Hari aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Similarly, although the mind and its attributes, etc, are objects of the witness alone, yet, as we assume mental states in the form of those, the definition mentioned above applies there also, and hence it is not too narrow. It cannot be urged that if the mind an d its attributes etc. are assumed to be objects of mental states, it will contradict the assumption that they are cognized by the witness alone; for, being cognized by the witness alone does not mean that they are objects of the witness without the presence of mental states but that they are the objects of the witness without the activity of the means of knowledge, such as the organs and inference. Hence the Acharya, in his gloss, in the passage dealing with egoism, has admitted a mental state in the form of the ego. Hence also, in the case of an illusory piece of silver, a state of nescience in the form of the silver has been admitted by the traditional interpreters. So the definition of which the mental states as the limiting adjuncts are a factor, applying to the mind and its attributes, etc. which are cognized by the witness alone, it is not too narrow. Therefore the gist of the matter is this: An object is said to be cognized by perception when it is capable and is devoid of any existence apart from that of Consciousness associated with the subject, which has for its limiting adjunct a mental state in the form of that object.
Dharmaraja previously explained that modification of the mind of the object is not perceived by another modification of the mind, whereas that Vritti is the object of itself. Here Dharmaraja explains about the witness as well. All the modifications of the mind and its attributes are the objects of witness, and cognition by witness alone does not mean that there are no modifications of the mind corresponding to the cognition, but it only means that it doesn’t require any activity like sense organ etc for its cognition. Self, which stays as the witness, witnesses all the activities of the mind without requiring anything to make it to cognize the mind and its attributes. The acharya which Dharmaraja is referring is Prakashatman. In the Prakashatman’s Vivarana, it is mentioned that Ahamkaram or Ego is a Vritti in the mind. This Vritti of ahamkara or ego is cognized by witness only. When a illusory silver is seen on the nacre, a Vritti is formed in the form of ignorance as silver is an illusion in the Nacre, which is also cognized by the witness. Thus on both the levels of reality, Vyavaharika level and Prathibasika level, it is witness which cognizes the Vritti without requiring any activity to cognize.
With this explanation he summarizes the second cognition type which we are learning, that perception from the standpoint of the object. For an object to be perceptible,
1) It should have the capability to be perceived
2) Its reality status is not other than the reality status of the Consciousness associated with the subject
When we perceive an object that has the capability to be perceived and has the same reality status same as the subject then by the conjunction of mind with the object through the sense organs forms a Vritti in the form of the object which makes the object perceptible.
Thanks,
Rajesh
Sunday, December 23, 2007
Sunday, December 2, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 9
Hari aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for taking a long break. My prayers to Guru so that there are no more breaks in learning in future.
Objection: Even then, in the case of perception, “A colored jar”, the size etc of the jar would be the object of perception, for since the Consciousness limited by the color is one with that limited by size etc., and the former is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, therefore the Consciousness limited by size etc. is also not different from (that associated with) the subject, and hence the existence of size etc. is not apart from that of (the Consciousness associated with) the subject.
Reply: No, for the fact of having as limiting adjuncts the mental states in the form of those particular objects is also a qualifying attributes of the subject. Thus, when the mental state has the form of color, there is no mental state in the form of size etc. Hence size etc. not having an existence same as that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state in the form of size etc. is a limiting adjunct, (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend (to the size etc.)
Now Dharmaraja raises another question. When we see a big red pot, we are actually the jar with two attributes, red color and the size of the jar. When we see the red color of the jar, Consciousness limited by Red color will be same as the Consciousness limited by the size as they are the attributes of the same object and as explained earlier the Consciousness limited by subject is not different from the Consciousness limited by the object. As explained Dharmaraja earlier, the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. Now the question is if we perceive the color of the pot, then existence of the size of the pot becomes implied even if we don’t see the object and hence that contradicts the earlier condition of non-existence of the object without the existence of subject.
As an answer to this question Dharmaraja puts forth another condition for this cognition i.e when we perceive an object only that form which we are seeing in the object alone forms the Vritti in the mind. To understand this through the example, if we are seeing the color of the pot, there is only Vritti of the color and there is no cognition of size at the time of cognition of pot. Thus when we see color of the pot, there is Vritti in the form of the color of the pot and there is no Vritti of the size of the pot. Thus Dharmaraja puts an end to the wrong extension of the previous condition. When we see the color of the pot, the object here is the color of the pot, Consciousness limited subject is not different from the color of the pot and the existence of color of the pot is not different from the existence of the subject. Thus the Vritti of color of the jar is different from the Vritti of the size of the pot and hence there is no over pervasion.
Objection: In that case the definition will not extend to the mental state, for, since for fear of a regressus in infinitum you do not admit that a mental state can have for its object another mental state, the definition stated above will not apply there, as one of its factors is that the mental state in the form of the object – here, the mental state itself – is a limiting adjunct (of the Consciousness associated with the subject)
Reply: Not so, for although in order to avoid a regressus in infinitum a mental state is not admitted to be the object of another mental state, yet it is assumed to be its own object, and hence, even in the instance cited, there is the Consciousness associated with the object, that has an existence not different from that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state, with itself as its own object, is the limiting adjunct.
Here Dharmaraja raises another question. Dharmaraja explained previously that the mind which goes out through the sense organs takes the form of the object which is the Vritti of the object. Now the question is this definition cannot be extended to Vritti itself. This Vritti can be perceived by the another Vritti in the form of the Vritti of the object itself which might go into infinite regression. Thus the definition above is not extended to the Vritti of the Vritti of the object as it is leading to anavastha dosham or fault of infinite regression. To this Dharmaraja answers saying, Vritti of an object doesn’t become an object of another Vritti. The Vritti of object is not perceived by another Vritti. That Vritti of the object is the object itself and thus there is no Anavastha Dhosham.
Prostrations to All
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for taking a long break. My prayers to Guru so that there are no more breaks in learning in future.
Objection: Even then, in the case of perception, “A colored jar”, the size etc of the jar would be the object of perception, for since the Consciousness limited by the color is one with that limited by size etc., and the former is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, therefore the Consciousness limited by size etc. is also not different from (that associated with) the subject, and hence the existence of size etc. is not apart from that of (the Consciousness associated with) the subject.
Reply: No, for the fact of having as limiting adjuncts the mental states in the form of those particular objects is also a qualifying attributes of the subject. Thus, when the mental state has the form of color, there is no mental state in the form of size etc. Hence size etc. not having an existence same as that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state in the form of size etc. is a limiting adjunct, (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend (to the size etc.)
Now Dharmaraja raises another question. When we see a big red pot, we are actually the jar with two attributes, red color and the size of the jar. When we see the red color of the jar, Consciousness limited by Red color will be same as the Consciousness limited by the size as they are the attributes of the same object and as explained earlier the Consciousness limited by subject is not different from the Consciousness limited by the object. As explained Dharmaraja earlier, the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. Now the question is if we perceive the color of the pot, then existence of the size of the pot becomes implied even if we don’t see the object and hence that contradicts the earlier condition of non-existence of the object without the existence of subject.
As an answer to this question Dharmaraja puts forth another condition for this cognition i.e when we perceive an object only that form which we are seeing in the object alone forms the Vritti in the mind. To understand this through the example, if we are seeing the color of the pot, there is only Vritti of the color and there is no cognition of size at the time of cognition of pot. Thus when we see color of the pot, there is Vritti in the form of the color of the pot and there is no Vritti of the size of the pot. Thus Dharmaraja puts an end to the wrong extension of the previous condition. When we see the color of the pot, the object here is the color of the pot, Consciousness limited subject is not different from the color of the pot and the existence of color of the pot is not different from the existence of the subject. Thus the Vritti of color of the jar is different from the Vritti of the size of the pot and hence there is no over pervasion.
Objection: In that case the definition will not extend to the mental state, for, since for fear of a regressus in infinitum you do not admit that a mental state can have for its object another mental state, the definition stated above will not apply there, as one of its factors is that the mental state in the form of the object – here, the mental state itself – is a limiting adjunct (of the Consciousness associated with the subject)
Reply: Not so, for although in order to avoid a regressus in infinitum a mental state is not admitted to be the object of another mental state, yet it is assumed to be its own object, and hence, even in the instance cited, there is the Consciousness associated with the object, that has an existence not different from that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state, with itself as its own object, is the limiting adjunct.
Here Dharmaraja raises another question. Dharmaraja explained previously that the mind which goes out through the sense organs takes the form of the object which is the Vritti of the object. Now the question is this definition cannot be extended to Vritti itself. This Vritti can be perceived by the another Vritti in the form of the Vritti of the object itself which might go into infinite regression. Thus the definition above is not extended to the Vritti of the Vritti of the object as it is leading to anavastha dosham or fault of infinite regression. To this Dharmaraja answers saying, Vritti of an object doesn’t become an object of another Vritti. The Vritti of object is not perceived by another Vritti. That Vritti of the object is the object itself and thus there is no Anavastha Dhosham.
Prostrations to All
Thanks,
Rajesh
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