Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
The perceptuality of objects such as a jar, however, consists in their not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) subject.
Objection: How can a jar etc. be one with the Consciousness limited by the mind, since it contradicts our experience of difference, as when we say, “I see this”?
Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject does not indeed mean identity it means having no existence apart from that of the subject. To be explicit, since a jar etc. are superimposed on the Consciousness limited by them, their existence is but the existence of the Consciousness associated with the object, fro the existence of what is superimposed is not admitted to be something over and above that of its substratum. And since the Consciousness associated with the object is, in the manner described above, but the Consciousness associated with the subject, the latter Consciousness alone is the substratum of a jar etc., and hence their existence is but that of the subject, and not something else. So the immediacy of a jar etc. is proved. But in case of inference etc., since the mind does not go out to the space covered by the fire etc., the Consciousness limited by the fire is not one with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and therefore the existence of the fire etc is distinct from that of the subject. So (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend to such cases.
After the analysis of the knowledge being perceptual, now he starts his analysis on the object being perceptual. For the object to be perceptual, the object is not different from that of the subject. After giving the condition, he raises a question how jar is one with the subject? When we say “I see this”, it clearly shows that the object is different from us, so how object be one with the subject. To this he answers that, by saying object is not different from subject, it doesn’t mean identity. It only means that the object cannot have an existence apart from the existence of the subject. The existence of the object is same as the existence of the subject.
As explained by Dharmaraja earlier, when we see a pot the mind goes out through the sense organs and takes the form of the pot. Thus we have Consciousness associated with the object and the Consciousness associated with the mind of the subject. As he said earlier, the Consciousness associated with object is not different from the Consciousness associated with the mind, and here from the perspective of object, Consciousness associated with the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject. Thus Consciousness is the substratum of both subject and the object. Pot cannot have any existence apart from the substratum of Consciousness to which it is associated with because the pot is superimposed on the Consciousness associated with it and since the Consciousness associated with the pot is same as the Consciousness associated with the subject, the pot is perceptual. Thus the existence of the pot is same as the existence of the subject.
In the case of inference, as in fire in the hill example, the fire is not perceived through the sense organs. Since Vritti is not formed through the sense contact, the Consciousness associated with fire is different from the Consciousness associated with subject and thus the existence of fire is different from the existence of the subject. Therefore fire is not the object of perception.
Thus the first criterion for object to be perceptual is that, the reality status of the object is not different from the reality status of Consciousness associated with the subject.
Objection: Even then, in the case of an inference regarding righteousness and unrighteousness, the latter would be objects of perception, because the Consciousness limited by them not being distinct from the Consciousness associated with the subject, the existence of righteousness etc. is not apart from that of the subject.
Reply: No, for capability of perception is also a qualifying attribute of the object.
Similar question was answered by Dharmaraja in the earlier analysis as well. The question is, in case of regarding oneself to be righteous or not, we have righteousness or unrighteousness as object and the consciousness limited by righteousness being not different from Consciousness limited by the subject, righteousness becomes an object of perception which in reality is not. To this as before, Dharmaraja answers that righteousness or unrighteousness doesn’t have the capability to be perceived and hence there is no problem at all.
Thus the second criterion for the object to be perceptual is its capability of being perceived.
We will continue with the analysis the next day.
Prostrations to All.