Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 9

Hari aum

Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All

Pardon all for taking a long break. My prayers to Guru so that there are no more breaks in learning in future.

Objection: Even then, in the case of perception, “A colored jar”, the size etc of the jar would be the object of perception, for since the Consciousness limited by the color is one with that limited by size etc., and the former is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, therefore the Consciousness limited by size etc. is also not different from (that associated with) the subject, and hence the existence of size etc. is not apart from that of (the Consciousness associated with) the subject.

Reply: No, for the fact of having as limiting adjuncts the mental states in the form of those particular objects is also a qualifying attributes of the subject. Thus, when the mental state has the form of color, there is no mental state in the form of size etc. Hence size etc. not having an existence same as that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state in the form of size etc. is a limiting adjunct, (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend (to the size etc.)

Now Dharmaraja raises another question. When we see a big red pot, we are actually the jar with two attributes, red color and the size of the jar. When we see the red color of the jar, Consciousness limited by Red color will be same as the Consciousness limited by the size as they are the attributes of the same object and as explained earlier the Consciousness limited by subject is not different from the Consciousness limited by the object. As explained Dharmaraja earlier, the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. Now the question is if we perceive the color of the pot, then existence of the size of the pot becomes implied even if we don’t see the object and hence that contradicts the earlier condition of non-existence of the object without the existence of subject.

As an answer to this question Dharmaraja puts forth another condition for this cognition i.e when we perceive an object only that form which we are seeing in the object alone forms the Vritti in the mind. To understand this through the example, if we are seeing the color of the pot, there is only Vritti of the color and there is no cognition of size at the time of cognition of pot. Thus when we see color of the pot, there is Vritti in the form of the color of the pot and there is no Vritti of the size of the pot. Thus Dharmaraja puts an end to the wrong extension of the previous condition. When we see the color of the pot, the object here is the color of the pot, Consciousness limited subject is not different from the color of the pot and the existence of color of the pot is not different from the existence of the subject. Thus the Vritti of color of the jar is different from the Vritti of the size of the pot and hence there is no over pervasion.

Objection: In that case the definition will not extend to the mental state, for, since for fear of a regressus in infinitum you do not admit that a mental state can have for its object another mental state, the definition stated above will not apply there, as one of its factors is that the mental state in the form of the object – here, the mental state itself – is a limiting adjunct (of the Consciousness associated with the subject)

Reply: Not so, for although in order to avoid a regressus in infinitum a mental state is not admitted to be the object of another mental state, yet it is assumed to be its own object, and hence, even in the instance cited, there is the Consciousness associated with the object, that has an existence not different from that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state, with itself as its own object, is the limiting adjunct.

Here Dharmaraja raises another question. Dharmaraja explained previously that the mind which goes out through the sense organs takes the form of the object which is the Vritti of the object. Now the question is this definition cannot be extended to Vritti itself. This Vritti can be perceived by the another Vritti in the form of the Vritti of the object itself which might go into infinite regression. Thus the definition above is not extended to the Vritti of the Vritti of the object as it is leading to anavastha dosham or fault of infinite regression. To this Dharmaraja answers saying, Vritti of an object doesn’t become an object of another Vritti. The Vritti of object is not perceived by another Vritti. That Vritti of the object is the object itself and thus there is no Anavastha Dhosham.

Prostrations to All

Thanks,
Rajesh