This is That Devadutta’. Similarly in the case of ‘Tat tvam Asi’, though the word meaning of Tat and Tvam are contradictory, still ignoring the limiting adjuncts the knowledge that is got is indeterminate knowledge.
Objection: but this knowledge is verbal comprehension, not perception, for it is not due to the organ.
Reply: no, for the fact of being due to the organs is not the criterion of perception, since it has already been condemned, but, as has been stated, it is the fact of the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge not being different from the Consciousness associated with objects, when the latter are present and are capable of being perceived. Thus, as the knowledge due to the sentence, “This is that Devadatta”, has for its object something connected with an organ, and as states of the mind that goes out are assumed, the Consciousness limited by Devadatta is not different from that limited by the mental state (in the form of object), and hence the knowledge due to the sentence, “This is that Devadatta”, is a perception. Similarly with the knowledge due to sentences like, “Thou art That”, also, for there the subject itself being the object, the condition about the unity of the two is present.
Now an objection is raised. The objection is how can “This is That Devadatta” or “Tat Tvam Asi” can be a perceptual knowledge, since there is no sense organs involved in such knowledge. Earlier, a question was raised about mind being organ or not, in the explanation as an answer to that he explained clearly that for a knowledge to be immediate, there is no dependency on being generated by organs. So we cannot say that since it is not generated by organ the knowledge is not immediate. Also later the conditions for the perceptual knowledge are explained as Consciousness limited by the object not different from the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the object and the object has the capability to be perceived.
In the case of knowledge “This is That Devadatta”, mind goes out through the sense organs and forms the Vritti of Devadatta. The Consciousness limited by Devadatta and Consciousness limited by Vritti of Devadatta are not different and Devadatta has the capability to be perceived. Thus the knowledge that we get from the sentence “This is That Devadatta” is perception only. The word ‘This’ generally denote to an object which is very close by and that we are perceiving through our eyes. In the same way, “Tat Tvam Asi” is also perception. Here subject itself becomes the object and are in the present. Thus the knowledge is perception only.
Prostrations to All.
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Happy New Year to All.
Now the (various) connections of the organs viz., conjunction, identity with what is conjoined, and so on, are considered to produce mental states that reveal Consciousness.
As explained earlier, when an object is perceived, the mind goes out through the sense organs and takes the Vritti of the object. The Consciousness limited by the object and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the object occupy the same space and it doesn’t have the reality other than the Consciousness of the Pramata. The object thus becomes a perceivable and the knowledge is the Perceptual knowledge of the object. The mind which goes out through sense organs forming a Vritti can be for one of the following.
Samyoga – this is normal conjunction through which we perceive the object such as jar.
Samyukta tadatmya – this is when a particular attribute or quality of an object is perceived, say the color of an object.
Samyukta Abhinna tadatmya – when a particular attribute or quality of the same object which the mind is conjoined with is perceived.
That mental state is of four kinds: doubt, certitude, egoism and recollection. Owing to this diversity of states, the mind, though one, is designated as the manas, the intellect, the ego and the citta. So it has been said: “The manas, the intellect, the ego and the Chitta constitute the internal instrument. Doubt, certitude, egoism and recollection – these are their objects”.
Dharmaraja here explains about the Anthah karanam and its four kinds based on its functionality. We can divide the anthah karanam into four kinds based on its functions as we have learned from other works. The four kinds are Manas, bhuddhi, chittam and ahamkaram.
Manas – this part of the mind has all thoughts about the objects of the world in the form of doubts.
Bhuddi – the intellect part, which is involved at times of decision making.
Chittam – this is the store house of the mind or the memory.
Ahamkaram – the ego part of the mind
The perception spoken of above is of two kinds: Savikalpaka (determinate) and nirvikalpaka (indeterminate). Of these, the former is that knowledge which apprehends relatedness (of the substantive and qualifying attribute); for example, knowledte such as, “I know the jar”. Whereas indeterminate perception is that knowledge which does not apprehend this relatedness; for example, knowledge arising from sentence like, “This is that Devadutta” or “Thou art That”
After explaining about the perceptual knowledge, the conditions of perceptual knowledge and objects being subject to perception, he enters into the next topic about the kinds of perceptual knowledge. Perceptual knowledge can be of 2 kinds, determinate and indeterminate. When we see pot in front of us, we get the knowledge that “I know this jar”. Now here the jar is related to the perceiver.
In the case of the knowledge “This is That Devadutta”, we ignore all the relations and hence it is indeterminate knowledge. The use of the word ‘This’ means the present time and the use of ‘That’ means past time, we cannot relate those two contradictory time periods and hence ignoring all the relations we get the knowledge ‘This is That Devadutta’. Similarly in the case of ‘Tat tvam Asi’, though the word meaning of Tat and Tvam are contradictory, still ignoring the limiting adjuncts the knowledge that is got is indeterminate knowledge.
Objection: but this knowledge is verbal comprehension, not perception, for it is not due to the organ.
Reply: no, for the fact of being due to the organs is not the criterion of perception, since it has already been condemned, but, as has been stated, it is the fact of the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge not being different from the Consciousness associated with objects, when the latter are present and are capable of being perceived. Thus, as the knowledge due to the sentence, “This is that Devadatta”, has for its object something connected with an organ, and as states of the mind that goes out are assumed, the Consciousness limited by Devadatta is not different from that limited by the mental state (in the form of object), and hence the knowledge due to the sentence, “This is that Devadatta”, is a perception. Similarly with the knowledge due to sentences like, “Thou art That”, also, for there the subject itself being the object, the condition about the unity of the two is present.
Now an objection is raised. The objection is how can “This is That Devadatta” or “Tat Tvam Asi” can be a perceptual knowledge, since there is no sense organs involved in such knowledge. Earlier, a question was raised about mind being organ or not, in the explanation as an answer to that he explained clearly that for a knowledge to be immediate, there is no dependency on being generated by organs. So we cannot say that since it is not generated by organ the knowledge is not immediate. Also later the conditions for the perceptual knowledge are explained as Consciousness limited by the object not different from the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the object and the object has the capability to be perceived.
In the case of knowledge “This is That Devadatta”, mind goes out through the sense organs and forms the Vritti of Devadatta. The Consciousness limited by Devadatta and Consciousness limited by Vritti of Devadatta are not different and Devadatta has the capability to be perceived. Thus the knowledge that we get from the sentence “This is That Devadatta” is perception only. The word ‘This’ generally denote to an object which is very close by and that we are perceiving through our eyes. In the same way, “Tat Tvam Asi” is also perception. Here subject itself becomes the object and are in the present. Thus the knowledge is perception only.
Prostrations to All.
Thanks,
Rajesh
Sunday, December 23, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 10
Hari aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Similarly, although the mind and its attributes, etc, are objects of the witness alone, yet, as we assume mental states in the form of those, the definition mentioned above applies there also, and hence it is not too narrow. It cannot be urged that if the mind an d its attributes etc. are assumed to be objects of mental states, it will contradict the assumption that they are cognized by the witness alone; for, being cognized by the witness alone does not mean that they are objects of the witness without the presence of mental states but that they are the objects of the witness without the activity of the means of knowledge, such as the organs and inference. Hence the Acharya, in his gloss, in the passage dealing with egoism, has admitted a mental state in the form of the ego. Hence also, in the case of an illusory piece of silver, a state of nescience in the form of the silver has been admitted by the traditional interpreters. So the definition of which the mental states as the limiting adjuncts are a factor, applying to the mind and its attributes, etc. which are cognized by the witness alone, it is not too narrow. Therefore the gist of the matter is this: An object is said to be cognized by perception when it is capable and is devoid of any existence apart from that of Consciousness associated with the subject, which has for its limiting adjunct a mental state in the form of that object.
Dharmaraja previously explained that modification of the mind of the object is not perceived by another modification of the mind, whereas that Vritti is the object of itself. Here Dharmaraja explains about the witness as well. All the modifications of the mind and its attributes are the objects of witness, and cognition by witness alone does not mean that there are no modifications of the mind corresponding to the cognition, but it only means that it doesn’t require any activity like sense organ etc for its cognition. Self, which stays as the witness, witnesses all the activities of the mind without requiring anything to make it to cognize the mind and its attributes. The acharya which Dharmaraja is referring is Prakashatman. In the Prakashatman’s Vivarana, it is mentioned that Ahamkaram or Ego is a Vritti in the mind. This Vritti of ahamkara or ego is cognized by witness only. When a illusory silver is seen on the nacre, a Vritti is formed in the form of ignorance as silver is an illusion in the Nacre, which is also cognized by the witness. Thus on both the levels of reality, Vyavaharika level and Prathibasika level, it is witness which cognizes the Vritti without requiring any activity to cognize.
With this explanation he summarizes the second cognition type which we are learning, that perception from the standpoint of the object. For an object to be perceptible,
1) It should have the capability to be perceived
2) Its reality status is not other than the reality status of the Consciousness associated with the subject
When we perceive an object that has the capability to be perceived and has the same reality status same as the subject then by the conjunction of mind with the object through the sense organs forms a Vritti in the form of the object which makes the object perceptible.
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Similarly, although the mind and its attributes, etc, are objects of the witness alone, yet, as we assume mental states in the form of those, the definition mentioned above applies there also, and hence it is not too narrow. It cannot be urged that if the mind an d its attributes etc. are assumed to be objects of mental states, it will contradict the assumption that they are cognized by the witness alone; for, being cognized by the witness alone does not mean that they are objects of the witness without the presence of mental states but that they are the objects of the witness without the activity of the means of knowledge, such as the organs and inference. Hence the Acharya, in his gloss, in the passage dealing with egoism, has admitted a mental state in the form of the ego. Hence also, in the case of an illusory piece of silver, a state of nescience in the form of the silver has been admitted by the traditional interpreters. So the definition of which the mental states as the limiting adjuncts are a factor, applying to the mind and its attributes, etc. which are cognized by the witness alone, it is not too narrow. Therefore the gist of the matter is this: An object is said to be cognized by perception when it is capable and is devoid of any existence apart from that of Consciousness associated with the subject, which has for its limiting adjunct a mental state in the form of that object.
Dharmaraja previously explained that modification of the mind of the object is not perceived by another modification of the mind, whereas that Vritti is the object of itself. Here Dharmaraja explains about the witness as well. All the modifications of the mind and its attributes are the objects of witness, and cognition by witness alone does not mean that there are no modifications of the mind corresponding to the cognition, but it only means that it doesn’t require any activity like sense organ etc for its cognition. Self, which stays as the witness, witnesses all the activities of the mind without requiring anything to make it to cognize the mind and its attributes. The acharya which Dharmaraja is referring is Prakashatman. In the Prakashatman’s Vivarana, it is mentioned that Ahamkaram or Ego is a Vritti in the mind. This Vritti of ahamkara or ego is cognized by witness only. When a illusory silver is seen on the nacre, a Vritti is formed in the form of ignorance as silver is an illusion in the Nacre, which is also cognized by the witness. Thus on both the levels of reality, Vyavaharika level and Prathibasika level, it is witness which cognizes the Vritti without requiring any activity to cognize.
With this explanation he summarizes the second cognition type which we are learning, that perception from the standpoint of the object. For an object to be perceptible,
1) It should have the capability to be perceived
2) Its reality status is not other than the reality status of the Consciousness associated with the subject
When we perceive an object that has the capability to be perceived and has the same reality status same as the subject then by the conjunction of mind with the object through the sense organs forms a Vritti in the form of the object which makes the object perceptible.
Thanks,
Rajesh
Sunday, December 2, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 9
Hari aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for taking a long break. My prayers to Guru so that there are no more breaks in learning in future.
Objection: Even then, in the case of perception, “A colored jar”, the size etc of the jar would be the object of perception, for since the Consciousness limited by the color is one with that limited by size etc., and the former is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, therefore the Consciousness limited by size etc. is also not different from (that associated with) the subject, and hence the existence of size etc. is not apart from that of (the Consciousness associated with) the subject.
Reply: No, for the fact of having as limiting adjuncts the mental states in the form of those particular objects is also a qualifying attributes of the subject. Thus, when the mental state has the form of color, there is no mental state in the form of size etc. Hence size etc. not having an existence same as that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state in the form of size etc. is a limiting adjunct, (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend (to the size etc.)
Now Dharmaraja raises another question. When we see a big red pot, we are actually the jar with two attributes, red color and the size of the jar. When we see the red color of the jar, Consciousness limited by Red color will be same as the Consciousness limited by the size as they are the attributes of the same object and as explained earlier the Consciousness limited by subject is not different from the Consciousness limited by the object. As explained Dharmaraja earlier, the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. Now the question is if we perceive the color of the pot, then existence of the size of the pot becomes implied even if we don’t see the object and hence that contradicts the earlier condition of non-existence of the object without the existence of subject.
As an answer to this question Dharmaraja puts forth another condition for this cognition i.e when we perceive an object only that form which we are seeing in the object alone forms the Vritti in the mind. To understand this through the example, if we are seeing the color of the pot, there is only Vritti of the color and there is no cognition of size at the time of cognition of pot. Thus when we see color of the pot, there is Vritti in the form of the color of the pot and there is no Vritti of the size of the pot. Thus Dharmaraja puts an end to the wrong extension of the previous condition. When we see the color of the pot, the object here is the color of the pot, Consciousness limited subject is not different from the color of the pot and the existence of color of the pot is not different from the existence of the subject. Thus the Vritti of color of the jar is different from the Vritti of the size of the pot and hence there is no over pervasion.
Objection: In that case the definition will not extend to the mental state, for, since for fear of a regressus in infinitum you do not admit that a mental state can have for its object another mental state, the definition stated above will not apply there, as one of its factors is that the mental state in the form of the object – here, the mental state itself – is a limiting adjunct (of the Consciousness associated with the subject)
Reply: Not so, for although in order to avoid a regressus in infinitum a mental state is not admitted to be the object of another mental state, yet it is assumed to be its own object, and hence, even in the instance cited, there is the Consciousness associated with the object, that has an existence not different from that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state, with itself as its own object, is the limiting adjunct.
Here Dharmaraja raises another question. Dharmaraja explained previously that the mind which goes out through the sense organs takes the form of the object which is the Vritti of the object. Now the question is this definition cannot be extended to Vritti itself. This Vritti can be perceived by the another Vritti in the form of the Vritti of the object itself which might go into infinite regression. Thus the definition above is not extended to the Vritti of the Vritti of the object as it is leading to anavastha dosham or fault of infinite regression. To this Dharmaraja answers saying, Vritti of an object doesn’t become an object of another Vritti. The Vritti of object is not perceived by another Vritti. That Vritti of the object is the object itself and thus there is no Anavastha Dhosham.
Prostrations to All
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for taking a long break. My prayers to Guru so that there are no more breaks in learning in future.
Objection: Even then, in the case of perception, “A colored jar”, the size etc of the jar would be the object of perception, for since the Consciousness limited by the color is one with that limited by size etc., and the former is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, therefore the Consciousness limited by size etc. is also not different from (that associated with) the subject, and hence the existence of size etc. is not apart from that of (the Consciousness associated with) the subject.
Reply: No, for the fact of having as limiting adjuncts the mental states in the form of those particular objects is also a qualifying attributes of the subject. Thus, when the mental state has the form of color, there is no mental state in the form of size etc. Hence size etc. not having an existence same as that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state in the form of size etc. is a limiting adjunct, (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend (to the size etc.)
Now Dharmaraja raises another question. When we see a big red pot, we are actually the jar with two attributes, red color and the size of the jar. When we see the red color of the jar, Consciousness limited by Red color will be same as the Consciousness limited by the size as they are the attributes of the same object and as explained earlier the Consciousness limited by subject is not different from the Consciousness limited by the object. As explained Dharmaraja earlier, the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. Now the question is if we perceive the color of the pot, then existence of the size of the pot becomes implied even if we don’t see the object and hence that contradicts the earlier condition of non-existence of the object without the existence of subject.
As an answer to this question Dharmaraja puts forth another condition for this cognition i.e when we perceive an object only that form which we are seeing in the object alone forms the Vritti in the mind. To understand this through the example, if we are seeing the color of the pot, there is only Vritti of the color and there is no cognition of size at the time of cognition of pot. Thus when we see color of the pot, there is Vritti in the form of the color of the pot and there is no Vritti of the size of the pot. Thus Dharmaraja puts an end to the wrong extension of the previous condition. When we see the color of the pot, the object here is the color of the pot, Consciousness limited subject is not different from the color of the pot and the existence of color of the pot is not different from the existence of the subject. Thus the Vritti of color of the jar is different from the Vritti of the size of the pot and hence there is no over pervasion.
Objection: In that case the definition will not extend to the mental state, for, since for fear of a regressus in infinitum you do not admit that a mental state can have for its object another mental state, the definition stated above will not apply there, as one of its factors is that the mental state in the form of the object – here, the mental state itself – is a limiting adjunct (of the Consciousness associated with the subject)
Reply: Not so, for although in order to avoid a regressus in infinitum a mental state is not admitted to be the object of another mental state, yet it is assumed to be its own object, and hence, even in the instance cited, there is the Consciousness associated with the object, that has an existence not different from that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state, with itself as its own object, is the limiting adjunct.
Here Dharmaraja raises another question. Dharmaraja explained previously that the mind which goes out through the sense organs takes the form of the object which is the Vritti of the object. Now the question is this definition cannot be extended to Vritti itself. This Vritti can be perceived by the another Vritti in the form of the Vritti of the object itself which might go into infinite regression. Thus the definition above is not extended to the Vritti of the Vritti of the object as it is leading to anavastha dosham or fault of infinite regression. To this Dharmaraja answers saying, Vritti of an object doesn’t become an object of another Vritti. The Vritti of object is not perceived by another Vritti. That Vritti of the object is the object itself and thus there is no Anavastha Dhosham.
Prostrations to All
Thanks,
Rajesh
Sunday, October 28, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 8
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
The perceptuality of objects such as a jar, however, consists in their not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) subject.
Objection: How can a jar etc. be one with the Consciousness limited by the mind, since it contradicts our experience of difference, as when we say, “I see this”?
Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject does not indeed mean identity it means having no existence apart from that of the subject. To be explicit, since a jar etc. are superimposed on the Consciousness limited by them, their existence is but the existence of the Consciousness associated with the object, fro the existence of what is superimposed is not admitted to be something over and above that of its substratum. And since the Consciousness associated with the object is, in the manner described above, but the Consciousness associated with the subject, the latter Consciousness alone is the substratum of a jar etc., and hence their existence is but that of the subject, and not something else. So the immediacy of a jar etc. is proved. But in case of inference etc., since the mind does not go out to the space covered by the fire etc., the Consciousness limited by the fire is not one with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and therefore the existence of the fire etc is distinct from that of the subject. So (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend to such cases.
After the analysis of the knowledge being perceptual, now he starts his analysis on the object being perceptual. For the object to be perceptual, the object is not different from that of the subject. After giving the condition, he raises a question how jar is one with the subject? When we say “I see this”, it clearly shows that the object is different from us, so how object be one with the subject. To this he answers that, by saying object is not different from subject, it doesn’t mean identity. It only means that the object cannot have an existence apart from the existence of the subject. The existence of the object is same as the existence of the subject.
As explained by Dharmaraja earlier, when we see a pot the mind goes out through the sense organs and takes the form of the pot. Thus we have Consciousness associated with the object and the Consciousness associated with the mind of the subject. As he said earlier, the Consciousness associated with object is not different from the Consciousness associated with the mind, and here from the perspective of object, Consciousness associated with the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject. Thus Consciousness is the substratum of both subject and the object. Pot cannot have any existence apart from the substratum of Consciousness to which it is associated with because the pot is superimposed on the Consciousness associated with it and since the Consciousness associated with the pot is same as the Consciousness associated with the subject, the pot is perceptual. Thus the existence of the pot is same as the existence of the subject.
In the case of inference, as in fire in the hill example, the fire is not perceived through the sense organs. Since Vritti is not formed through the sense contact, the Consciousness associated with fire is different from the Consciousness associated with subject and thus the existence of fire is different from the existence of the subject. Therefore fire is not the object of perception.
Thus the first criterion for object to be perceptual is that, the reality status of the object is not different from the reality status of Consciousness associated with the subject.
Objection: Even then, in the case of an inference regarding righteousness and unrighteousness, the latter would be objects of perception, because the Consciousness limited by them not being distinct from the Consciousness associated with the subject, the existence of righteousness etc. is not apart from that of the subject.
Reply: No, for capability of perception is also a qualifying attribute of the object.
Similar question was answered by Dharmaraja in the earlier analysis as well. The question is, in case of regarding oneself to be righteous or not, we have righteousness or unrighteousness as object and the consciousness limited by righteousness being not different from Consciousness limited by the subject, righteousness becomes an object of perception which in reality is not. To this as before, Dharmaraja answers that righteousness or unrighteousness doesn’t have the capability to be perceived and hence there is no problem at all.
Thus the second criterion for the object to be perceptual is its capability of being perceived.
We will continue with the analysis the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
The perceptuality of objects such as a jar, however, consists in their not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) subject.
Objection: How can a jar etc. be one with the Consciousness limited by the mind, since it contradicts our experience of difference, as when we say, “I see this”?
Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject does not indeed mean identity it means having no existence apart from that of the subject. To be explicit, since a jar etc. are superimposed on the Consciousness limited by them, their existence is but the existence of the Consciousness associated with the object, fro the existence of what is superimposed is not admitted to be something over and above that of its substratum. And since the Consciousness associated with the object is, in the manner described above, but the Consciousness associated with the subject, the latter Consciousness alone is the substratum of a jar etc., and hence their existence is but that of the subject, and not something else. So the immediacy of a jar etc. is proved. But in case of inference etc., since the mind does not go out to the space covered by the fire etc., the Consciousness limited by the fire is not one with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and therefore the existence of the fire etc is distinct from that of the subject. So (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend to such cases.
After the analysis of the knowledge being perceptual, now he starts his analysis on the object being perceptual. For the object to be perceptual, the object is not different from that of the subject. After giving the condition, he raises a question how jar is one with the subject? When we say “I see this”, it clearly shows that the object is different from us, so how object be one with the subject. To this he answers that, by saying object is not different from subject, it doesn’t mean identity. It only means that the object cannot have an existence apart from the existence of the subject. The existence of the object is same as the existence of the subject.
As explained by Dharmaraja earlier, when we see a pot the mind goes out through the sense organs and takes the form of the pot. Thus we have Consciousness associated with the object and the Consciousness associated with the mind of the subject. As he said earlier, the Consciousness associated with object is not different from the Consciousness associated with the mind, and here from the perspective of object, Consciousness associated with the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject. Thus Consciousness is the substratum of both subject and the object. Pot cannot have any existence apart from the substratum of Consciousness to which it is associated with because the pot is superimposed on the Consciousness associated with it and since the Consciousness associated with the pot is same as the Consciousness associated with the subject, the pot is perceptual. Thus the existence of the pot is same as the existence of the subject.
In the case of inference, as in fire in the hill example, the fire is not perceived through the sense organs. Since Vritti is not formed through the sense contact, the Consciousness associated with fire is different from the Consciousness associated with subject and thus the existence of fire is different from the existence of the subject. Therefore fire is not the object of perception.
Thus the first criterion for object to be perceptual is that, the reality status of the object is not different from the reality status of Consciousness associated with the subject.
Objection: Even then, in the case of an inference regarding righteousness and unrighteousness, the latter would be objects of perception, because the Consciousness limited by them not being distinct from the Consciousness associated with the subject, the existence of righteousness etc. is not apart from that of the subject.
Reply: No, for capability of perception is also a qualifying attribute of the object.
Similar question was answered by Dharmaraja in the earlier analysis as well. The question is, in case of regarding oneself to be righteous or not, we have righteousness or unrighteousness as object and the consciousness limited by righteousness being not different from Consciousness limited by the subject, righteousness becomes an object of perception which in reality is not. To this as before, Dharmaraja answers that righteousness or unrighteousness doesn’t have the capability to be perceived and hence there is no problem at all.
Thus the second criterion for the object to be perceptual is its capability of being perceived.
We will continue with the analysis the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 7
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
Next Dharmaraja attacks two more concepts of Nyaya which we will in the next day.
It cannot be urged that if we thus admit both mediacy and iommediacy in the same knowledge, they would not be generic attribute (Jati); for we accept this objection, because technical terms regarding something being a generic attribute or characteristics other than that (Upadhi) are unsupported by any means of knowledge, and as such are unauthorized. Perceptions such as, ‘This jar’, are a proof of the existence of the attribute ‘jarhood’, for instance, but not of its being a generic attribute as well for since the thing to be established, viz, generic attribute, is something fictitious, the inference that establishes it also has no room. Moreover, since inherence is unfounded, and the whole universe, which is other than Brahman, is transitory, the definition of a generic attribute, which is based on its being eternal and inherent in many things, cannot apply to jarhood etc. Exactly in a similar way, the fact of being a characteristic other than a generic attribute may also be refuted.
Previously Dharmaraja refuted anuvyavasaya and alaukikam pratyaksham. Now Dharmaraja refutes another theory, Jati. Nyaya system accepts generic attribute called Jati. Jati is eternal and is inherent in many things. For example, Jarhood is the generic attribute as it is present in all the jars. It is eternal because this generic attribute of jarhood is present even if there is no jar. Inherence is an eternal relation in Nyaya system which relates generic to specific.
There are certain cases for which generic attribute is not accepted, they are
Unity of the substratum – etherhood is not accepted as generic attribute because, the substratum ether is only one, there are no two ethers.
Equality of extension – if the two attributes correspond to the same substance then both are not considered as generic attribute. Example jarhood and some other attribute of jar, both cannot be considered as generic attribute.
Cross-division – two attributes are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. For example, materiality and limitedness are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. Materiality is present in Earth, water, fire, air and ether but not present in mind. Limitedness is present in Earth, water, fire, air and mind, but not in ether. Hence there cannot be any Jati in these two.
Infinite Regression: If we assume that ghatvam or jarhood has another generic attribute ghatvatvam, then there will not be any end. Thus generic attribute of generic attribute is not accepted.
In the previous example Dharmaraja said that knowledge of Sandal wood is immediate and fragrance of the sandal is mediate. Now, since there is both mediacy and immediacy in the same knowledge they will not be Jati as there is cross-division. Mediacy and immediacy are exclusive to each other and hence it cannot lead to the generic attribute because of cross-division. This is the objection raised by the Nyaya system.
Dharmaraja welcomes such an objection and refutes Jati. According to Nyaya system, in case of Jar, ghatatvam or Jarhood is the Jati and it is eternally inherent in the Jar. When we perceive a jar, we don’t perceive the jar directly, we only perceive the jarhood and we relate the jarhood with the jar cognitively and infer that “This is Jar”. But Vedanta doesn’t accept Jati at all. In case of Jar, Jarhood is not a Jati but only an Upadhi or attribute which distinguishes it from some other substance. This cannot be considered as generic attribute because there cannot be any proof of Jarhood being a Jati. Jati or generic attribute can never be proved by any means of knowledge and hence such a concept is only a fictitious concept. Also according to Vedanta, Brahman alone is eternal there is nothing else other than Brahman which is eternal. Thus Dharmaraja proved that there is no room of having a Jati at all and the inference that we get by relating to the substance which is related through Inherence is also not possible at all.
In sentence like, “The hill has fire”, since the mental states are admitted to be different in respect of the hill and the fire, their distinguishing characteristic also are different, and hence there is no contradiction in mediacy and immediacy being together in the same Consciousness. So knowledge that is limited by mental states in the form of particular objects, is a perception in respect of such knowledge, when it is no different from the Consciousness limited by objects that are present and are capable of being apprehended by particular organs.
In this para, Dharmaraja concludes the analysis of knowledge being perceptual knowledge. In the case of fire in the hill example, the knowledge of hill is got by the conjunction of eye with the hill. Thus the Consciousness limited by the hill and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti formed in the mind are one and the same. Therefore, the knowledge of the hill is the perceptual knowledge. The fire in the hill is not seen but only inferred through the perception of smoke in the hill. Therefore, the Consciousness limited the fire is different from the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the fire as there is no sense conjunction. Therefore, the knowledge of fire is not a perceptual knowledge.
Thus the following are the conditions for knowledge to be perception:
Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence Consciousness limited by object is same as Consciousness limited by the Vritti in the present.
Object of perception should have the capability of being perceived.
We will see Dharmaraja’s analysis on the object being perceptual the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
Next Dharmaraja attacks two more concepts of Nyaya which we will in the next day.
It cannot be urged that if we thus admit both mediacy and iommediacy in the same knowledge, they would not be generic attribute (Jati); for we accept this objection, because technical terms regarding something being a generic attribute or characteristics other than that (Upadhi) are unsupported by any means of knowledge, and as such are unauthorized. Perceptions such as, ‘This jar’, are a proof of the existence of the attribute ‘jarhood’, for instance, but not of its being a generic attribute as well for since the thing to be established, viz, generic attribute, is something fictitious, the inference that establishes it also has no room. Moreover, since inherence is unfounded, and the whole universe, which is other than Brahman, is transitory, the definition of a generic attribute, which is based on its being eternal and inherent in many things, cannot apply to jarhood etc. Exactly in a similar way, the fact of being a characteristic other than a generic attribute may also be refuted.
Previously Dharmaraja refuted anuvyavasaya and alaukikam pratyaksham. Now Dharmaraja refutes another theory, Jati. Nyaya system accepts generic attribute called Jati. Jati is eternal and is inherent in many things. For example, Jarhood is the generic attribute as it is present in all the jars. It is eternal because this generic attribute of jarhood is present even if there is no jar. Inherence is an eternal relation in Nyaya system which relates generic to specific.
There are certain cases for which generic attribute is not accepted, they are
Unity of the substratum – etherhood is not accepted as generic attribute because, the substratum ether is only one, there are no two ethers.
Equality of extension – if the two attributes correspond to the same substance then both are not considered as generic attribute. Example jarhood and some other attribute of jar, both cannot be considered as generic attribute.
Cross-division – two attributes are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. For example, materiality and limitedness are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. Materiality is present in Earth, water, fire, air and ether but not present in mind. Limitedness is present in Earth, water, fire, air and mind, but not in ether. Hence there cannot be any Jati in these two.
Infinite Regression: If we assume that ghatvam or jarhood has another generic attribute ghatvatvam, then there will not be any end. Thus generic attribute of generic attribute is not accepted.
In the previous example Dharmaraja said that knowledge of Sandal wood is immediate and fragrance of the sandal is mediate. Now, since there is both mediacy and immediacy in the same knowledge they will not be Jati as there is cross-division. Mediacy and immediacy are exclusive to each other and hence it cannot lead to the generic attribute because of cross-division. This is the objection raised by the Nyaya system.
Dharmaraja welcomes such an objection and refutes Jati. According to Nyaya system, in case of Jar, ghatatvam or Jarhood is the Jati and it is eternally inherent in the Jar. When we perceive a jar, we don’t perceive the jar directly, we only perceive the jarhood and we relate the jarhood with the jar cognitively and infer that “This is Jar”. But Vedanta doesn’t accept Jati at all. In case of Jar, Jarhood is not a Jati but only an Upadhi or attribute which distinguishes it from some other substance. This cannot be considered as generic attribute because there cannot be any proof of Jarhood being a Jati. Jati or generic attribute can never be proved by any means of knowledge and hence such a concept is only a fictitious concept. Also according to Vedanta, Brahman alone is eternal there is nothing else other than Brahman which is eternal. Thus Dharmaraja proved that there is no room of having a Jati at all and the inference that we get by relating to the substance which is related through Inherence is also not possible at all.
In sentence like, “The hill has fire”, since the mental states are admitted to be different in respect of the hill and the fire, their distinguishing characteristic also are different, and hence there is no contradiction in mediacy and immediacy being together in the same Consciousness. So knowledge that is limited by mental states in the form of particular objects, is a perception in respect of such knowledge, when it is no different from the Consciousness limited by objects that are present and are capable of being apprehended by particular organs.
In this para, Dharmaraja concludes the analysis of knowledge being perceptual knowledge. In the case of fire in the hill example, the knowledge of hill is got by the conjunction of eye with the hill. Thus the Consciousness limited by the hill and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti formed in the mind are one and the same. Therefore, the knowledge of the hill is the perceptual knowledge. The fire in the hill is not seen but only inferred through the perception of smoke in the hill. Therefore, the Consciousness limited the fire is different from the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the fire as there is no sense conjunction. Therefore, the knowledge of fire is not a perceptual knowledge.
Thus the following are the conditions for knowledge to be perception:
Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence Consciousness limited by object is same as Consciousness limited by the Vritti in the present.
Object of perception should have the capability of being perceived.
We will see Dharmaraja’s analysis on the object being perceptual the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 6
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for the long break in the learning Vedanta Paribhasha.
Therefore knowledge such as, “The hill has fire”, is also mediate so far as the fire is concerned, and immediate in respect of the hill; for the Consciousness limited by the hill etc. is not different from that limited by the state of the mind that has gone out, but in respect of the fire, since the mind doesn’t go out to form a state, the Consciousness limited by the fire and the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge are different from each other. Thus the experience takes the form, “I see the hill”, and “I infer the fire”. But in the system of logic the apperception would be of the form “I infer the hill”.
When we see an object the mind through the openings of the sense organs goes out towards the object and takes the form of the object. This modification of the mind is called Vritti. For the perceptual knowledge, the anthah karana Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence the Consciousness limited by both anthah karana Vritti and Consciousness limited by the object are one and the same. The Vritti and the object should not only occupy the same space but also same time and not only that, the object should have the capability to be perceived.
Thus the conditions are
Anthah Karana Vritti and the object should occupy same space and same time.
The object should have the capability to be perceived.
After giving the conditions for the knowledge to be perceptual knowledge, he then through an example differentiates perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge. When we see smoke in the hill, we infer that the hill has fire. The hill is perceived clearly and fire not seen at all. The anthah karana Vritti of the hill and the hill occupy the same space in the present and hence the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the hill and the hill are the same and hence we get the perceptual knowledge that “I see the hill”. On the other hand, the mental modification in the form of fire and the fire doesn’t occupy the same space because there is no sense contact at all. The mental modification is through the inferential knowledge that there should be fire in the hill as there is smoke. Thus we have the knowledge “I see the Hill” and “I infer the fire”.
According to Nyaya system, when we see a jar, we don’t get the knowledge immediately that “This is jar”. First when the eye contacts the jar, only the quality of being Jar or the jarhood is perceived. This knowledge is called Vyavasaya (Primary knowledge). From this primary knowledge comes the knowledge that “I know the Jar” by relating this Jarhood to the Jar cognitively. This reflective knowledge is called Anuvyavasaya. Thus we see the jarhood and infer that it is a jar. In the same way when the hill is seen, according to Nyaya System, through Anuvyavasaya we get the knowledge that “I infer the Hill”.
Nyaya system accepts two cognitions first the knowledge about the quality of the object and then the knowledge about the object by relating cognitively the quality with the object. Vedanta doesn’t accept two cognitions in perception. When we see an object knowledge about the object is got directly. The problem with anuvyavasaya of Nyaya system is that, for the first cognition to give knowledge we require second cognition, also the second cognition may require a third cognition for the knowledge and so on thus going to Infinite regression. The perceiver will be standing staring at the object with infinite thoughts running in the mind to know finally that “This is such and such object”JJ.
In an inferential knowledge, however, in which the subject is not in contact with the organ, the knowledge is wholly mediate. Knowledge such as, “A fragrant piece of sandal”, is also immediate in respect of the piece of sandal, and mediate in respect of fragrance, because the latter being incapable of apprehension by the eye, the definition, mentioned before, based on capability of being perceived cannot apply here.
Here Dharmaraja criticizes another concept of Nyaya on the grounds of perception. According to Nyaya, there are two types of perception, Laukikam and Alaukikam.
Laukikam is of two kinds, External perception where the sense organs comes into contact with the object and the Internal perception where mind comes into contact with the modification of the mind in the form of external cognition, happiness, pain etc.
Alaukikam is of 3 kinds.
Samanyalakshana (Knowledge based on a common feature) – Whenever we see a jar, through the conjunction of the eye with the jar the jarhood is only seen first and then from that comes the knowledge of the jar.
Jnanalakshana (knowledge based on previous knowledge) – When we see an object say a rose, we say that “I see a fragrant rose”. Though the expression should have been “I see a rose”, still since through earlier experience of fragrant smell of rose we say that “I see a fragrant rose”.
Yogaja – Perceptual knowledge of seeing the past, future etc through Yogic power.
Now here in the example given by Dharmaraja, we are seeing a Sandal wood. According to Nyaya System, the perceptual knowledge would be “I see a fragrant sandal wood” as through sense contact sandal wood is known and through the past experience the fragrance of sandal wood is known. Thus even the fragrance also becomes part of the perception. But according to Vedanta, sandal wood alone is perception as it is in contact with the eyes. The knowledge of fragrance is not a perceptual knowledge because fragrance doesn’t have the capability of being perceived through eyes.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for the long break in the learning Vedanta Paribhasha.
Therefore knowledge such as, “The hill has fire”, is also mediate so far as the fire is concerned, and immediate in respect of the hill; for the Consciousness limited by the hill etc. is not different from that limited by the state of the mind that has gone out, but in respect of the fire, since the mind doesn’t go out to form a state, the Consciousness limited by the fire and the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge are different from each other. Thus the experience takes the form, “I see the hill”, and “I infer the fire”. But in the system of logic the apperception would be of the form “I infer the hill”.
When we see an object the mind through the openings of the sense organs goes out towards the object and takes the form of the object. This modification of the mind is called Vritti. For the perceptual knowledge, the anthah karana Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence the Consciousness limited by both anthah karana Vritti and Consciousness limited by the object are one and the same. The Vritti and the object should not only occupy the same space but also same time and not only that, the object should have the capability to be perceived.
Thus the conditions are
Anthah Karana Vritti and the object should occupy same space and same time.
The object should have the capability to be perceived.
After giving the conditions for the knowledge to be perceptual knowledge, he then through an example differentiates perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge. When we see smoke in the hill, we infer that the hill has fire. The hill is perceived clearly and fire not seen at all. The anthah karana Vritti of the hill and the hill occupy the same space in the present and hence the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the hill and the hill are the same and hence we get the perceptual knowledge that “I see the hill”. On the other hand, the mental modification in the form of fire and the fire doesn’t occupy the same space because there is no sense contact at all. The mental modification is through the inferential knowledge that there should be fire in the hill as there is smoke. Thus we have the knowledge “I see the Hill” and “I infer the fire”.
According to Nyaya system, when we see a jar, we don’t get the knowledge immediately that “This is jar”. First when the eye contacts the jar, only the quality of being Jar or the jarhood is perceived. This knowledge is called Vyavasaya (Primary knowledge). From this primary knowledge comes the knowledge that “I know the Jar” by relating this Jarhood to the Jar cognitively. This reflective knowledge is called Anuvyavasaya. Thus we see the jarhood and infer that it is a jar. In the same way when the hill is seen, according to Nyaya System, through Anuvyavasaya we get the knowledge that “I infer the Hill”.
Nyaya system accepts two cognitions first the knowledge about the quality of the object and then the knowledge about the object by relating cognitively the quality with the object. Vedanta doesn’t accept two cognitions in perception. When we see an object knowledge about the object is got directly. The problem with anuvyavasaya of Nyaya system is that, for the first cognition to give knowledge we require second cognition, also the second cognition may require a third cognition for the knowledge and so on thus going to Infinite regression. The perceiver will be standing staring at the object with infinite thoughts running in the mind to know finally that “This is such and such object”JJ.
In an inferential knowledge, however, in which the subject is not in contact with the organ, the knowledge is wholly mediate. Knowledge such as, “A fragrant piece of sandal”, is also immediate in respect of the piece of sandal, and mediate in respect of fragrance, because the latter being incapable of apprehension by the eye, the definition, mentioned before, based on capability of being perceived cannot apply here.
Here Dharmaraja criticizes another concept of Nyaya on the grounds of perception. According to Nyaya, there are two types of perception, Laukikam and Alaukikam.
Laukikam is of two kinds, External perception where the sense organs comes into contact with the object and the Internal perception where mind comes into contact with the modification of the mind in the form of external cognition, happiness, pain etc.
Alaukikam is of 3 kinds.
Samanyalakshana (Knowledge based on a common feature) – Whenever we see a jar, through the conjunction of the eye with the jar the jarhood is only seen first and then from that comes the knowledge of the jar.
Jnanalakshana (knowledge based on previous knowledge) – When we see an object say a rose, we say that “I see a fragrant rose”. Though the expression should have been “I see a rose”, still since through earlier experience of fragrant smell of rose we say that “I see a fragrant rose”.
Yogaja – Perceptual knowledge of seeing the past, future etc through Yogic power.
Now here in the example given by Dharmaraja, we are seeing a Sandal wood. According to Nyaya System, the perceptual knowledge would be “I see a fragrant sandal wood” as through sense contact sandal wood is known and through the past experience the fragrance of sandal wood is known. Thus even the fragrance also becomes part of the perception. But according to Vedanta, sandal wood alone is perception as it is in contact with the eyes. The knowledge of fragrance is not a perceptual knowledge because fragrance doesn’t have the capability of being perceived through eyes.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
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