Hari aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Similarly, although the mind and its attributes, etc, are objects of the witness alone, yet, as we assume mental states in the form of those, the definition mentioned above applies there also, and hence it is not too narrow. It cannot be urged that if the mind an d its attributes etc. are assumed to be objects of mental states, it will contradict the assumption that they are cognized by the witness alone; for, being cognized by the witness alone does not mean that they are objects of the witness without the presence of mental states but that they are the objects of the witness without the activity of the means of knowledge, such as the organs and inference. Hence the Acharya, in his gloss, in the passage dealing with egoism, has admitted a mental state in the form of the ego. Hence also, in the case of an illusory piece of silver, a state of nescience in the form of the silver has been admitted by the traditional interpreters. So the definition of which the mental states as the limiting adjuncts are a factor, applying to the mind and its attributes, etc. which are cognized by the witness alone, it is not too narrow. Therefore the gist of the matter is this: An object is said to be cognized by perception when it is capable and is devoid of any existence apart from that of Consciousness associated with the subject, which has for its limiting adjunct a mental state in the form of that object.
Dharmaraja previously explained that modification of the mind of the object is not perceived by another modification of the mind, whereas that Vritti is the object of itself. Here Dharmaraja explains about the witness as well. All the modifications of the mind and its attributes are the objects of witness, and cognition by witness alone does not mean that there are no modifications of the mind corresponding to the cognition, but it only means that it doesn’t require any activity like sense organ etc for its cognition. Self, which stays as the witness, witnesses all the activities of the mind without requiring anything to make it to cognize the mind and its attributes. The acharya which Dharmaraja is referring is Prakashatman. In the Prakashatman’s Vivarana, it is mentioned that Ahamkaram or Ego is a Vritti in the mind. This Vritti of ahamkara or ego is cognized by witness only. When a illusory silver is seen on the nacre, a Vritti is formed in the form of ignorance as silver is an illusion in the Nacre, which is also cognized by the witness. Thus on both the levels of reality, Vyavaharika level and Prathibasika level, it is witness which cognizes the Vritti without requiring any activity to cognize.
With this explanation he summarizes the second cognition type which we are learning, that perception from the standpoint of the object. For an object to be perceptible,
1) It should have the capability to be perceived
2) Its reality status is not other than the reality status of the Consciousness associated with the subject
When we perceive an object that has the capability to be perceived and has the same reality status same as the subject then by the conjunction of mind with the object through the sense organs forms a Vritti in the form of the object which makes the object perceptible.
Thanks,
Rajesh
Sunday, December 23, 2007
Sunday, December 2, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 9
Hari aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for taking a long break. My prayers to Guru so that there are no more breaks in learning in future.
Objection: Even then, in the case of perception, “A colored jar”, the size etc of the jar would be the object of perception, for since the Consciousness limited by the color is one with that limited by size etc., and the former is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, therefore the Consciousness limited by size etc. is also not different from (that associated with) the subject, and hence the existence of size etc. is not apart from that of (the Consciousness associated with) the subject.
Reply: No, for the fact of having as limiting adjuncts the mental states in the form of those particular objects is also a qualifying attributes of the subject. Thus, when the mental state has the form of color, there is no mental state in the form of size etc. Hence size etc. not having an existence same as that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state in the form of size etc. is a limiting adjunct, (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend (to the size etc.)
Now Dharmaraja raises another question. When we see a big red pot, we are actually the jar with two attributes, red color and the size of the jar. When we see the red color of the jar, Consciousness limited by Red color will be same as the Consciousness limited by the size as they are the attributes of the same object and as explained earlier the Consciousness limited by subject is not different from the Consciousness limited by the object. As explained Dharmaraja earlier, the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. Now the question is if we perceive the color of the pot, then existence of the size of the pot becomes implied even if we don’t see the object and hence that contradicts the earlier condition of non-existence of the object without the existence of subject.
As an answer to this question Dharmaraja puts forth another condition for this cognition i.e when we perceive an object only that form which we are seeing in the object alone forms the Vritti in the mind. To understand this through the example, if we are seeing the color of the pot, there is only Vritti of the color and there is no cognition of size at the time of cognition of pot. Thus when we see color of the pot, there is Vritti in the form of the color of the pot and there is no Vritti of the size of the pot. Thus Dharmaraja puts an end to the wrong extension of the previous condition. When we see the color of the pot, the object here is the color of the pot, Consciousness limited subject is not different from the color of the pot and the existence of color of the pot is not different from the existence of the subject. Thus the Vritti of color of the jar is different from the Vritti of the size of the pot and hence there is no over pervasion.
Objection: In that case the definition will not extend to the mental state, for, since for fear of a regressus in infinitum you do not admit that a mental state can have for its object another mental state, the definition stated above will not apply there, as one of its factors is that the mental state in the form of the object – here, the mental state itself – is a limiting adjunct (of the Consciousness associated with the subject)
Reply: Not so, for although in order to avoid a regressus in infinitum a mental state is not admitted to be the object of another mental state, yet it is assumed to be its own object, and hence, even in the instance cited, there is the Consciousness associated with the object, that has an existence not different from that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state, with itself as its own object, is the limiting adjunct.
Here Dharmaraja raises another question. Dharmaraja explained previously that the mind which goes out through the sense organs takes the form of the object which is the Vritti of the object. Now the question is this definition cannot be extended to Vritti itself. This Vritti can be perceived by the another Vritti in the form of the Vritti of the object itself which might go into infinite regression. Thus the definition above is not extended to the Vritti of the Vritti of the object as it is leading to anavastha dosham or fault of infinite regression. To this Dharmaraja answers saying, Vritti of an object doesn’t become an object of another Vritti. The Vritti of object is not perceived by another Vritti. That Vritti of the object is the object itself and thus there is no Anavastha Dhosham.
Prostrations to All
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for taking a long break. My prayers to Guru so that there are no more breaks in learning in future.
Objection: Even then, in the case of perception, “A colored jar”, the size etc of the jar would be the object of perception, for since the Consciousness limited by the color is one with that limited by size etc., and the former is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, therefore the Consciousness limited by size etc. is also not different from (that associated with) the subject, and hence the existence of size etc. is not apart from that of (the Consciousness associated with) the subject.
Reply: No, for the fact of having as limiting adjuncts the mental states in the form of those particular objects is also a qualifying attributes of the subject. Thus, when the mental state has the form of color, there is no mental state in the form of size etc. Hence size etc. not having an existence same as that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state in the form of size etc. is a limiting adjunct, (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend (to the size etc.)
Now Dharmaraja raises another question. When we see a big red pot, we are actually the jar with two attributes, red color and the size of the jar. When we see the red color of the jar, Consciousness limited by Red color will be same as the Consciousness limited by the size as they are the attributes of the same object and as explained earlier the Consciousness limited by subject is not different from the Consciousness limited by the object. As explained Dharmaraja earlier, the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. Now the question is if we perceive the color of the pot, then existence of the size of the pot becomes implied even if we don’t see the object and hence that contradicts the earlier condition of non-existence of the object without the existence of subject.
As an answer to this question Dharmaraja puts forth another condition for this cognition i.e when we perceive an object only that form which we are seeing in the object alone forms the Vritti in the mind. To understand this through the example, if we are seeing the color of the pot, there is only Vritti of the color and there is no cognition of size at the time of cognition of pot. Thus when we see color of the pot, there is Vritti in the form of the color of the pot and there is no Vritti of the size of the pot. Thus Dharmaraja puts an end to the wrong extension of the previous condition. When we see the color of the pot, the object here is the color of the pot, Consciousness limited subject is not different from the color of the pot and the existence of color of the pot is not different from the existence of the subject. Thus the Vritti of color of the jar is different from the Vritti of the size of the pot and hence there is no over pervasion.
Objection: In that case the definition will not extend to the mental state, for, since for fear of a regressus in infinitum you do not admit that a mental state can have for its object another mental state, the definition stated above will not apply there, as one of its factors is that the mental state in the form of the object – here, the mental state itself – is a limiting adjunct (of the Consciousness associated with the subject)
Reply: Not so, for although in order to avoid a regressus in infinitum a mental state is not admitted to be the object of another mental state, yet it is assumed to be its own object, and hence, even in the instance cited, there is the Consciousness associated with the object, that has an existence not different from that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state, with itself as its own object, is the limiting adjunct.
Here Dharmaraja raises another question. Dharmaraja explained previously that the mind which goes out through the sense organs takes the form of the object which is the Vritti of the object. Now the question is this definition cannot be extended to Vritti itself. This Vritti can be perceived by the another Vritti in the form of the Vritti of the object itself which might go into infinite regression. Thus the definition above is not extended to the Vritti of the Vritti of the object as it is leading to anavastha dosham or fault of infinite regression. To this Dharmaraja answers saying, Vritti of an object doesn’t become an object of another Vritti. The Vritti of object is not perceived by another Vritti. That Vritti of the object is the object itself and thus there is no Anavastha Dhosham.
Prostrations to All
Thanks,
Rajesh
Sunday, October 28, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 8
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
The perceptuality of objects such as a jar, however, consists in their not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) subject.
Objection: How can a jar etc. be one with the Consciousness limited by the mind, since it contradicts our experience of difference, as when we say, “I see this”?
Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject does not indeed mean identity it means having no existence apart from that of the subject. To be explicit, since a jar etc. are superimposed on the Consciousness limited by them, their existence is but the existence of the Consciousness associated with the object, fro the existence of what is superimposed is not admitted to be something over and above that of its substratum. And since the Consciousness associated with the object is, in the manner described above, but the Consciousness associated with the subject, the latter Consciousness alone is the substratum of a jar etc., and hence their existence is but that of the subject, and not something else. So the immediacy of a jar etc. is proved. But in case of inference etc., since the mind does not go out to the space covered by the fire etc., the Consciousness limited by the fire is not one with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and therefore the existence of the fire etc is distinct from that of the subject. So (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend to such cases.
After the analysis of the knowledge being perceptual, now he starts his analysis on the object being perceptual. For the object to be perceptual, the object is not different from that of the subject. After giving the condition, he raises a question how jar is one with the subject? When we say “I see this”, it clearly shows that the object is different from us, so how object be one with the subject. To this he answers that, by saying object is not different from subject, it doesn’t mean identity. It only means that the object cannot have an existence apart from the existence of the subject. The existence of the object is same as the existence of the subject.
As explained by Dharmaraja earlier, when we see a pot the mind goes out through the sense organs and takes the form of the pot. Thus we have Consciousness associated with the object and the Consciousness associated with the mind of the subject. As he said earlier, the Consciousness associated with object is not different from the Consciousness associated with the mind, and here from the perspective of object, Consciousness associated with the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject. Thus Consciousness is the substratum of both subject and the object. Pot cannot have any existence apart from the substratum of Consciousness to which it is associated with because the pot is superimposed on the Consciousness associated with it and since the Consciousness associated with the pot is same as the Consciousness associated with the subject, the pot is perceptual. Thus the existence of the pot is same as the existence of the subject.
In the case of inference, as in fire in the hill example, the fire is not perceived through the sense organs. Since Vritti is not formed through the sense contact, the Consciousness associated with fire is different from the Consciousness associated with subject and thus the existence of fire is different from the existence of the subject. Therefore fire is not the object of perception.
Thus the first criterion for object to be perceptual is that, the reality status of the object is not different from the reality status of Consciousness associated with the subject.
Objection: Even then, in the case of an inference regarding righteousness and unrighteousness, the latter would be objects of perception, because the Consciousness limited by them not being distinct from the Consciousness associated with the subject, the existence of righteousness etc. is not apart from that of the subject.
Reply: No, for capability of perception is also a qualifying attribute of the object.
Similar question was answered by Dharmaraja in the earlier analysis as well. The question is, in case of regarding oneself to be righteous or not, we have righteousness or unrighteousness as object and the consciousness limited by righteousness being not different from Consciousness limited by the subject, righteousness becomes an object of perception which in reality is not. To this as before, Dharmaraja answers that righteousness or unrighteousness doesn’t have the capability to be perceived and hence there is no problem at all.
Thus the second criterion for the object to be perceptual is its capability of being perceived.
We will continue with the analysis the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
The perceptuality of objects such as a jar, however, consists in their not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) subject.
Objection: How can a jar etc. be one with the Consciousness limited by the mind, since it contradicts our experience of difference, as when we say, “I see this”?
Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject does not indeed mean identity it means having no existence apart from that of the subject. To be explicit, since a jar etc. are superimposed on the Consciousness limited by them, their existence is but the existence of the Consciousness associated with the object, fro the existence of what is superimposed is not admitted to be something over and above that of its substratum. And since the Consciousness associated with the object is, in the manner described above, but the Consciousness associated with the subject, the latter Consciousness alone is the substratum of a jar etc., and hence their existence is but that of the subject, and not something else. So the immediacy of a jar etc. is proved. But in case of inference etc., since the mind does not go out to the space covered by the fire etc., the Consciousness limited by the fire is not one with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and therefore the existence of the fire etc is distinct from that of the subject. So (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend to such cases.
After the analysis of the knowledge being perceptual, now he starts his analysis on the object being perceptual. For the object to be perceptual, the object is not different from that of the subject. After giving the condition, he raises a question how jar is one with the subject? When we say “I see this”, it clearly shows that the object is different from us, so how object be one with the subject. To this he answers that, by saying object is not different from subject, it doesn’t mean identity. It only means that the object cannot have an existence apart from the existence of the subject. The existence of the object is same as the existence of the subject.
As explained by Dharmaraja earlier, when we see a pot the mind goes out through the sense organs and takes the form of the pot. Thus we have Consciousness associated with the object and the Consciousness associated with the mind of the subject. As he said earlier, the Consciousness associated with object is not different from the Consciousness associated with the mind, and here from the perspective of object, Consciousness associated with the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject. Thus Consciousness is the substratum of both subject and the object. Pot cannot have any existence apart from the substratum of Consciousness to which it is associated with because the pot is superimposed on the Consciousness associated with it and since the Consciousness associated with the pot is same as the Consciousness associated with the subject, the pot is perceptual. Thus the existence of the pot is same as the existence of the subject.
In the case of inference, as in fire in the hill example, the fire is not perceived through the sense organs. Since Vritti is not formed through the sense contact, the Consciousness associated with fire is different from the Consciousness associated with subject and thus the existence of fire is different from the existence of the subject. Therefore fire is not the object of perception.
Thus the first criterion for object to be perceptual is that, the reality status of the object is not different from the reality status of Consciousness associated with the subject.
Objection: Even then, in the case of an inference regarding righteousness and unrighteousness, the latter would be objects of perception, because the Consciousness limited by them not being distinct from the Consciousness associated with the subject, the existence of righteousness etc. is not apart from that of the subject.
Reply: No, for capability of perception is also a qualifying attribute of the object.
Similar question was answered by Dharmaraja in the earlier analysis as well. The question is, in case of regarding oneself to be righteous or not, we have righteousness or unrighteousness as object and the consciousness limited by righteousness being not different from Consciousness limited by the subject, righteousness becomes an object of perception which in reality is not. To this as before, Dharmaraja answers that righteousness or unrighteousness doesn’t have the capability to be perceived and hence there is no problem at all.
Thus the second criterion for the object to be perceptual is its capability of being perceived.
We will continue with the analysis the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 7
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
Next Dharmaraja attacks two more concepts of Nyaya which we will in the next day.
It cannot be urged that if we thus admit both mediacy and iommediacy in the same knowledge, they would not be generic attribute (Jati); for we accept this objection, because technical terms regarding something being a generic attribute or characteristics other than that (Upadhi) are unsupported by any means of knowledge, and as such are unauthorized. Perceptions such as, ‘This jar’, are a proof of the existence of the attribute ‘jarhood’, for instance, but not of its being a generic attribute as well for since the thing to be established, viz, generic attribute, is something fictitious, the inference that establishes it also has no room. Moreover, since inherence is unfounded, and the whole universe, which is other than Brahman, is transitory, the definition of a generic attribute, which is based on its being eternal and inherent in many things, cannot apply to jarhood etc. Exactly in a similar way, the fact of being a characteristic other than a generic attribute may also be refuted.
Previously Dharmaraja refuted anuvyavasaya and alaukikam pratyaksham. Now Dharmaraja refutes another theory, Jati. Nyaya system accepts generic attribute called Jati. Jati is eternal and is inherent in many things. For example, Jarhood is the generic attribute as it is present in all the jars. It is eternal because this generic attribute of jarhood is present even if there is no jar. Inherence is an eternal relation in Nyaya system which relates generic to specific.
There are certain cases for which generic attribute is not accepted, they are
Unity of the substratum – etherhood is not accepted as generic attribute because, the substratum ether is only one, there are no two ethers.
Equality of extension – if the two attributes correspond to the same substance then both are not considered as generic attribute. Example jarhood and some other attribute of jar, both cannot be considered as generic attribute.
Cross-division – two attributes are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. For example, materiality and limitedness are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. Materiality is present in Earth, water, fire, air and ether but not present in mind. Limitedness is present in Earth, water, fire, air and mind, but not in ether. Hence there cannot be any Jati in these two.
Infinite Regression: If we assume that ghatvam or jarhood has another generic attribute ghatvatvam, then there will not be any end. Thus generic attribute of generic attribute is not accepted.
In the previous example Dharmaraja said that knowledge of Sandal wood is immediate and fragrance of the sandal is mediate. Now, since there is both mediacy and immediacy in the same knowledge they will not be Jati as there is cross-division. Mediacy and immediacy are exclusive to each other and hence it cannot lead to the generic attribute because of cross-division. This is the objection raised by the Nyaya system.
Dharmaraja welcomes such an objection and refutes Jati. According to Nyaya system, in case of Jar, ghatatvam or Jarhood is the Jati and it is eternally inherent in the Jar. When we perceive a jar, we don’t perceive the jar directly, we only perceive the jarhood and we relate the jarhood with the jar cognitively and infer that “This is Jar”. But Vedanta doesn’t accept Jati at all. In case of Jar, Jarhood is not a Jati but only an Upadhi or attribute which distinguishes it from some other substance. This cannot be considered as generic attribute because there cannot be any proof of Jarhood being a Jati. Jati or generic attribute can never be proved by any means of knowledge and hence such a concept is only a fictitious concept. Also according to Vedanta, Brahman alone is eternal there is nothing else other than Brahman which is eternal. Thus Dharmaraja proved that there is no room of having a Jati at all and the inference that we get by relating to the substance which is related through Inherence is also not possible at all.
In sentence like, “The hill has fire”, since the mental states are admitted to be different in respect of the hill and the fire, their distinguishing characteristic also are different, and hence there is no contradiction in mediacy and immediacy being together in the same Consciousness. So knowledge that is limited by mental states in the form of particular objects, is a perception in respect of such knowledge, when it is no different from the Consciousness limited by objects that are present and are capable of being apprehended by particular organs.
In this para, Dharmaraja concludes the analysis of knowledge being perceptual knowledge. In the case of fire in the hill example, the knowledge of hill is got by the conjunction of eye with the hill. Thus the Consciousness limited by the hill and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti formed in the mind are one and the same. Therefore, the knowledge of the hill is the perceptual knowledge. The fire in the hill is not seen but only inferred through the perception of smoke in the hill. Therefore, the Consciousness limited the fire is different from the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the fire as there is no sense conjunction. Therefore, the knowledge of fire is not a perceptual knowledge.
Thus the following are the conditions for knowledge to be perception:
Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence Consciousness limited by object is same as Consciousness limited by the Vritti in the present.
Object of perception should have the capability of being perceived.
We will see Dharmaraja’s analysis on the object being perceptual the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
Next Dharmaraja attacks two more concepts of Nyaya which we will in the next day.
It cannot be urged that if we thus admit both mediacy and iommediacy in the same knowledge, they would not be generic attribute (Jati); for we accept this objection, because technical terms regarding something being a generic attribute or characteristics other than that (Upadhi) are unsupported by any means of knowledge, and as such are unauthorized. Perceptions such as, ‘This jar’, are a proof of the existence of the attribute ‘jarhood’, for instance, but not of its being a generic attribute as well for since the thing to be established, viz, generic attribute, is something fictitious, the inference that establishes it also has no room. Moreover, since inherence is unfounded, and the whole universe, which is other than Brahman, is transitory, the definition of a generic attribute, which is based on its being eternal and inherent in many things, cannot apply to jarhood etc. Exactly in a similar way, the fact of being a characteristic other than a generic attribute may also be refuted.
Previously Dharmaraja refuted anuvyavasaya and alaukikam pratyaksham. Now Dharmaraja refutes another theory, Jati. Nyaya system accepts generic attribute called Jati. Jati is eternal and is inherent in many things. For example, Jarhood is the generic attribute as it is present in all the jars. It is eternal because this generic attribute of jarhood is present even if there is no jar. Inherence is an eternal relation in Nyaya system which relates generic to specific.
There are certain cases for which generic attribute is not accepted, they are
Unity of the substratum – etherhood is not accepted as generic attribute because, the substratum ether is only one, there are no two ethers.
Equality of extension – if the two attributes correspond to the same substance then both are not considered as generic attribute. Example jarhood and some other attribute of jar, both cannot be considered as generic attribute.
Cross-division – two attributes are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. For example, materiality and limitedness are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. Materiality is present in Earth, water, fire, air and ether but not present in mind. Limitedness is present in Earth, water, fire, air and mind, but not in ether. Hence there cannot be any Jati in these two.
Infinite Regression: If we assume that ghatvam or jarhood has another generic attribute ghatvatvam, then there will not be any end. Thus generic attribute of generic attribute is not accepted.
In the previous example Dharmaraja said that knowledge of Sandal wood is immediate and fragrance of the sandal is mediate. Now, since there is both mediacy and immediacy in the same knowledge they will not be Jati as there is cross-division. Mediacy and immediacy are exclusive to each other and hence it cannot lead to the generic attribute because of cross-division. This is the objection raised by the Nyaya system.
Dharmaraja welcomes such an objection and refutes Jati. According to Nyaya system, in case of Jar, ghatatvam or Jarhood is the Jati and it is eternally inherent in the Jar. When we perceive a jar, we don’t perceive the jar directly, we only perceive the jarhood and we relate the jarhood with the jar cognitively and infer that “This is Jar”. But Vedanta doesn’t accept Jati at all. In case of Jar, Jarhood is not a Jati but only an Upadhi or attribute which distinguishes it from some other substance. This cannot be considered as generic attribute because there cannot be any proof of Jarhood being a Jati. Jati or generic attribute can never be proved by any means of knowledge and hence such a concept is only a fictitious concept. Also according to Vedanta, Brahman alone is eternal there is nothing else other than Brahman which is eternal. Thus Dharmaraja proved that there is no room of having a Jati at all and the inference that we get by relating to the substance which is related through Inherence is also not possible at all.
In sentence like, “The hill has fire”, since the mental states are admitted to be different in respect of the hill and the fire, their distinguishing characteristic also are different, and hence there is no contradiction in mediacy and immediacy being together in the same Consciousness. So knowledge that is limited by mental states in the form of particular objects, is a perception in respect of such knowledge, when it is no different from the Consciousness limited by objects that are present and are capable of being apprehended by particular organs.
In this para, Dharmaraja concludes the analysis of knowledge being perceptual knowledge. In the case of fire in the hill example, the knowledge of hill is got by the conjunction of eye with the hill. Thus the Consciousness limited by the hill and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti formed in the mind are one and the same. Therefore, the knowledge of the hill is the perceptual knowledge. The fire in the hill is not seen but only inferred through the perception of smoke in the hill. Therefore, the Consciousness limited the fire is different from the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the fire as there is no sense conjunction. Therefore, the knowledge of fire is not a perceptual knowledge.
Thus the following are the conditions for knowledge to be perception:
Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence Consciousness limited by object is same as Consciousness limited by the Vritti in the present.
Object of perception should have the capability of being perceived.
We will see Dharmaraja’s analysis on the object being perceptual the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 6
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for the long break in the learning Vedanta Paribhasha.
Therefore knowledge such as, “The hill has fire”, is also mediate so far as the fire is concerned, and immediate in respect of the hill; for the Consciousness limited by the hill etc. is not different from that limited by the state of the mind that has gone out, but in respect of the fire, since the mind doesn’t go out to form a state, the Consciousness limited by the fire and the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge are different from each other. Thus the experience takes the form, “I see the hill”, and “I infer the fire”. But in the system of logic the apperception would be of the form “I infer the hill”.
When we see an object the mind through the openings of the sense organs goes out towards the object and takes the form of the object. This modification of the mind is called Vritti. For the perceptual knowledge, the anthah karana Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence the Consciousness limited by both anthah karana Vritti and Consciousness limited by the object are one and the same. The Vritti and the object should not only occupy the same space but also same time and not only that, the object should have the capability to be perceived.
Thus the conditions are
Anthah Karana Vritti and the object should occupy same space and same time.
The object should have the capability to be perceived.
After giving the conditions for the knowledge to be perceptual knowledge, he then through an example differentiates perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge. When we see smoke in the hill, we infer that the hill has fire. The hill is perceived clearly and fire not seen at all. The anthah karana Vritti of the hill and the hill occupy the same space in the present and hence the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the hill and the hill are the same and hence we get the perceptual knowledge that “I see the hill”. On the other hand, the mental modification in the form of fire and the fire doesn’t occupy the same space because there is no sense contact at all. The mental modification is through the inferential knowledge that there should be fire in the hill as there is smoke. Thus we have the knowledge “I see the Hill” and “I infer the fire”.
According to Nyaya system, when we see a jar, we don’t get the knowledge immediately that “This is jar”. First when the eye contacts the jar, only the quality of being Jar or the jarhood is perceived. This knowledge is called Vyavasaya (Primary knowledge). From this primary knowledge comes the knowledge that “I know the Jar” by relating this Jarhood to the Jar cognitively. This reflective knowledge is called Anuvyavasaya. Thus we see the jarhood and infer that it is a jar. In the same way when the hill is seen, according to Nyaya System, through Anuvyavasaya we get the knowledge that “I infer the Hill”.
Nyaya system accepts two cognitions first the knowledge about the quality of the object and then the knowledge about the object by relating cognitively the quality with the object. Vedanta doesn’t accept two cognitions in perception. When we see an object knowledge about the object is got directly. The problem with anuvyavasaya of Nyaya system is that, for the first cognition to give knowledge we require second cognition, also the second cognition may require a third cognition for the knowledge and so on thus going to Infinite regression. The perceiver will be standing staring at the object with infinite thoughts running in the mind to know finally that “This is such and such object”JJ.
In an inferential knowledge, however, in which the subject is not in contact with the organ, the knowledge is wholly mediate. Knowledge such as, “A fragrant piece of sandal”, is also immediate in respect of the piece of sandal, and mediate in respect of fragrance, because the latter being incapable of apprehension by the eye, the definition, mentioned before, based on capability of being perceived cannot apply here.
Here Dharmaraja criticizes another concept of Nyaya on the grounds of perception. According to Nyaya, there are two types of perception, Laukikam and Alaukikam.
Laukikam is of two kinds, External perception where the sense organs comes into contact with the object and the Internal perception where mind comes into contact with the modification of the mind in the form of external cognition, happiness, pain etc.
Alaukikam is of 3 kinds.
Samanyalakshana (Knowledge based on a common feature) – Whenever we see a jar, through the conjunction of the eye with the jar the jarhood is only seen first and then from that comes the knowledge of the jar.
Jnanalakshana (knowledge based on previous knowledge) – When we see an object say a rose, we say that “I see a fragrant rose”. Though the expression should have been “I see a rose”, still since through earlier experience of fragrant smell of rose we say that “I see a fragrant rose”.
Yogaja – Perceptual knowledge of seeing the past, future etc through Yogic power.
Now here in the example given by Dharmaraja, we are seeing a Sandal wood. According to Nyaya System, the perceptual knowledge would be “I see a fragrant sandal wood” as through sense contact sandal wood is known and through the past experience the fragrance of sandal wood is known. Thus even the fragrance also becomes part of the perception. But according to Vedanta, sandal wood alone is perception as it is in contact with the eyes. The knowledge of fragrance is not a perceptual knowledge because fragrance doesn’t have the capability of being perceived through eyes.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for the long break in the learning Vedanta Paribhasha.
Therefore knowledge such as, “The hill has fire”, is also mediate so far as the fire is concerned, and immediate in respect of the hill; for the Consciousness limited by the hill etc. is not different from that limited by the state of the mind that has gone out, but in respect of the fire, since the mind doesn’t go out to form a state, the Consciousness limited by the fire and the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge are different from each other. Thus the experience takes the form, “I see the hill”, and “I infer the fire”. But in the system of logic the apperception would be of the form “I infer the hill”.
When we see an object the mind through the openings of the sense organs goes out towards the object and takes the form of the object. This modification of the mind is called Vritti. For the perceptual knowledge, the anthah karana Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence the Consciousness limited by both anthah karana Vritti and Consciousness limited by the object are one and the same. The Vritti and the object should not only occupy the same space but also same time and not only that, the object should have the capability to be perceived.
Thus the conditions are
Anthah Karana Vritti and the object should occupy same space and same time.
The object should have the capability to be perceived.
After giving the conditions for the knowledge to be perceptual knowledge, he then through an example differentiates perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge. When we see smoke in the hill, we infer that the hill has fire. The hill is perceived clearly and fire not seen at all. The anthah karana Vritti of the hill and the hill occupy the same space in the present and hence the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the hill and the hill are the same and hence we get the perceptual knowledge that “I see the hill”. On the other hand, the mental modification in the form of fire and the fire doesn’t occupy the same space because there is no sense contact at all. The mental modification is through the inferential knowledge that there should be fire in the hill as there is smoke. Thus we have the knowledge “I see the Hill” and “I infer the fire”.
According to Nyaya system, when we see a jar, we don’t get the knowledge immediately that “This is jar”. First when the eye contacts the jar, only the quality of being Jar or the jarhood is perceived. This knowledge is called Vyavasaya (Primary knowledge). From this primary knowledge comes the knowledge that “I know the Jar” by relating this Jarhood to the Jar cognitively. This reflective knowledge is called Anuvyavasaya. Thus we see the jarhood and infer that it is a jar. In the same way when the hill is seen, according to Nyaya System, through Anuvyavasaya we get the knowledge that “I infer the Hill”.
Nyaya system accepts two cognitions first the knowledge about the quality of the object and then the knowledge about the object by relating cognitively the quality with the object. Vedanta doesn’t accept two cognitions in perception. When we see an object knowledge about the object is got directly. The problem with anuvyavasaya of Nyaya system is that, for the first cognition to give knowledge we require second cognition, also the second cognition may require a third cognition for the knowledge and so on thus going to Infinite regression. The perceiver will be standing staring at the object with infinite thoughts running in the mind to know finally that “This is such and such object”JJ.
In an inferential knowledge, however, in which the subject is not in contact with the organ, the knowledge is wholly mediate. Knowledge such as, “A fragrant piece of sandal”, is also immediate in respect of the piece of sandal, and mediate in respect of fragrance, because the latter being incapable of apprehension by the eye, the definition, mentioned before, based on capability of being perceived cannot apply here.
Here Dharmaraja criticizes another concept of Nyaya on the grounds of perception. According to Nyaya, there are two types of perception, Laukikam and Alaukikam.
Laukikam is of two kinds, External perception where the sense organs comes into contact with the object and the Internal perception where mind comes into contact with the modification of the mind in the form of external cognition, happiness, pain etc.
Alaukikam is of 3 kinds.
Samanyalakshana (Knowledge based on a common feature) – Whenever we see a jar, through the conjunction of the eye with the jar the jarhood is only seen first and then from that comes the knowledge of the jar.
Jnanalakshana (knowledge based on previous knowledge) – When we see an object say a rose, we say that “I see a fragrant rose”. Though the expression should have been “I see a rose”, still since through earlier experience of fragrant smell of rose we say that “I see a fragrant rose”.
Yogaja – Perceptual knowledge of seeing the past, future etc through Yogic power.
Now here in the example given by Dharmaraja, we are seeing a Sandal wood. According to Nyaya System, the perceptual knowledge would be “I see a fragrant sandal wood” as through sense contact sandal wood is known and through the past experience the fragrance of sandal wood is known. Thus even the fragrance also becomes part of the perception. But according to Vedanta, sandal wood alone is perception as it is in contact with the eyes. The knowledge of fragrance is not a perceptual knowledge because fragrance doesn’t have the capability of being perceived through eyes.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Vedanta Paribhasha – Pratyaksham - 5
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Objection: In that case the recollection of the happiness etc. abiding in oneself would be a perception in respect of the happiness etc.
Reply: No, for there the happiness that is being recollected being a past event, and the mental state in the form of recollection being a present event, the two limiting adjuncts in the mind belong to different times, and hence the two Consciousnesses limited by them are different; for the criterion of the unity of the substratum having the limiting adjuncts is that the two limiting adjuncts must occupy the same space at the same time. If, however, the criterion of that unity be occupation of the same space alone, then in order to prevent from unduly extending to a recollection such as, “I was happy before” the object must be qualified by the idea of presence.
In the case of perceptual knowledge, we have 3 entities,
pramata, the subject
Prameya, the object
Pramana, the mind which stretches out to the object.
When a person sees a pot in front of him, the mind goes out through the openings of the eyes and takes the form of the pot. This modification of mind in the form of pot is known as Vritti. The consciousness qualified by the Vritti is same as the consciousness qualified by the object because the space occupied the Vritti and object is one and the same. Thus, the person gets the knowledge that “This is pot”. Thus, the first criterion for the knowledge to be perceptual is that the object and the Vritti formed in antah karanam should occupy the same space. After explaining about the perception of external objects, he also told that the knowledge that “I am happy” is also a perceptual knowledge as the internal object happiness and the modification in the form of happiness occupy the same space.
Now Dharmaraja raises a question. If the knowledge “I am happy” is a perceptual knowledge on account of happiness and vritti occupying the same space, then the knowledge that “I was happy” should also a perception as in this case also the object and the vritti may occupy the same space. He dismisses this question by saying that the object of recollection of happiness and its Vritti belong to different time. The experience of happiness is in past and the recollection is in present. Since both the object and the Vritti belong to different time, the Consciousness qualified by them is different. Thus he brings forth the second criterion for perceptual knowledge that along with the same space which the object and the vritti occupy, they should also be present at the same time. Dharmaraja at the very beginning itself differentiated between the valid knowledge and the remembrance. In this context, the happiness is an experience in the past and that experience is remembered in the present and hence is not a valid knowledge. The reason for this not being a valid perceptual knowledge is that they both belong to different time. Finally, he finishes the explanation of this criterion by saying that if we are to consider only same space criterion, then the object should be in present.
Objection: Even then, when the present righteousness and unrighteousness relating to one are known through verbal testimony and so forth, the definition unduly extends to such verbal comprehension etc because there the Consciousness limited by righteousness and unrighteousness and the Consciousness limited by the mental state in the form of those are one.
Reply: No, for capability of perception also must form a qualifying attribute of the object. That in spite of their being equally attributes of the mind, some are capable of being perceived while others are not, can be explained only by a reference to the inherent of things, which we want assume on the basis of the actual result. Otherwise, even in the Nyaya system, righteousness and unrighteousness would inevitably be matter of perception like happiness etc, because they are equally attributes of the Self.
Now Dharmaraja raises a question. Dharma and adharma can be known only through Verbal Testimony. When somebody says that “You are righteous”, such verbal testimony at the present gets extended to be perception also because the consciousness limited by dharma or adharma and the consciousness limited by the Vritti of dharma or adharma will be same. Thus there is overpervasion of extending into perception. To this he answers that, for an object to be perceptible, the object should have the capability of being perceived. If an object doesn’t have the capability then there cannot be any perceptual knowledge at all. Here ones own dharma or adharma doesn’t have the capability to be perceived and hence there is no over pervasion.
Also he says that such a question cannot be put forth by Nayayikas because, for them dharma and adharma are the qualities of the Self. Nyaya system talks about 24 qualities dharma, adharma, sukha, dukha are few among the 24 qualities. Therefore even according to Nyaya system, dharma and adharma cannot be perceived as then it would lead us to say that Sukha and dukha are also perception as they are also qualities like dharma and adharma. But according to Nyaya system, Sukha and Dukha can be known through Inference only.
Thus, the third criterion for knowledge to be perceptual is Capability of object to be perceived.
It cannot be urged that even then, while happiness is present, the knowledge arising from sentences such as “You are happy”, would be a perception; for we accept this view, inasmuch as in sentence like, “you are the tenth man”, which refer to objects that are in contact (with the organ), we admit immediate or perceptual knowledge even from verbal testimony.
Dharmaraja anticipates a question that if somebody says when there is happiness in the present “You are happy”, whether the knowledge out of that verbal testimony is perception or not. He says that it is perception knowledge the object which is happiness is present and when the anthah karanam senses this object, the person gets the clear knowledge that “I am happy”. ‘Happiness’ is an internal object, when it is present the Consciousness qualified by happiness and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of happiness is one and the same and hence the knowledge that “I am happy” is perceptual knowledge. Dharmaraja quotes an example for the same, the 10 fool example which is a very familiar example for everyone. When the passer-by told the person who counted others “You are the tenth man”, he gets the clear knowledge that “I am the tenth man”.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Objection: In that case the recollection of the happiness etc. abiding in oneself would be a perception in respect of the happiness etc.
Reply: No, for there the happiness that is being recollected being a past event, and the mental state in the form of recollection being a present event, the two limiting adjuncts in the mind belong to different times, and hence the two Consciousnesses limited by them are different; for the criterion of the unity of the substratum having the limiting adjuncts is that the two limiting adjuncts must occupy the same space at the same time. If, however, the criterion of that unity be occupation of the same space alone, then in order to prevent from unduly extending to a recollection such as, “I was happy before” the object must be qualified by the idea of presence.
In the case of perceptual knowledge, we have 3 entities,
pramata, the subject
Prameya, the object
Pramana, the mind which stretches out to the object.
When a person sees a pot in front of him, the mind goes out through the openings of the eyes and takes the form of the pot. This modification of mind in the form of pot is known as Vritti. The consciousness qualified by the Vritti is same as the consciousness qualified by the object because the space occupied the Vritti and object is one and the same. Thus, the person gets the knowledge that “This is pot”. Thus, the first criterion for the knowledge to be perceptual is that the object and the Vritti formed in antah karanam should occupy the same space. After explaining about the perception of external objects, he also told that the knowledge that “I am happy” is also a perceptual knowledge as the internal object happiness and the modification in the form of happiness occupy the same space.
Now Dharmaraja raises a question. If the knowledge “I am happy” is a perceptual knowledge on account of happiness and vritti occupying the same space, then the knowledge that “I was happy” should also a perception as in this case also the object and the vritti may occupy the same space. He dismisses this question by saying that the object of recollection of happiness and its Vritti belong to different time. The experience of happiness is in past and the recollection is in present. Since both the object and the Vritti belong to different time, the Consciousness qualified by them is different. Thus he brings forth the second criterion for perceptual knowledge that along with the same space which the object and the vritti occupy, they should also be present at the same time. Dharmaraja at the very beginning itself differentiated between the valid knowledge and the remembrance. In this context, the happiness is an experience in the past and that experience is remembered in the present and hence is not a valid knowledge. The reason for this not being a valid perceptual knowledge is that they both belong to different time. Finally, he finishes the explanation of this criterion by saying that if we are to consider only same space criterion, then the object should be in present.
Objection: Even then, when the present righteousness and unrighteousness relating to one are known through verbal testimony and so forth, the definition unduly extends to such verbal comprehension etc because there the Consciousness limited by righteousness and unrighteousness and the Consciousness limited by the mental state in the form of those are one.
Reply: No, for capability of perception also must form a qualifying attribute of the object. That in spite of their being equally attributes of the mind, some are capable of being perceived while others are not, can be explained only by a reference to the inherent of things, which we want assume on the basis of the actual result. Otherwise, even in the Nyaya system, righteousness and unrighteousness would inevitably be matter of perception like happiness etc, because they are equally attributes of the Self.
Now Dharmaraja raises a question. Dharma and adharma can be known only through Verbal Testimony. When somebody says that “You are righteous”, such verbal testimony at the present gets extended to be perception also because the consciousness limited by dharma or adharma and the consciousness limited by the Vritti of dharma or adharma will be same. Thus there is overpervasion of extending into perception. To this he answers that, for an object to be perceptible, the object should have the capability of being perceived. If an object doesn’t have the capability then there cannot be any perceptual knowledge at all. Here ones own dharma or adharma doesn’t have the capability to be perceived and hence there is no over pervasion.
Also he says that such a question cannot be put forth by Nayayikas because, for them dharma and adharma are the qualities of the Self. Nyaya system talks about 24 qualities dharma, adharma, sukha, dukha are few among the 24 qualities. Therefore even according to Nyaya system, dharma and adharma cannot be perceived as then it would lead us to say that Sukha and dukha are also perception as they are also qualities like dharma and adharma. But according to Nyaya system, Sukha and Dukha can be known through Inference only.
Thus, the third criterion for knowledge to be perceptual is Capability of object to be perceived.
It cannot be urged that even then, while happiness is present, the knowledge arising from sentences such as “You are happy”, would be a perception; for we accept this view, inasmuch as in sentence like, “you are the tenth man”, which refer to objects that are in contact (with the organ), we admit immediate or perceptual knowledge even from verbal testimony.
Dharmaraja anticipates a question that if somebody says when there is happiness in the present “You are happy”, whether the knowledge out of that verbal testimony is perception or not. He says that it is perception knowledge the object which is happiness is present and when the anthah karanam senses this object, the person gets the clear knowledge that “I am happy”. ‘Happiness’ is an internal object, when it is present the Consciousness qualified by happiness and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of happiness is one and the same and hence the knowledge that “I am happy” is perceptual knowledge. Dharmaraja quotes an example for the same, the 10 fool example which is a very familiar example for everyone. When the passer-by told the person who counted others “You are the tenth man”, he gets the clear knowledge that “I am the tenth man”.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Monday, July 30, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 4
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Thathra yathaa thataakodhakam chidhrannirgathya kulyaathmanaa kedhaaraan pravishya thath vath eva chathushkonaadhi aakaaram bhavathi thathaa thaijasam anthah karanamapi chakshuraadhidvaaraa nirgathya ghataadhivishayadesham gatva ghataadhi vishaya akarena parinamathe sa eva parinaamo vrittih ithi uchyatheanumithyaadhisThale thu na anthah karanasya vahnyaadhi deshagamanam, vahnyaadheh chakshuraadhi asannikarshaath thaTha cha ‘ayam gatah’ ithyaadhi pratyakshasthale ghatadheh thath aakaara vritteshcha bahirekathra deshe samavadhaanaath thath ubhaya avachinnam chaitanyam ekameva; vbhaajakayorapi anthahkarana vritti ghataadhi vishayayor ekadeshasthatvena bhedha ajanakatvaath atha eva maTaantharvarthi ghata avachinnam aakaasho na mataa avachinna akashaadh bhidhyathe thaThaa cha ‘ayam ghatah’ ithi pratyakshasthale ghata akaara vritti ghata samyogithaya ghata avachinna chaithanyasya thath vritti avachinna chaitanyasya cha abhinnathayaa, thathra ghatajnaanasya ghata aakaaramshe pratyakshatvam sukhaadhi avachinna chaithanyasya thath vritti avachinna chaitanyasya cha niyamena ekadeshasthitha upaadhi avachinnatvaath niyamena “aham sukhee” ithiyaadhijnaanasya pratyakshatvam
Here, just as the water of a tank, going out through a hole and entering fields through channels, comes to have, even like those [fields], a quandrangular or other figure, similarly, the internal organ too, which is of the nature of light, going out through the sense of sight, etc. and reaching the locality of contents of pot, is transformed into the form of contents like pot. This same modification is called a psychosis (vritti). In the case, however, of inferential cognition, etc. there is no going out of the internal organ to the locality of [inferred] fire, etc., since the fire, etc. are not in contact with the sense of light, etc. And thus, in the case of perceptions like ‘This is a pot’, since for pot, etc. and the psychoses with those forms, there is existence in the same locality outside, the consciousness defined by both is but single; for, the psychosis of the internal organ and the content like pot, though capable of differentiating, do not generate difference [here] because of being present in the same locality. It is for the same reason that ether defined by a pot within a hall is not different from the hall-defined ether. And thus, in the case of perception, ‘This is pot’, the psychosis with the form of pot being in conjunction with pot, and hence pot-defined consciousness being non-different from consciousness defined by that [pot -] psychosis, there is for the pot-cognition perceptual character in regard to the aspect of the form of the pot. Again, since the Consciousness limited by the happiness etc. and the Consciousness limited by the mental state relating to them are invariably limited by the two limiting adjuncts that occupy the same space, the knowledge “I am happy”, is invariably a perception.
Dharmaraja raised a question that whether mind is a sense organ or not. As an answer to this question, he said that mind is not an organ and also dismissed the possible notion that direct perception depends on the sense organ. Then, another question is asked, what are actual criteria for perception? As an answer to this question, the author gives the criteria of perception from two stand point. One from the perceptual knowledge stand point and other is object of perception stand point. He starts his explanation on the first stand-point that is of perceptual knowledge stand point. He then defined three terms. Vishaya chaitanyam – Consciousness limited by the object, Pramana Chaitanyam – Consciousness limited by the vritti in internal organ and Pramatr Chaitanyam – Consciousness limited by Antah karanam which corresponds to the subject who is perceiving an object.
The author then explains on what is vritti. He explains this through a example. The water which is flowing through a channel, flows into the field through an opening and takes the shape of the field. If the field is rectangular, it takes rectangular shape and so on. In the same way, mind goes out through the openings of sense organs and takes the shape of the object. Mind is the one which illumines all the objects and also enlives the sense organs. The water is comparable to the mind, the opening into the field is comparable to the sense organ and the field is comparable to the object with respect to the example he quoted. When we see a pot, mind goes out through the openings of eyes and takes the form of the pot. This modification of mind in the form of pot is known as Vritti. So whatever object we see, the mind goes out through the eyes and takes the form of the object which is known as vritti.
Whenever we see the object through the eyes, the anthah karana vritti is formed taking the form of the object. When we see a smoke in a mountain, we infer that there is fire in the mountain. The eyes see only the smoke that is coming from the mountain and not the fire. Thus, smoke alone is perception as there is association of sense organs with the smoke and hence only for smoke the anthah karana vritti is formed taking the form of smoke. Thus, fire doesn’t come under the perceptual knowledge. In the case of the perception, “This is pot”, we have pot and we have vritti of the pot. But the consciousness qualified by both pot and vritti are one and the same. This is because the pot and the vritti of the pot occupy the same space outside the body. The consciousness limited by the vritti of the pot is not different from the consciousness limited by the pot both the vritti and the pot occupies the same space. Though it may seem that there are factors that can produce a difference between the pot and the vritti, still since they both occupy the same space, they both are same only. To make this clear, he uses an example to explain. The space inside a jar is not different from the space of the hall in which it is present though there seems to be a limiting adjunct in the form of the jar. In the same way, the Consciousness limited by the pot is not different from the Consciousness limited the vritti of the pot. From this vritti of the perceiver gets the knowledge that “This is pot”.
So, the first criterion for perceptual knowledge is, the object and the vritti of the object should occupy the same space. In the case of fire in the mountain example, the smoke coming from the mountain can be perceived through the eyes and there is vritti taking the form of smoke. Thus, we get the perceptual knowledge with respect to the smoke. In the case of fire, which is knowledge out of inference, eyes don’t perceive the fire and hence the object and the vritti of fire occupy different space and hence there is no perception.
After explaining about the perception of external objects like jar, he explains about the internal objects like happiness, sorrow etc. In the case of happiness, the Consciousness limited by happiness and the consciousness limited by the vritti of happiness occupy the same space. Thus, the knowledge that “I am happy” is perceptual knowledge only.
Dharmaraja gives few more criteria for knowledge to be perceptual, which we can in the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Thathra yathaa thataakodhakam chidhrannirgathya kulyaathmanaa kedhaaraan pravishya thath vath eva chathushkonaadhi aakaaram bhavathi thathaa thaijasam anthah karanamapi chakshuraadhidvaaraa nirgathya ghataadhivishayadesham gatva ghataadhi vishaya akarena parinamathe sa eva parinaamo vrittih ithi uchyatheanumithyaadhisThale thu na anthah karanasya vahnyaadhi deshagamanam, vahnyaadheh chakshuraadhi asannikarshaath thaTha cha ‘ayam gatah’ ithyaadhi pratyakshasthale ghatadheh thath aakaara vritteshcha bahirekathra deshe samavadhaanaath thath ubhaya avachinnam chaitanyam ekameva; vbhaajakayorapi anthahkarana vritti ghataadhi vishayayor ekadeshasthatvena bhedha ajanakatvaath atha eva maTaantharvarthi ghata avachinnam aakaasho na mataa avachinna akashaadh bhidhyathe thaThaa cha ‘ayam ghatah’ ithi pratyakshasthale ghata akaara vritti ghata samyogithaya ghata avachinna chaithanyasya thath vritti avachinna chaitanyasya cha abhinnathayaa, thathra ghatajnaanasya ghata aakaaramshe pratyakshatvam sukhaadhi avachinna chaithanyasya thath vritti avachinna chaitanyasya cha niyamena ekadeshasthitha upaadhi avachinnatvaath niyamena “aham sukhee” ithiyaadhijnaanasya pratyakshatvam
Here, just as the water of a tank, going out through a hole and entering fields through channels, comes to have, even like those [fields], a quandrangular or other figure, similarly, the internal organ too, which is of the nature of light, going out through the sense of sight, etc. and reaching the locality of contents of pot, is transformed into the form of contents like pot. This same modification is called a psychosis (vritti). In the case, however, of inferential cognition, etc. there is no going out of the internal organ to the locality of [inferred] fire, etc., since the fire, etc. are not in contact with the sense of light, etc. And thus, in the case of perceptions like ‘This is a pot’, since for pot, etc. and the psychoses with those forms, there is existence in the same locality outside, the consciousness defined by both is but single; for, the psychosis of the internal organ and the content like pot, though capable of differentiating, do not generate difference [here] because of being present in the same locality. It is for the same reason that ether defined by a pot within a hall is not different from the hall-defined ether. And thus, in the case of perception, ‘This is pot’, the psychosis with the form of pot being in conjunction with pot, and hence pot-defined consciousness being non-different from consciousness defined by that [pot -] psychosis, there is for the pot-cognition perceptual character in regard to the aspect of the form of the pot. Again, since the Consciousness limited by the happiness etc. and the Consciousness limited by the mental state relating to them are invariably limited by the two limiting adjuncts that occupy the same space, the knowledge “I am happy”, is invariably a perception.
Dharmaraja raised a question that whether mind is a sense organ or not. As an answer to this question, he said that mind is not an organ and also dismissed the possible notion that direct perception depends on the sense organ. Then, another question is asked, what are actual criteria for perception? As an answer to this question, the author gives the criteria of perception from two stand point. One from the perceptual knowledge stand point and other is object of perception stand point. He starts his explanation on the first stand-point that is of perceptual knowledge stand point. He then defined three terms. Vishaya chaitanyam – Consciousness limited by the object, Pramana Chaitanyam – Consciousness limited by the vritti in internal organ and Pramatr Chaitanyam – Consciousness limited by Antah karanam which corresponds to the subject who is perceiving an object.
The author then explains on what is vritti. He explains this through a example. The water which is flowing through a channel, flows into the field through an opening and takes the shape of the field. If the field is rectangular, it takes rectangular shape and so on. In the same way, mind goes out through the openings of sense organs and takes the shape of the object. Mind is the one which illumines all the objects and also enlives the sense organs. The water is comparable to the mind, the opening into the field is comparable to the sense organ and the field is comparable to the object with respect to the example he quoted. When we see a pot, mind goes out through the openings of eyes and takes the form of the pot. This modification of mind in the form of pot is known as Vritti. So whatever object we see, the mind goes out through the eyes and takes the form of the object which is known as vritti.
Whenever we see the object through the eyes, the anthah karana vritti is formed taking the form of the object. When we see a smoke in a mountain, we infer that there is fire in the mountain. The eyes see only the smoke that is coming from the mountain and not the fire. Thus, smoke alone is perception as there is association of sense organs with the smoke and hence only for smoke the anthah karana vritti is formed taking the form of smoke. Thus, fire doesn’t come under the perceptual knowledge. In the case of the perception, “This is pot”, we have pot and we have vritti of the pot. But the consciousness qualified by both pot and vritti are one and the same. This is because the pot and the vritti of the pot occupy the same space outside the body. The consciousness limited by the vritti of the pot is not different from the consciousness limited by the pot both the vritti and the pot occupies the same space. Though it may seem that there are factors that can produce a difference between the pot and the vritti, still since they both occupy the same space, they both are same only. To make this clear, he uses an example to explain. The space inside a jar is not different from the space of the hall in which it is present though there seems to be a limiting adjunct in the form of the jar. In the same way, the Consciousness limited by the pot is not different from the Consciousness limited the vritti of the pot. From this vritti of the perceiver gets the knowledge that “This is pot”.
So, the first criterion for perceptual knowledge is, the object and the vritti of the object should occupy the same space. In the case of fire in the mountain example, the smoke coming from the mountain can be perceived through the eyes and there is vritti taking the form of smoke. Thus, we get the perceptual knowledge with respect to the smoke. In the case of fire, which is knowledge out of inference, eyes don’t perceive the fire and hence the object and the vritti of fire occupy different space and hence there is no perception.
After explaining about the perception of external objects like jar, he explains about the internal objects like happiness, sorrow etc. In the case of happiness, the Consciousness limited by happiness and the consciousness limited by the vritti of happiness occupy the same space. Thus, the knowledge that “I am happy” is perceptual knowledge only.
Dharmaraja gives few more criteria for knowledge to be perceptual, which we can in the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Sunday, July 8, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 3
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Na chaivam manasah anindriyatvath sukhaadhipratyakshasya
Saakshaatvam na syaath indriya ajanyathvaadhithi vaachyam
Nahi indriyajanyatvena jnaanasya saakshaatvam
Anumithyaadherapi manojanyathayaa saakshaatva aptheh
Isvara jnaanasya anindriya janyasya saakshaatvaana apatheshcha
It cannot be urged that if the mind thus be not an organ,. The perception of happiness etc, will not be immediate; because the immediacy of knowledge does not lie in its being due to an organ; for in that case inference etc. also, being due to the mind, would be immediate, and God’s knowledge, which is not due to any organ, would not be immediate.
There was an objection raised as to whether mind is also an organ or not. Dharmaraja told that there is no proof to show that mind is a sense organ, and quoted a Srutti to show that mind is different from the sense organ. When we perceive a pot through our eyes, we get the direct knowledge that there is pot. Suppose we are seeing a smoke in a mountain. We can infer that there is fire in the mountain. The knowledge that there is fire in the mountain is not produced by direct perception and hence this knowledge is not a direct knowledge but an indirect knowledge only. This inference comes up only in the mind and if we consider mind as a sense organ, then the knowledge that there is fire in the mountain will become a direct knowledge, which is not correct. The author points out this fault if we consider mind as the sense organ.
Also for knowledge to be immediate, it doesn’t depend on being generated from sense organ. Isvara is omnipotent and omniscient as he is the creator the world. Therefore he is all-knowing as well and the knowledge is immediate. He doesn’t require any instrument to know anything in the world. Then since the knowledge of Isvara is not due to any organ, it would mean that Isvara’s knowledge is not immediate and cannot have perceptual knowledge which is a fault when we consider knowledge got from sense organs alone are immediate. Therefore, direct knowledge need not depend on being generated by sense organ. The knowledge like “I am Happy” etc. are not generated by sense organs, but still it is direct knowledge only.
Sidhaanthe pratyakshatva prayojakam kimithi cheth kim jnaanagathasya
Pratyakshatvasya prayojakam pruchchasi kimvaa vishayagathasya
Aadhye pramaana chaithanyasya vishaya avachinna chaitanyaabhedha ithi broomah
thaThaahi thrividham chaitanyam –
vishayachaitanyam pramaanachaitanyam pramaathruchaitanyam
chethi thathra Ghataadhi avachinnam chaitanyam vishaya chaithanyam
anthah karana vritti avachinnam chaitanyam pramaanachaithanyam
anthah karana avachinna chaitanyam pramaatruchaitanyam
What, then, is the criterion of perceptuality according to the tenets of Vedanta?
Reply: Do you inquire about the criterion of the perceptuality of knowledge or of object? If it be the former, we say it is the unity of the Consciousness reflected in the means of knowledge with the consciousness limited by the object. To be explicit: Consciousness is threefold – as associated with the object (vishaya), with the means of knowledge (pramaana) and with the subject or knower (pramaatr). Of these, Consciousness limited by the jar etc., is the consciousness associated with the object; that limited by the mental state is the Consciousness associated with the mean of knowledge; and that limited by the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject.
The author then anticipates a question. What is the criterion for the perceptuality? He then answers this question from two stand-point, from the stand point of the knowledge got out of perception and from the stand point of the object. When we say “This pot” the knowledge got is knowledge of perception and when we see from the object stand point, the pot is the object of perception. The criteria for knowledge to be perceptual and criteria for object to be perceptual are different. First he starts his analysis on criteria for knowledge to be perceptual. In this case of knowledge to be perceptual, the criterion is that the Consciousness limited by the means of knowledge and the Consciousness limited by the object is one and the same.
After giving the criterion for knowledge to be perceptual, he defines 3 terms.
Vishaya Chaitanyam: It is consciousness limited by the object.
Pramana Chaitanyam: It is the consciousness limited by the modification of the mind when an object is perceived.
Pramaatr Chaitamyam: It is the Consciousness limited by the anthah karanam which correspond to the experiencer, the subject.
The author then defines what is vritti or modification of the mind and from then continues his explanation by means of questions and answers on the first standpoint of knowledge to be perceptual. We will see that in the next day.
Prostrations to All
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Na chaivam manasah anindriyatvath sukhaadhipratyakshasya
Saakshaatvam na syaath indriya ajanyathvaadhithi vaachyam
Nahi indriyajanyatvena jnaanasya saakshaatvam
Anumithyaadherapi manojanyathayaa saakshaatva aptheh
Isvara jnaanasya anindriya janyasya saakshaatvaana apatheshcha
It cannot be urged that if the mind thus be not an organ,. The perception of happiness etc, will not be immediate; because the immediacy of knowledge does not lie in its being due to an organ; for in that case inference etc. also, being due to the mind, would be immediate, and God’s knowledge, which is not due to any organ, would not be immediate.
There was an objection raised as to whether mind is also an organ or not. Dharmaraja told that there is no proof to show that mind is a sense organ, and quoted a Srutti to show that mind is different from the sense organ. When we perceive a pot through our eyes, we get the direct knowledge that there is pot. Suppose we are seeing a smoke in a mountain. We can infer that there is fire in the mountain. The knowledge that there is fire in the mountain is not produced by direct perception and hence this knowledge is not a direct knowledge but an indirect knowledge only. This inference comes up only in the mind and if we consider mind as a sense organ, then the knowledge that there is fire in the mountain will become a direct knowledge, which is not correct. The author points out this fault if we consider mind as the sense organ.
Also for knowledge to be immediate, it doesn’t depend on being generated from sense organ. Isvara is omnipotent and omniscient as he is the creator the world. Therefore he is all-knowing as well and the knowledge is immediate. He doesn’t require any instrument to know anything in the world. Then since the knowledge of Isvara is not due to any organ, it would mean that Isvara’s knowledge is not immediate and cannot have perceptual knowledge which is a fault when we consider knowledge got from sense organs alone are immediate. Therefore, direct knowledge need not depend on being generated by sense organ. The knowledge like “I am Happy” etc. are not generated by sense organs, but still it is direct knowledge only.
Sidhaanthe pratyakshatva prayojakam kimithi cheth kim jnaanagathasya
Pratyakshatvasya prayojakam pruchchasi kimvaa vishayagathasya
Aadhye pramaana chaithanyasya vishaya avachinna chaitanyaabhedha ithi broomah
thaThaahi thrividham chaitanyam –
vishayachaitanyam pramaanachaitanyam pramaathruchaitanyam
chethi thathra Ghataadhi avachinnam chaitanyam vishaya chaithanyam
anthah karana vritti avachinnam chaitanyam pramaanachaithanyam
anthah karana avachinna chaitanyam pramaatruchaitanyam
What, then, is the criterion of perceptuality according to the tenets of Vedanta?
Reply: Do you inquire about the criterion of the perceptuality of knowledge or of object? If it be the former, we say it is the unity of the Consciousness reflected in the means of knowledge with the consciousness limited by the object. To be explicit: Consciousness is threefold – as associated with the object (vishaya), with the means of knowledge (pramaana) and with the subject or knower (pramaatr). Of these, Consciousness limited by the jar etc., is the consciousness associated with the object; that limited by the mental state is the Consciousness associated with the mean of knowledge; and that limited by the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject.
The author then anticipates a question. What is the criterion for the perceptuality? He then answers this question from two stand-point, from the stand point of the knowledge got out of perception and from the stand point of the object. When we say “This pot” the knowledge got is knowledge of perception and when we see from the object stand point, the pot is the object of perception. The criteria for knowledge to be perceptual and criteria for object to be perceptual are different. First he starts his analysis on criteria for knowledge to be perceptual. In this case of knowledge to be perceptual, the criterion is that the Consciousness limited by the means of knowledge and the Consciousness limited by the object is one and the same.
After giving the criterion for knowledge to be perceptual, he defines 3 terms.
Vishaya Chaitanyam: It is consciousness limited by the object.
Pramana Chaitanyam: It is the consciousness limited by the modification of the mind when an object is perceived.
Pramaatr Chaitamyam: It is the Consciousness limited by the anthah karanam which correspond to the experiencer, the subject.
The author then defines what is vritti or modification of the mind and from then continues his explanation by means of questions and answers on the first standpoint of knowledge to be perceptual. We will see that in the next day.
Prostrations to All
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Tuesday, June 26, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 2
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
Nanu niravayavasya anthahkaranasya parinaamaathmikaa vritti katham?
Iththam na thaavad anthahkaranam niravayavam, saadhidrvyathvena saavayavathvaath saadhithvam cha ‘thanmano asrujatha’ ithyaadhi sruttheh vritti roopa jnaanasya manodharmthve cha ‘kaamah sankalpo vichikithsaa shradha ashradha Dhrithi aDhrithi hrih Dheeh Bheeh ithyethath sarvam mana eva’ ithi sruttirmaanam Dhee shabdhena vritti roopajnaanaaBhiDhaanam atha eva kaamaadherapi manoDharmathvam
Now, in the case of the partless, internal organ, how can there be psychosis, which is of the nature of a modification?
It is thus: The internal organ is not partless, since, being a substance with beginning, it has parts. And its having a beginning is known from such srutti as, ‘That created the mind’ ( Br. , I.2.2). And, in respect of cognition with a psychosis nature of being a property (dharma) of the mind, the evidence is the sruti: ‘Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, firmness, lack of firmness, modesty, cognition, fear, all these are but the mind’ (Brh., I.5.3). By the word ‘cognition (Dheeh)’, there is denotation of cognition with a psychosis-nature. For the same reason, even for desire, etc. there is the nature of being property of the mind.
Previously the authored answered the objection on what is knowledge by introducing the term Vritti Vishishta Chaitanyam or Consciousness qualified by the modification of the mind. Now here the author answers another question. Is Antah karanam with parts or without parts? If anthah karanam doesn’t have parts then how can there be modification of mind or vritti in the mind? The author answers that mind do have parts. When we perceive an object, there is association of mind with the object. When there is association with something that which is associated should have parts. Since mind is associated with the object that we perceive, mind should have parts in the form of thoughts in the mind. Therefore it is clear that mind has parts. Dharmaraja gives the reason that since mind is a thing which has a beginning, it should have parts. He also quotes from Brihadaranyaka Upanishad to show that anthah karanam has beginning. He also quotes Srutti, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad again, to show that the knowledge or Vritti is an attribute of the anthah karanam. Thus all the knowledge in the anthah karanam which is in the form vritti vishishta chaitanyam belong to the anthah karanam only.
Nanu kaamaadheh anthah karanadharmathve ‘aham ichchaami, aham jaanaami, aham bhiBhemi’ ithyaadhi anubhava aatmaDharmathvam avagaahamaanah kaTham upapadhyathe?
Uchayathe ayah pindasya dhagDhrithvaabhaave api dhagDhrutvaashrya vahni thaadhaathmya adhyaasaath yaTha ‘ayo dhahathi’ ithi vyavahaarah, thaTha suKhaadhi akaara parinaamyanthahkaranaikya adhyaasaath ‘aham suKhee, aham dhuKee’ ithyaadhi vyavahaaro jaayathe
Now, if for desire, etc. there be the nature of being property of the internal organ, how could experience like “I desire, I cognize, I fear”, apprehending the nature of properties of the Self, be intelligible?
It is said: Just as, though in a piece of iron there is no capacity to burn, yet because of superimposition of identity with fire, the locus of capacity to burn, there is the empirical usage ‘iron burns’, even so such empirical usage as ‘I am happy, I am miserable’ is originated, because of the superimposition of identity [of the Self] with the internal organ that undergoes change in the form of [psychoses such as] pleasure etc.
Now comes another question. If every experience belong to the anthah karanam then when during various moments of experience we say that “I am happy”, “I am sad”, “I fear” etc. we don’t say that “mind is happy”, “mind is sad” so on. How is this possible or why is this so? It is very true that all the experiences belong to the mind only. Self is ever pure and always stays as a witness. A witness is never affected by what it is witnessing, in the same way Self which is the witness of every experience is never affected by any experience. But still we claim that “I am happy” etc. This is because of superimposition of these mental modifications on the Self. This superimposition is because of the ignorance of the Self, as acharya tells in drig drishya viveka that
“ahamkaarasya thadhaathmyam chichayaa dheha saakshibhih
Sahajam karmajam bhraanthijanyam cha trividhim kramaath”
“The identification of ego with the reflection of consciousness, body and the witness is of three kinds: natural, born of past actions and born of ignorance respectively”
In the above sloka, the acharya clearly tells the identification of ego with the witness is because of the ignorance of the Self.
Dharmaraja gives an example to show how this identification happens. When there is ball of iron which is burning we say that “The iron burns”. Iron doesn’t have the quality of burning only fire has, but still because of false identification we say that iron is burning in the same way Self is never affected by any experience but because of the false identification with the anthah karanam we say that “I am happy”, “I am sad” and so on.
There is a very similar sloka in drig drishya viveka again
“chaayaahmkaarayoraikyam thapthaayah pindavanmatham
Thadhahamkaarathaadhaathmyath dhehashchethanathaamagaath”
“It is considered that the identify of the reflection of consciousness and the ego is like that of red hot iron ball. That ego in turn due to identification enlivens the body
Nanu anthah karanasya indriyathaa atheendriyathvaath kaTham pratyaksha vishayathethi?
Uchyathe na thaavath ‘anthah karanam indriyam’ ithyathra maanamasthi
‘manah shashTaani indriyaani’ ithi Bhagavadgeetha vachanam pramaanam ithi cheth, na; anindriyenaapi manasaa shatthvasankhyaapooranaavirodhaath na hi indriyagathsankhyaa poornamindriyenaivethi niyamah “yajamaanapanchamaa idaam bhkshayanthi” ithyathra rithvigatha panchathvasankhyaayaa anruthvijaapi yajamaanena pooranadharshanaath; “vedanadhyaapayaamaasa mahabhaarathapanchamaan” ithyaadhou vedagathapanchathvasankhyaayaa avedhenaapi bhaarathena pooranadharshanaath; ‘indhriyebhayah: paraa hyarThaa arTheBhyashcha param manah’ ithi sruthyaa manasonindriyathva avagamaathcha
Now, since the internal organ, being a sense organ, is super-sensuous, how can it be the object of Pratyaksha?
It is said [in reply]: There is no evidence for this, that the internal organ is a sense-organ.
If it be said that the evidence is the statement of Bhagavad-Gita, ‘The sense organs with the mind as the sixth’(XV. 7), [we say] ‘no’, since there is no contradiction in the mind making up the number six, even though not [itself] a sense-organ. There is, indeed, no restrictive rule that the completion of a number connected with the sense-organs must be only by [another] sense-organ; for in ‘Those [four rtviks] having the yajamaana (performer of the sacrifice) as the fifth eat the idaa’, it is seen the number five connected with the rtviks is completed by the yajamaana, though [he is] not a rtvik; again in ‘He taught the Vedas together with the Mahabharata as the fifth’, etc. completion by the Bharata of the number five connected with the Vedas is seen, though [the former is] not a veda, further, because of such sruti as ‘Objects are superior to the sense organs, the mind is superior even to objects’ (Katha, III.10), its not being a sense-organ is deduced of the mind.
The next question raised by the author is whether anthah karanam is also a sense organ or not? When sense organ perceive an object, that perception is caught in the anthah karanam. If anthan karanam is also a sense organ, how can there be any perception as it is imperceptible? We cannot assume another anthah karanam also as another question will be raised as to whether that anthah karanam is a sense organ or not which will go into infinite regression. Thus how can there be perception when anthah karanam is a sense organ is the question raised here. Bhamati school considers mind as an organ whereas vivarana school doesn’t accept mind as a sense organ. Dharamaraja follows the Vivarana school now gives reason as to why mind cannot considered as sense organ.
He starts his refutation of this statement by saying that there is no proof in the srutti to show that anthah karanam is a sense organ.
We can see that in Gita 15th chapter 7th sloka, which says “manah sasthani indriyaani – the sense organs and the mind as sixth”. But we cannot take this as a proof because the mind is sixth is told only to complete the count. Author here gives two examples to explain this reason.
Ida is something to eat by the four rtviks (one rivik for one veda) and the yajama which counts to 5. When we say “the four rtviks along with yajamana as fifth had ida”, it may seem to mean that yajamana is the fifth rtvik. Yajamana is one who conducts the yagas or yagnas and he is not a priest. Therefore here yajamana is taken as fifth only to complete the counting but he is not one among the rtvik. Similarly, when we say “He taught Vedas along with Mahabharata as fifth”, it doesn’t mean Mahabharata is a fifth veda other than the four Vedas. Maharabharata is joined with the four Vedas just to complete the counting which makes it to five.
In the same way, though Krishna says in the 15th chapter sense organs along with the mind as the sixth, it doesn’t mean that mind is the sixth sense organ. It is so told just to complete the counting. He also quotes from Srutti to show that mind is not a sense organ, but something higher than the sense organ. He quotes from Katha Upanishad which tells that sense objects are higher than the sense organs and the mind is higher than the sense objects which clearly shows that mind is not a sense organ.
Now a question may come. For a perception to be immediate or aparoksham, there should be a sense organ association. If mind is not considered as sense organ, how can there be immediate perception. We will see the answer in the next day.
Prostrations to All
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
Nanu niravayavasya anthahkaranasya parinaamaathmikaa vritti katham?
Iththam na thaavad anthahkaranam niravayavam, saadhidrvyathvena saavayavathvaath saadhithvam cha ‘thanmano asrujatha’ ithyaadhi sruttheh vritti roopa jnaanasya manodharmthve cha ‘kaamah sankalpo vichikithsaa shradha ashradha Dhrithi aDhrithi hrih Dheeh Bheeh ithyethath sarvam mana eva’ ithi sruttirmaanam Dhee shabdhena vritti roopajnaanaaBhiDhaanam atha eva kaamaadherapi manoDharmathvam
Now, in the case of the partless, internal organ, how can there be psychosis, which is of the nature of a modification?
It is thus: The internal organ is not partless, since, being a substance with beginning, it has parts. And its having a beginning is known from such srutti as, ‘That created the mind’ ( Br. , I.2.2). And, in respect of cognition with a psychosis nature of being a property (dharma) of the mind, the evidence is the sruti: ‘Desire, resolve, doubt, faith, lack of faith, firmness, lack of firmness, modesty, cognition, fear, all these are but the mind’ (Brh., I.5.3). By the word ‘cognition (Dheeh)’, there is denotation of cognition with a psychosis-nature. For the same reason, even for desire, etc. there is the nature of being property of the mind.
Previously the authored answered the objection on what is knowledge by introducing the term Vritti Vishishta Chaitanyam or Consciousness qualified by the modification of the mind. Now here the author answers another question. Is Antah karanam with parts or without parts? If anthah karanam doesn’t have parts then how can there be modification of mind or vritti in the mind? The author answers that mind do have parts. When we perceive an object, there is association of mind with the object. When there is association with something that which is associated should have parts. Since mind is associated with the object that we perceive, mind should have parts in the form of thoughts in the mind. Therefore it is clear that mind has parts. Dharmaraja gives the reason that since mind is a thing which has a beginning, it should have parts. He also quotes from Brihadaranyaka Upanishad to show that anthah karanam has beginning. He also quotes Srutti, Brihadaranyaka Upanishad again, to show that the knowledge or Vritti is an attribute of the anthah karanam. Thus all the knowledge in the anthah karanam which is in the form vritti vishishta chaitanyam belong to the anthah karanam only.
Nanu kaamaadheh anthah karanadharmathve ‘aham ichchaami, aham jaanaami, aham bhiBhemi’ ithyaadhi anubhava aatmaDharmathvam avagaahamaanah kaTham upapadhyathe?
Uchayathe ayah pindasya dhagDhrithvaabhaave api dhagDhrutvaashrya vahni thaadhaathmya adhyaasaath yaTha ‘ayo dhahathi’ ithi vyavahaarah, thaTha suKhaadhi akaara parinaamyanthahkaranaikya adhyaasaath ‘aham suKhee, aham dhuKee’ ithyaadhi vyavahaaro jaayathe
Now, if for desire, etc. there be the nature of being property of the internal organ, how could experience like “I desire, I cognize, I fear”, apprehending the nature of properties of the Self, be intelligible?
It is said: Just as, though in a piece of iron there is no capacity to burn, yet because of superimposition of identity with fire, the locus of capacity to burn, there is the empirical usage ‘iron burns’, even so such empirical usage as ‘I am happy, I am miserable’ is originated, because of the superimposition of identity [of the Self] with the internal organ that undergoes change in the form of [psychoses such as] pleasure etc.
Now comes another question. If every experience belong to the anthah karanam then when during various moments of experience we say that “I am happy”, “I am sad”, “I fear” etc. we don’t say that “mind is happy”, “mind is sad” so on. How is this possible or why is this so? It is very true that all the experiences belong to the mind only. Self is ever pure and always stays as a witness. A witness is never affected by what it is witnessing, in the same way Self which is the witness of every experience is never affected by any experience. But still we claim that “I am happy” etc. This is because of superimposition of these mental modifications on the Self. This superimposition is because of the ignorance of the Self, as acharya tells in drig drishya viveka that
“ahamkaarasya thadhaathmyam chichayaa dheha saakshibhih
Sahajam karmajam bhraanthijanyam cha trividhim kramaath”
“The identification of ego with the reflection of consciousness, body and the witness is of three kinds: natural, born of past actions and born of ignorance respectively”
In the above sloka, the acharya clearly tells the identification of ego with the witness is because of the ignorance of the Self.
Dharmaraja gives an example to show how this identification happens. When there is ball of iron which is burning we say that “The iron burns”. Iron doesn’t have the quality of burning only fire has, but still because of false identification we say that iron is burning in the same way Self is never affected by any experience but because of the false identification with the anthah karanam we say that “I am happy”, “I am sad” and so on.
There is a very similar sloka in drig drishya viveka again
“chaayaahmkaarayoraikyam thapthaayah pindavanmatham
Thadhahamkaarathaadhaathmyath dhehashchethanathaamagaath”
“It is considered that the identify of the reflection of consciousness and the ego is like that of red hot iron ball. That ego in turn due to identification enlivens the body
Nanu anthah karanasya indriyathaa atheendriyathvaath kaTham pratyaksha vishayathethi?
Uchyathe na thaavath ‘anthah karanam indriyam’ ithyathra maanamasthi
‘manah shashTaani indriyaani’ ithi Bhagavadgeetha vachanam pramaanam ithi cheth, na; anindriyenaapi manasaa shatthvasankhyaapooranaavirodhaath na hi indriyagathsankhyaa poornamindriyenaivethi niyamah “yajamaanapanchamaa idaam bhkshayanthi” ithyathra rithvigatha panchathvasankhyaayaa anruthvijaapi yajamaanena pooranadharshanaath; “vedanadhyaapayaamaasa mahabhaarathapanchamaan” ithyaadhou vedagathapanchathvasankhyaayaa avedhenaapi bhaarathena pooranadharshanaath; ‘indhriyebhayah: paraa hyarThaa arTheBhyashcha param manah’ ithi sruthyaa manasonindriyathva avagamaathcha
Now, since the internal organ, being a sense organ, is super-sensuous, how can it be the object of Pratyaksha?
It is said [in reply]: There is no evidence for this, that the internal organ is a sense-organ.
If it be said that the evidence is the statement of Bhagavad-Gita, ‘The sense organs with the mind as the sixth’(XV. 7), [we say] ‘no’, since there is no contradiction in the mind making up the number six, even though not [itself] a sense-organ. There is, indeed, no restrictive rule that the completion of a number connected with the sense-organs must be only by [another] sense-organ; for in ‘Those [four rtviks] having the yajamaana (performer of the sacrifice) as the fifth eat the idaa’, it is seen the number five connected with the rtviks is completed by the yajamaana, though [he is] not a rtvik; again in ‘He taught the Vedas together with the Mahabharata as the fifth’, etc. completion by the Bharata of the number five connected with the Vedas is seen, though [the former is] not a veda, further, because of such sruti as ‘Objects are superior to the sense organs, the mind is superior even to objects’ (Katha, III.10), its not being a sense-organ is deduced of the mind.
The next question raised by the author is whether anthah karanam is also a sense organ or not? When sense organ perceive an object, that perception is caught in the anthah karanam. If anthan karanam is also a sense organ, how can there be any perception as it is imperceptible? We cannot assume another anthah karanam also as another question will be raised as to whether that anthah karanam is a sense organ or not which will go into infinite regression. Thus how can there be perception when anthah karanam is a sense organ is the question raised here. Bhamati school considers mind as an organ whereas vivarana school doesn’t accept mind as a sense organ. Dharamaraja follows the Vivarana school now gives reason as to why mind cannot considered as sense organ.
He starts his refutation of this statement by saying that there is no proof in the srutti to show that anthah karanam is a sense organ.
We can see that in Gita 15th chapter 7th sloka, which says “manah sasthani indriyaani – the sense organs and the mind as sixth”. But we cannot take this as a proof because the mind is sixth is told only to complete the count. Author here gives two examples to explain this reason.
Ida is something to eat by the four rtviks (one rivik for one veda) and the yajama which counts to 5. When we say “the four rtviks along with yajamana as fifth had ida”, it may seem to mean that yajamana is the fifth rtvik. Yajamana is one who conducts the yagas or yagnas and he is not a priest. Therefore here yajamana is taken as fifth only to complete the counting but he is not one among the rtvik. Similarly, when we say “He taught Vedas along with Mahabharata as fifth”, it doesn’t mean Mahabharata is a fifth veda other than the four Vedas. Maharabharata is joined with the four Vedas just to complete the counting which makes it to five.
In the same way, though Krishna says in the 15th chapter sense organs along with the mind as the sixth, it doesn’t mean that mind is the sixth sense organ. It is so told just to complete the counting. He also quotes from Srutti to show that mind is not a sense organ, but something higher than the sense organ. He quotes from Katha Upanishad which tells that sense objects are higher than the sense organs and the mind is higher than the sense objects which clearly shows that mind is not a sense organ.
Now a question may come. For a perception to be immediate or aparoksham, there should be a sense organ association. If mind is not considered as sense organ, how can there be immediate perception. We will see the answer in the next day.
Prostrations to All
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Monday, June 4, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 1
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
Thathra pratyakshapramaakaranam pratyaksha pramaanam pratyaksha pramaa thu athra chaitanyameva, “yad saakshaad aparokshaad” ithi srutheh ‘aparokshaath’ ithyasya aparoksham ithyarthah
Of these, that which is the distinctive cause (karana) of valid perceptual (pratyaksha) knowledge is the pratyaksha-pramaana. Here [in the definition], valid perception knowledge is but consciousness, because of the sruti, ‘That [Brahman] which is direct, immediate’ (Brh., III.4.1). Of the word aparokshaa, the meaning is aparoksham(immediate).
The first chapter of this work explains about the pratyaksha pramaanam. As we learned in the introduction, pramaa means valid knowledge and that which serves as the instrument to get this valid knowledge is called Pramaanam. Pratyaksha Pramaa means valid perceptual knowledge and Pratyaksha Pramaanam means that which serves as the instrument to get the Pratyaksha Pramaa or valid perceptual knowledge.
According to scriptures, there is only Brahman.
Mandukya says
“Sarvam hyethath brahma”
Everything is Brahman’
Brahman is of the nature of Sat-Chit-Anandam. So whatever seen in the world is only Brahman of the nature of Consciousness. Every object in the world has the essential nature of Brahman along with nama and roopa. When the nama and roopa are removed, what exists is only Sat Chit Ananda Brahman. So all experiences in the world are pervaded by Consciousness only and hence we can say the perceptual knowledge is also Consciousness only. The object which we perceive in front of us is immediate perception of Consciousness only, but because of adhyaasam or superimposition we perceive the object as nama and roopa. The underlying substratum of pot is clay only, therefore though we say “I am seeing a pot”, it is only clay we are seeing and pot is only a temporary name and form of clay. In the same way, whenever we see an object which is front of us though we say that “I am seeing this object”, but actually what is present is only Consciousness. Dharmaraja quotes from Brihadaranyaka Upanishad that Brahman is direct and immediate.
Lakshmidhara kavi says in Advaita Makaranda that
“abhaaroopasya vishvasya bhaanam bhaasathridhervinaa
Kadhaachith na avakalpeta bhaa chaaham tena sarvagah”
“The inert Universe can never be experienced without the proximity of Consciousness. I, the Consciousness, therefore, am present everywhere”
Nanu chaithanyam anaadhi, thath katham chakshuraadheh thath karanathvena pramaanathvamithi? Uchyathe chaithanyasyaanaadhithvepi thath abhivyanjaka anthah karana vrittih indriya sannikarshaadhinaa jaayathe, ithi vritti vishishtam chaithanyam aadhimadh ithyuchyathe, jnaana avachedhakathvaacha vrittau jnaanathvopachaarah thadhuktham vivarane, “anthah karanavrittau jnaanathvopachaaraath”
Objection: Is not Consciousness without a beginning? So how can the eye etc., as instruments of that, be the means of knowledge?
Reply: The answer is this. Although Consciousness is without a beginning, yet that mental state which reveals it arises through the contact of the organs etc. Hence consciousness qualified by the mental state is spoken of having a beginning. And as the mental state limits the (resulting) knowledge, it is figuratively designated as knowledge. So it has been said in the Vivarana, “On account of the mental state being figuratively spoken of as knowledge”
After giving a brief explanation of what is valid perceptual knowledge, the author then continues the work by raising the objection and answering them. It is very well known that Consciousness is without beginning and the author has explained that pratyaksha prama is Consciousness only. Since the Consciousness is always there, how can there be any knowledge through the organs of eyes etc. To this he answers, Consciousness is without beginning no doubt, but here we are not speaking about Consciousness in its pure sense. When an object is seen, the mind gets modified and takes the form of the object. The consciousness qualified by this modification of the mind is only said to have a beginning. How the modification of mind is produced? The modification of the mind is caused by the conjunction of sense organ and the object. When the sense organ like eye etc. gets in contact with the object, the mind gets modified and takes the form of the object. The consciousness which is qualified by this modification of the mind only gives the knowledge about the object. When we see a pot, the consciousness limited by the modification of mind, which is in the form of pot, gives knowledge about the pot. If there is no modification it means there is no conjunction of sense organs with any object and thus there is no perception. This consciousness qualified by the modification of the mind is figuratively called as the knowledge.
Prostrations to All
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
Thathra pratyakshapramaakaranam pratyaksha pramaanam pratyaksha pramaa thu athra chaitanyameva, “yad saakshaad aparokshaad” ithi srutheh ‘aparokshaath’ ithyasya aparoksham ithyarthah
Of these, that which is the distinctive cause (karana) of valid perceptual (pratyaksha) knowledge is the pratyaksha-pramaana. Here [in the definition], valid perception knowledge is but consciousness, because of the sruti, ‘That [Brahman] which is direct, immediate’ (Brh., III.4.1). Of the word aparokshaa, the meaning is aparoksham(immediate).
The first chapter of this work explains about the pratyaksha pramaanam. As we learned in the introduction, pramaa means valid knowledge and that which serves as the instrument to get this valid knowledge is called Pramaanam. Pratyaksha Pramaa means valid perceptual knowledge and Pratyaksha Pramaanam means that which serves as the instrument to get the Pratyaksha Pramaa or valid perceptual knowledge.
According to scriptures, there is only Brahman.
Mandukya says
“Sarvam hyethath brahma”
Everything is Brahman’
Brahman is of the nature of Sat-Chit-Anandam. So whatever seen in the world is only Brahman of the nature of Consciousness. Every object in the world has the essential nature of Brahman along with nama and roopa. When the nama and roopa are removed, what exists is only Sat Chit Ananda Brahman. So all experiences in the world are pervaded by Consciousness only and hence we can say the perceptual knowledge is also Consciousness only. The object which we perceive in front of us is immediate perception of Consciousness only, but because of adhyaasam or superimposition we perceive the object as nama and roopa. The underlying substratum of pot is clay only, therefore though we say “I am seeing a pot”, it is only clay we are seeing and pot is only a temporary name and form of clay. In the same way, whenever we see an object which is front of us though we say that “I am seeing this object”, but actually what is present is only Consciousness. Dharmaraja quotes from Brihadaranyaka Upanishad that Brahman is direct and immediate.
Lakshmidhara kavi says in Advaita Makaranda that
“abhaaroopasya vishvasya bhaanam bhaasathridhervinaa
Kadhaachith na avakalpeta bhaa chaaham tena sarvagah”
“The inert Universe can never be experienced without the proximity of Consciousness. I, the Consciousness, therefore, am present everywhere”
Nanu chaithanyam anaadhi, thath katham chakshuraadheh thath karanathvena pramaanathvamithi? Uchyathe chaithanyasyaanaadhithvepi thath abhivyanjaka anthah karana vrittih indriya sannikarshaadhinaa jaayathe, ithi vritti vishishtam chaithanyam aadhimadh ithyuchyathe, jnaana avachedhakathvaacha vrittau jnaanathvopachaarah thadhuktham vivarane, “anthah karanavrittau jnaanathvopachaaraath”
Objection: Is not Consciousness without a beginning? So how can the eye etc., as instruments of that, be the means of knowledge?
Reply: The answer is this. Although Consciousness is without a beginning, yet that mental state which reveals it arises through the contact of the organs etc. Hence consciousness qualified by the mental state is spoken of having a beginning. And as the mental state limits the (resulting) knowledge, it is figuratively designated as knowledge. So it has been said in the Vivarana, “On account of the mental state being figuratively spoken of as knowledge”
After giving a brief explanation of what is valid perceptual knowledge, the author then continues the work by raising the objection and answering them. It is very well known that Consciousness is without beginning and the author has explained that pratyaksha prama is Consciousness only. Since the Consciousness is always there, how can there be any knowledge through the organs of eyes etc. To this he answers, Consciousness is without beginning no doubt, but here we are not speaking about Consciousness in its pure sense. When an object is seen, the mind gets modified and takes the form of the object. The consciousness qualified by this modification of the mind is only said to have a beginning. How the modification of mind is produced? The modification of the mind is caused by the conjunction of sense organ and the object. When the sense organ like eye etc. gets in contact with the object, the mind gets modified and takes the form of the object. The consciousness which is qualified by this modification of the mind only gives the knowledge about the object. When we see a pot, the consciousness limited by the modification of mind, which is in the form of pot, gives knowledge about the pot. If there is no modification it means there is no conjunction of sense organs with any object and thus there is no perception. This consciousness qualified by the modification of the mind is figuratively called as the knowledge.
Prostrations to All
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Saturday, June 2, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Introduction - 2
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
iha khalu dharmaarthakaamamokshaakyeshu chathurvidhapurushaartheshu
moksha eva parama purushaarthah, "na sa punaraavarthathe"
ithyaadhi sruthyaa tasyaiva nithyathva avagamaath, ithareshaam thrayaanaam pratyakshena,
"tadhyatheha karmajitho lokah ksheeyathe, evamevaamuthra punyajitho lokah ksheeyathe"
ithyaadhi sruthyaa cha anithyathva avagamaath cha| sa cha brahmajnaanaadh ithi
brahma thath jnaanam thath pramaanamcha saprapancha nirupyathe|
Here, verily, of the four kinds of human goals, called Dharma, Artha, Kaama and Moksha, Moksha alone is the supreme human goal; for its eternality is ascertained from such sruti as "He does not return again" (Chandogya VIII.15.1); whereas of the other three, non-eternality is understood both through perception and through such sruti as 'Therefore, just as the enjoyment here acquired through is consumed, even so is the enjoyment in a hereafter acquired by merit, consumed" (Chandogya,VIII.1.6). And since that results from Brahman Knowledge, Brahman, the knowledge thereof and the means to get the knowledge thereof are expounded in detail.
The actual text starts from this part after the self-introduction verses of the author. The Ultimate goal of every human beings in the world is only happiness but the object of happiness will vary from person to person and the objects of happiness are broadly classified as four purusharthas. The 4 purusharthas are Dharma (Righteousness), Artha (wealth), Kama (Sensual Pleasures) and Moksha(Liberation). The end product of all these four purusharthas is happiness only, but the happiness that is got from the first three purusharthas are temporary and whereas the happiness that is got from fourth purushartha is permanent. Though we seek happiness from various objects, our final aim is to get happiness which is permanent and since it is only Moksha which can give permanent happiness, the author here says that out of the four purusharthas Moksha is the Supreme human goal. When a person gets liberation, he will be happy ever and complete and hence there would not be any desire (as desire comes only when there is sense of incompleteness). Happiness that is got from any other object will never be permanent because, the world and its object in itself are temporary. Only that which is permanent can give permanent happiness and since the wordly objects are temporary, the other three purusharthas cannot give permanent happiness.
Moksham means liberation from the ocean of bondage. A person is liberated when he gets the Ultimate Knowlege that "I am Brahman". Therefore, the Ultimate goal is getting that knowledge that "I am Brahman". It is not a new knowledge to get as well, as we already are Brahman, but the Ultimate goal is ascertaining that we are Brahman only. Therefore, we should know about brahman and the means to get that knowledge and the author says that knowledge of Brahman and the means to get that knowledge is been cleary explained in this text.
thathra pramaakaranam pramaanam | thathra smritivyavruththam
pramaathvam anadhigata abaadhitha artha vishayaka jnaanathvam |
smritisaadhaarananthu abaadhitha artha vishayaka jnaanathvam |
neeroopasyaapi kaalasyendhriyavedhya vedhyathva abhyupagamena, dhaaraavaahikabudherapi
poorvapoorvajnaanaavishaya thaththath kshanavishesha vishayakathvena na
thathra avyaapthih | kincha sidhaanthe dhaaraavaahikabudhisthale na
jnaanabhedhah, kinthu yaavad ghata sphuranam
thaavadh ghata akaara anthah karana vrittih eka eva,
na thu naanaa, vritheh svavirodhi vritti uthpaththi paryantham
sthayithva abhupagamaath, thathaa cha thath prathiphalitha chaitanya roopam
ghataadhi jnaanamapi thathra thaavath kaaleenam ekameva ithi na avyaapthi shankaapi
Of these, the distinctive cause (karana) of valid knowledge is Pramaanam. Here, the nature of such valid knowledge, as excludes recollection, consists in being cognition having for content an entity that is not already known and is not sublated; whereas, that [nature of valid knowledge] which is common to recollection consists in being cognition having for content an unsublated entity. Since sense-cognition is admitted even for time, though it is colourless, even for [the second and subsequent cognition in] a continuous stream of cognition, there is as content what is not the content of earlier cognitions, namely the object qualifed by the particular [succeeding] instants; hence there is no non-pervasion in respect of that [continous stream of cognition, by the definition]. Further, in [our] final view, there is no break in a continous stream of cognition, rather is it that so long as there is presentation of pot, there is but a single psychosis of internal organ, having the form of pot, not many, since of a psychosis, persistence until the rise of [another] psychosis opposed to that [original] is admitted. And thus, even the cognition of pot, etc., which is of the nature of consciousness reflected in that, is but single, lasting for that period of time, hence there is not even the suspicion of non-pervasion.
Prama, in sanskrit, means valid knowledge and the means or way to get that valid knowledge or prama is called pramaanam. What exactly is Pramanam? When we see a real object which we do not know before, that cognition is called pramaanam. Pramaanam is different from recollection, as in recollection the object is already known. When we meet a new person the knowledge that we get is new and that means of getting the knowledge is Pramanam whereas when we meet our friend, though the knowledge is about a real object, since it is from recollection, it is not pramanam, it is called smriti. The only difference between smriti and pramanam is that, through pramanam there is new knowledge whereas in smriti, there is only recollection as knowledge is there in the memory.
After defining pramanam, the author anticipates a doubt, if the cognition is a continous cognition, how can it be pramanam? Suppose we see a new object for a long time, there is continuous cognition of that object. One may question, other than the first cognition, the rest cannot be considered as pramanam. To this he answers by analyzing through two angles. If we consider the cognition as discrete cognition, then at each interval of time it is a new cognition and thus it is pramanam only. In Vedanta, whenver there is a cognition, there will be corresponding vritti or modification of the mind. So as long as one object is percieved, so long the mind takes that particular form until we see a different object. Thus in both cases, it is new knowledge only and hence it Pramanam.
nanu sidhaanthe ghaadheh mithyaathvena bhaadhithathvaath katham thath jnaanam pramaanam?
uchyathe | brahmasaakshaathkaaraanantharam hi ghathaadheenaam bhaadhah, "yathra
thu asya sarvam atmaivaabhooth thath kena kam pashyeth"
ithi srutheh | na thu samsaaradhashaayaam bhaadhah, " yathra hi dvaithamiva bhavathi
thath ithara itharam pashyathi" ithi srutheh| thathaa cha " abhaadhitha" - padhena
samsaaradhashaayaam abhaadhithathvam
vivakshithvam, ithi na ghataadhi pramaayam avyaapthih | thath uktham
"dehaathma prathyato yadhvath pramaanathnena kalpithah |
lowkikam thadhvadhevedham pramaanaanthva athmanishchayaath|| " ithi |
"aa athamanishchayaath" - brahma saakshaathkaara paryantham ithyarthah
"lowkikam" ithi ghaadhi jnaanam ithyarthah |
'Now, since in final view, pot, etc., being illusory, are sublated, how can their cognition be valid knowledge?'
The reply is: There is indeed the sublation of pot, etc. after the intution of Brahman, because of the sruti, 'when, however, for him everything has become the Self, then, wherewith and what shall he see?'(brh, IV.5.15). But there is no sublation in the state of bondage (samsaara), because of the sruti, 'When indeed there is duality, as it were, then one sees the other' (Brh. IV.5.15). And thus since what is intended by the word 'unsublated' is 'not being sublated during the state of Samsaaram', there is no non-pervasion of the valid cognition of pot, etc. This has been said
"Just as the cognition of the body as the Self is assumed to be valid, even so is this worldly [cognition] valid till the ascertainment of the Self".
'Till the ascertainment of the Self' means till the intuition of Brahman
'Worldly[cognition]' means the cognition of pot etc.
Now an objection is raised. As per Vedanta, everything other than Self is an illusion. Therefore whenever we see an object of the world, the objector says, since the object is an illusion how can the means of that knowledge be pramanam? Yes the objects that are seen in the world are illusion only no doubt, but those are illusion only after a person realizes that there is only Brahman and nothing else. Paramarthika and Vyavahaarika level cannot be mixed. When a person gets liberated, there would be nothing to see at all, there would be no instrument to percieve the object. But till a person realizes his very nature of Brahman, he will see dualities. This is what is meant here, the cognition of objects before one realizes his own nature of Self. Therefore all the means for the cognition of the objects are Pramanam only in the Vyavaharika level. He further explains this that as long as one thinks that "I am body" till that time the cognition of the worldly objects are real. Therefore till the time one gets liberation, the world and the objects will be seen as real.
thaani cha pramaanaani shat - pratyaksham anumaana upamaana aagama arthapaththi anupalabdhi bhedhaath
These pramaanas are six, divided into Pratyaksha (perception), anumana (inference), upamaana (comparison), shabdha (verbal), arthapathi (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition).
Vedanta accepts six pramanams, which are Pratyaksha (perception), anumana (inference), upamaana (comparison), shabdha (verbal), arthapathi (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition).
With this the introduction part of Vedanta Paribhasha is over and after this starts the first chapter which is about the Pratyaksha pramanam. We will start with the first chapter the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
iha khalu dharmaarthakaamamokshaakyeshu chathurvidhapurushaartheshu
moksha eva parama purushaarthah, "na sa punaraavarthathe"
ithyaadhi sruthyaa tasyaiva nithyathva avagamaath, ithareshaam thrayaanaam pratyakshena,
"tadhyatheha karmajitho lokah ksheeyathe, evamevaamuthra punyajitho lokah ksheeyathe"
ithyaadhi sruthyaa cha anithyathva avagamaath cha| sa cha brahmajnaanaadh ithi
brahma thath jnaanam thath pramaanamcha saprapancha nirupyathe|
Here, verily, of the four kinds of human goals, called Dharma, Artha, Kaama and Moksha, Moksha alone is the supreme human goal; for its eternality is ascertained from such sruti as "He does not return again" (Chandogya VIII.15.1); whereas of the other three, non-eternality is understood both through perception and through such sruti as 'Therefore, just as the enjoyment here acquired through is consumed, even so is the enjoyment in a hereafter acquired by merit, consumed" (Chandogya,VIII.1.6). And since that results from Brahman Knowledge, Brahman, the knowledge thereof and the means to get the knowledge thereof are expounded in detail.
The actual text starts from this part after the self-introduction verses of the author. The Ultimate goal of every human beings in the world is only happiness but the object of happiness will vary from person to person and the objects of happiness are broadly classified as four purusharthas. The 4 purusharthas are Dharma (Righteousness), Artha (wealth), Kama (Sensual Pleasures) and Moksha(Liberation). The end product of all these four purusharthas is happiness only, but the happiness that is got from the first three purusharthas are temporary and whereas the happiness that is got from fourth purushartha is permanent. Though we seek happiness from various objects, our final aim is to get happiness which is permanent and since it is only Moksha which can give permanent happiness, the author here says that out of the four purusharthas Moksha is the Supreme human goal. When a person gets liberation, he will be happy ever and complete and hence there would not be any desire (as desire comes only when there is sense of incompleteness). Happiness that is got from any other object will never be permanent because, the world and its object in itself are temporary. Only that which is permanent can give permanent happiness and since the wordly objects are temporary, the other three purusharthas cannot give permanent happiness.
Moksham means liberation from the ocean of bondage. A person is liberated when he gets the Ultimate Knowlege that "I am Brahman". Therefore, the Ultimate goal is getting that knowledge that "I am Brahman". It is not a new knowledge to get as well, as we already are Brahman, but the Ultimate goal is ascertaining that we are Brahman only. Therefore, we should know about brahman and the means to get that knowledge and the author says that knowledge of Brahman and the means to get that knowledge is been cleary explained in this text.
thathra pramaakaranam pramaanam | thathra smritivyavruththam
pramaathvam anadhigata abaadhitha artha vishayaka jnaanathvam |
smritisaadhaarananthu abaadhitha artha vishayaka jnaanathvam |
neeroopasyaapi kaalasyendhriyavedhya vedhyathva abhyupagamena, dhaaraavaahikabudherapi
poorvapoorvajnaanaavishaya thaththath kshanavishesha vishayakathvena na
thathra avyaapthih | kincha sidhaanthe dhaaraavaahikabudhisthale na
jnaanabhedhah, kinthu yaavad ghata sphuranam
thaavadh ghata akaara anthah karana vrittih eka eva,
na thu naanaa, vritheh svavirodhi vritti uthpaththi paryantham
sthayithva abhupagamaath, thathaa cha thath prathiphalitha chaitanya roopam
ghataadhi jnaanamapi thathra thaavath kaaleenam ekameva ithi na avyaapthi shankaapi
Of these, the distinctive cause (karana) of valid knowledge is Pramaanam. Here, the nature of such valid knowledge, as excludes recollection, consists in being cognition having for content an entity that is not already known and is not sublated; whereas, that [nature of valid knowledge] which is common to recollection consists in being cognition having for content an unsublated entity. Since sense-cognition is admitted even for time, though it is colourless, even for [the second and subsequent cognition in] a continuous stream of cognition, there is as content what is not the content of earlier cognitions, namely the object qualifed by the particular [succeeding] instants; hence there is no non-pervasion in respect of that [continous stream of cognition, by the definition]. Further, in [our] final view, there is no break in a continous stream of cognition, rather is it that so long as there is presentation of pot, there is but a single psychosis of internal organ, having the form of pot, not many, since of a psychosis, persistence until the rise of [another] psychosis opposed to that [original] is admitted. And thus, even the cognition of pot, etc., which is of the nature of consciousness reflected in that, is but single, lasting for that period of time, hence there is not even the suspicion of non-pervasion.
Prama, in sanskrit, means valid knowledge and the means or way to get that valid knowledge or prama is called pramaanam. What exactly is Pramanam? When we see a real object which we do not know before, that cognition is called pramaanam. Pramaanam is different from recollection, as in recollection the object is already known. When we meet a new person the knowledge that we get is new and that means of getting the knowledge is Pramanam whereas when we meet our friend, though the knowledge is about a real object, since it is from recollection, it is not pramanam, it is called smriti. The only difference between smriti and pramanam is that, through pramanam there is new knowledge whereas in smriti, there is only recollection as knowledge is there in the memory.
After defining pramanam, the author anticipates a doubt, if the cognition is a continous cognition, how can it be pramanam? Suppose we see a new object for a long time, there is continuous cognition of that object. One may question, other than the first cognition, the rest cannot be considered as pramanam. To this he answers by analyzing through two angles. If we consider the cognition as discrete cognition, then at each interval of time it is a new cognition and thus it is pramanam only. In Vedanta, whenver there is a cognition, there will be corresponding vritti or modification of the mind. So as long as one object is percieved, so long the mind takes that particular form until we see a different object. Thus in both cases, it is new knowledge only and hence it Pramanam.
nanu sidhaanthe ghaadheh mithyaathvena bhaadhithathvaath katham thath jnaanam pramaanam?
uchyathe | brahmasaakshaathkaaraanantharam hi ghathaadheenaam bhaadhah, "yathra
thu asya sarvam atmaivaabhooth thath kena kam pashyeth"
ithi srutheh | na thu samsaaradhashaayaam bhaadhah, " yathra hi dvaithamiva bhavathi
thath ithara itharam pashyathi" ithi srutheh| thathaa cha " abhaadhitha" - padhena
samsaaradhashaayaam abhaadhithathvam
vivakshithvam, ithi na ghataadhi pramaayam avyaapthih | thath uktham
"dehaathma prathyato yadhvath pramaanathnena kalpithah |
lowkikam thadhvadhevedham pramaanaanthva athmanishchayaath|| " ithi |
"aa athamanishchayaath" - brahma saakshaathkaara paryantham ithyarthah
"lowkikam" ithi ghaadhi jnaanam ithyarthah |
'Now, since in final view, pot, etc., being illusory, are sublated, how can their cognition be valid knowledge?'
The reply is: There is indeed the sublation of pot, etc. after the intution of Brahman, because of the sruti, 'when, however, for him everything has become the Self, then, wherewith and what shall he see?'(brh, IV.5.15). But there is no sublation in the state of bondage (samsaara), because of the sruti, 'When indeed there is duality, as it were, then one sees the other' (Brh. IV.5.15). And thus since what is intended by the word 'unsublated' is 'not being sublated during the state of Samsaaram', there is no non-pervasion of the valid cognition of pot, etc. This has been said
"Just as the cognition of the body as the Self is assumed to be valid, even so is this worldly [cognition] valid till the ascertainment of the Self".
'Till the ascertainment of the Self' means till the intuition of Brahman
'Worldly[cognition]' means the cognition of pot etc.
Now an objection is raised. As per Vedanta, everything other than Self is an illusion. Therefore whenever we see an object of the world, the objector says, since the object is an illusion how can the means of that knowledge be pramanam? Yes the objects that are seen in the world are illusion only no doubt, but those are illusion only after a person realizes that there is only Brahman and nothing else. Paramarthika and Vyavahaarika level cannot be mixed. When a person gets liberated, there would be nothing to see at all, there would be no instrument to percieve the object. But till a person realizes his very nature of Brahman, he will see dualities. This is what is meant here, the cognition of objects before one realizes his own nature of Self. Therefore all the means for the cognition of the objects are Pramanam only in the Vyavaharika level. He further explains this that as long as one thinks that "I am body" till that time the cognition of the worldly objects are real. Therefore till the time one gets liberation, the world and the objects will be seen as real.
thaani cha pramaanaani shat - pratyaksham anumaana upamaana aagama arthapaththi anupalabdhi bhedhaath
These pramaanas are six, divided into Pratyaksha (perception), anumana (inference), upamaana (comparison), shabdha (verbal), arthapathi (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition).
Vedanta accepts six pramanams, which are Pratyaksha (perception), anumana (inference), upamaana (comparison), shabdha (verbal), arthapathi (postulation) and anupalabdhi (non-cognition).
With this the introduction part of Vedanta Paribhasha is over and after this starts the first chapter which is about the Pratyaksha pramanam. We will start with the first chapter the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Vedanta Paribhasha - Introduction - 1
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Let us all offer our prostrations to Guru and start learning Vedanta Paribhasha of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra.
The Vedanta-Paribhasha is an epistemological work (Epistemology is the study of the origin, nature and validity of knowledge) on Advaita Vedanta following Vivarana school of Prakasatma Yati, the commentator on Padmapada’s Pachapadika. The name of the author of this work is Dharmaraja Adhvarindra. Dharmaraja Adhvarindra was a native of Kandramanikkam Village, Tanjavur district and seem to have flourished in seventeenth century. He was a scholar of Nyaya-Vaisheshika and Vedanta philosophy. His few works on Nyaya are Tarkachudaamani (a commentary on Gangesha's Tattvacintamani) which has a subcommentary by his son Ramakrishna Adhvarindra, Nyayaratna or Nyayasidhantadeepaprakaasha (a commentary on the Nyayasidhantadeepa of Mahamahopaadhyaaya shashadhara), in all these works of Nyaya Dharmaraja adopted Navya Nyaya introduced by Gangesha Upadhyaya in 14th century. The known Vedanta works of his are only two, Vedanta Paribhasha and Padayojanika or Padadipika, a commentary on Panchapadika.
Vedanta Paribhasha has few commentaries as well. The most notable commentary is by his son Ramakrishna Adhvarindra which has a sub-commentary called Maniprabha and another notable commentary is by his nephew Peddaa Dikshita. There is also a commentary by Narayanabhatta Sastrin called Bhushanam. There are two books with English translation one by Swami Madhavananda of Ramakrishna Mutt and other by Prof S.S.Suryanarayana Shastri. There are eight chapters in this work, and first 6 chapters explains each of 6 pramanams in the light of Vedanta.
Pramanam means valid knowledge.
Six pramanas:
Prathyaksham (Perception)
Anumanam (Inference)
Upamanam (Comparison)
Agama (Verbal testimony)
Arthapathi (presumption)
anupalabdhi (non-apprehension)
As regard to valid means of knowledge there is difference among different systems.
Charvakas – Only Prathyaksham
Buddhists and Vaiseshikas – Prathyaksha and Anumana
Sankhya and Yoga – Prathyaksham, anumanam, agama
Nyaya – prathyaksham, anumanam, agama, and upamana
Prabhakara Mimamsa – Prathyaksham, Anumanam, Agamam, Upamanam and Arthapathi
Vedanta and Bhatta Mimamsa - Prathyaksham, Anumanam, Agamam, Upamanam, Arthapathi and Anupalabdhi.
In this work, each of the six pramanams are explained in detail from Vedanta view point and also refutes other systems mainly Nyaya system. This work is in prose form except for the introduction part in which the author introduces himself.
Introduction
Yadvidhyaavilaasena bhoothaBhouthikasrushtayah
Tam nowmi paramaathmaanam satchitaanandha vigraham
To that Supreme Self, the embodiment of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss Absolute, by the manifestation of the nescience (avidya) relating to which the projection of the (simple) elements and things made up of these elements takes place, I bow.
Any vedantic work will start by prostrating either Guru or Isvara or Brahman. Here, Dharmaraja prostartes to Brahman which is of the nature of Existence-Consciousness – Bliss Absolute. And it is because of ignorance of this Ultimate Reality, the world got manifested by the 5 elements. Avidya doesn’t have a separate existence other than Brahman, and yet it is different from Brahman. Here the author prostrates to that Ultimate Reality because of whose grace the entire manifestation of Universe is existing.
Yadhanthevaasipanchaasyairnirasthaa Bhedhivaaranaah
Tham pranaumi nrusimhaakyam yatheendhram paramam gurum
I salute that prince of monks, my teacher’s teacher, named Nrsimha, whose pupils have routed dualists, as lions do elephants
Shreemadh venkatanaaThaaKhyaan velaangudinivaasinah
Jagadhgurunaham vandhe sarvathanthrapravarthakaan
I salute the world-teacher named Srimad Venkatanaatha, resident of Velangudi, who was an expounder of all systems of philosophy.
Yena chinthaamanau teekaa dhashateekaaviBhanjinee
Tharkachoodaamanirnaama krthaa vidhvanmanoramaa
He who has written a commentary on the Chintamani, called Tarkacudamani, in which he has smashed ten commentaries and which has been appreciated by scholars
Tika shashaDharasyaapi baalavyuthpaththidhaayinee
Padhayojanayaa panchapaadhikaa vyaakrthaa thaThaa
Who has also written an illuminating commentary for the students on ShaShadhara (author of Nyaya-Siddhanta-dipa) and has besides expounded the Panchapadika by construing its words
Thena bhoDhaaya mandhaanaam vedaantharThaavalambinee
Dharmaraaja adhvarindrena paribhasha vithanyathe
That Dharmaraja Adhvarindra is composing this Paribhasha based on Vedantic teachings, for the enlightenment of backward students.
After these introduction verses about himself, Dharmaraja starts his explanation on what is valid knowledge, which we will see in the next day.
Prostrations to All
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Let us all offer our prostrations to Guru and start learning Vedanta Paribhasha of Dharmaraja Adhvarindra.
The Vedanta-Paribhasha is an epistemological work (Epistemology is the study of the origin, nature and validity of knowledge) on Advaita Vedanta following Vivarana school of Prakasatma Yati, the commentator on Padmapada’s Pachapadika. The name of the author of this work is Dharmaraja Adhvarindra. Dharmaraja Adhvarindra was a native of Kandramanikkam Village, Tanjavur district and seem to have flourished in seventeenth century. He was a scholar of Nyaya-Vaisheshika and Vedanta philosophy. His few works on Nyaya are Tarkachudaamani (a commentary on Gangesha's Tattvacintamani) which has a subcommentary by his son Ramakrishna Adhvarindra, Nyayaratna or Nyayasidhantadeepaprakaasha (a commentary on the Nyayasidhantadeepa of Mahamahopaadhyaaya shashadhara), in all these works of Nyaya Dharmaraja adopted Navya Nyaya introduced by Gangesha Upadhyaya in 14th century. The known Vedanta works of his are only two, Vedanta Paribhasha and Padayojanika or Padadipika, a commentary on Panchapadika.
Vedanta Paribhasha has few commentaries as well. The most notable commentary is by his son Ramakrishna Adhvarindra which has a sub-commentary called Maniprabha and another notable commentary is by his nephew Peddaa Dikshita. There is also a commentary by Narayanabhatta Sastrin called Bhushanam. There are two books with English translation one by Swami Madhavananda of Ramakrishna Mutt and other by Prof S.S.Suryanarayana Shastri. There are eight chapters in this work, and first 6 chapters explains each of 6 pramanams in the light of Vedanta.
Pramanam means valid knowledge.
Six pramanas:
Prathyaksham (Perception)
Anumanam (Inference)
Upamanam (Comparison)
Agama (Verbal testimony)
Arthapathi (presumption)
anupalabdhi (non-apprehension)
As regard to valid means of knowledge there is difference among different systems.
Charvakas – Only Prathyaksham
Buddhists and Vaiseshikas – Prathyaksha and Anumana
Sankhya and Yoga – Prathyaksham, anumanam, agama
Nyaya – prathyaksham, anumanam, agama, and upamana
Prabhakara Mimamsa – Prathyaksham, Anumanam, Agamam, Upamanam and Arthapathi
Vedanta and Bhatta Mimamsa - Prathyaksham, Anumanam, Agamam, Upamanam, Arthapathi and Anupalabdhi.
In this work, each of the six pramanams are explained in detail from Vedanta view point and also refutes other systems mainly Nyaya system. This work is in prose form except for the introduction part in which the author introduces himself.
Introduction
Yadvidhyaavilaasena bhoothaBhouthikasrushtayah
Tam nowmi paramaathmaanam satchitaanandha vigraham
To that Supreme Self, the embodiment of Existence, Consciousness and Bliss Absolute, by the manifestation of the nescience (avidya) relating to which the projection of the (simple) elements and things made up of these elements takes place, I bow.
Any vedantic work will start by prostrating either Guru or Isvara or Brahman. Here, Dharmaraja prostartes to Brahman which is of the nature of Existence-Consciousness – Bliss Absolute. And it is because of ignorance of this Ultimate Reality, the world got manifested by the 5 elements. Avidya doesn’t have a separate existence other than Brahman, and yet it is different from Brahman. Here the author prostrates to that Ultimate Reality because of whose grace the entire manifestation of Universe is existing.
Yadhanthevaasipanchaasyairnirasthaa Bhedhivaaranaah
Tham pranaumi nrusimhaakyam yatheendhram paramam gurum
I salute that prince of monks, my teacher’s teacher, named Nrsimha, whose pupils have routed dualists, as lions do elephants
Shreemadh venkatanaaThaaKhyaan velaangudinivaasinah
Jagadhgurunaham vandhe sarvathanthrapravarthakaan
I salute the world-teacher named Srimad Venkatanaatha, resident of Velangudi, who was an expounder of all systems of philosophy.
Yena chinthaamanau teekaa dhashateekaaviBhanjinee
Tharkachoodaamanirnaama krthaa vidhvanmanoramaa
He who has written a commentary on the Chintamani, called Tarkacudamani, in which he has smashed ten commentaries and which has been appreciated by scholars
Tika shashaDharasyaapi baalavyuthpaththidhaayinee
Padhayojanayaa panchapaadhikaa vyaakrthaa thaThaa
Who has also written an illuminating commentary for the students on ShaShadhara (author of Nyaya-Siddhanta-dipa) and has besides expounded the Panchapadika by construing its words
Thena bhoDhaaya mandhaanaam vedaantharThaavalambinee
Dharmaraaja adhvarindrena paribhasha vithanyathe
That Dharmaraja Adhvarindra is composing this Paribhasha based on Vedantic teachings, for the enlightenment of backward students.
After these introduction verses about himself, Dharmaraja starts his explanation on what is valid knowledge, which we will see in the next day.
Prostrations to All
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
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