Hari aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Happy New Year to All.
Now the (various) connections of the organs viz., conjunction, identity with what is conjoined, and so on, are considered to produce mental states that reveal Consciousness.
As explained earlier, when an object is perceived, the mind goes out through the sense organs and takes the Vritti of the object. The Consciousness limited by the object and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the object occupy the same space and it doesn’t have the reality other than the Consciousness of the Pramata. The object thus becomes a perceivable and the knowledge is the Perceptual knowledge of the object. The mind which goes out through sense organs forming a Vritti can be for one of the following.
Samyoga – this is normal conjunction through which we perceive the object such as jar.
Samyukta tadatmya – this is when a particular attribute or quality of an object is perceived, say the color of an object.
Samyukta Abhinna tadatmya – when a particular attribute or quality of the same object which the mind is conjoined with is perceived.
That mental state is of four kinds: doubt, certitude, egoism and recollection. Owing to this diversity of states, the mind, though one, is designated as the manas, the intellect, the ego and the citta. So it has been said: “The manas, the intellect, the ego and the Chitta constitute the internal instrument. Doubt, certitude, egoism and recollection – these are their objects”.
Dharmaraja here explains about the Anthah karanam and its four kinds based on its functionality. We can divide the anthah karanam into four kinds based on its functions as we have learned from other works. The four kinds are Manas, bhuddhi, chittam and ahamkaram.
Manas – this part of the mind has all thoughts about the objects of the world in the form of doubts.
Bhuddi – the intellect part, which is involved at times of decision making.
Chittam – this is the store house of the mind or the memory.
Ahamkaram – the ego part of the mind
The perception spoken of above is of two kinds: Savikalpaka (determinate) and nirvikalpaka (indeterminate). Of these, the former is that knowledge which apprehends relatedness (of the substantive and qualifying attribute); for example, knowledte such as, “I know the jar”. Whereas indeterminate perception is that knowledge which does not apprehend this relatedness; for example, knowledge arising from sentence like, “This is that Devadutta” or “Thou art That”
After explaining about the perceptual knowledge, the conditions of perceptual knowledge and objects being subject to perception, he enters into the next topic about the kinds of perceptual knowledge. Perceptual knowledge can be of 2 kinds, determinate and indeterminate. When we see pot in front of us, we get the knowledge that “I know this jar”. Now here the jar is related to the perceiver.
In the case of the knowledge “This is That Devadutta”, we ignore all the relations and hence it is indeterminate knowledge. The use of the word ‘This’ means the present time and the use of ‘That’ means past time, we cannot relate those two contradictory time periods and hence ignoring all the relations we get the knowledge ‘This is That Devadutta’. Similarly in the case of ‘Tat tvam Asi’, though the word meaning of Tat and Tvam are contradictory, still ignoring the limiting adjuncts the knowledge that is got is indeterminate knowledge.
Objection: but this knowledge is verbal comprehension, not perception, for it is not due to the organ.
Reply: no, for the fact of being due to the organs is not the criterion of perception, since it has already been condemned, but, as has been stated, it is the fact of the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge not being different from the Consciousness associated with objects, when the latter are present and are capable of being perceived. Thus, as the knowledge due to the sentence, “This is that Devadatta”, has for its object something connected with an organ, and as states of the mind that goes out are assumed, the Consciousness limited by Devadatta is not different from that limited by the mental state (in the form of object), and hence the knowledge due to the sentence, “This is that Devadatta”, is a perception. Similarly with the knowledge due to sentences like, “Thou art That”, also, for there the subject itself being the object, the condition about the unity of the two is present.
Now an objection is raised. The objection is how can “This is That Devadatta” or “Tat Tvam Asi” can be a perceptual knowledge, since there is no sense organs involved in such knowledge. Earlier, a question was raised about mind being organ or not, in the explanation as an answer to that he explained clearly that for a knowledge to be immediate, there is no dependency on being generated by organs. So we cannot say that since it is not generated by organ the knowledge is not immediate. Also later the conditions for the perceptual knowledge are explained as Consciousness limited by the object not different from the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the object and the object has the capability to be perceived.
In the case of knowledge “This is That Devadatta”, mind goes out through the sense organs and forms the Vritti of Devadatta. The Consciousness limited by Devadatta and Consciousness limited by Vritti of Devadatta are not different and Devadatta has the capability to be perceived. Thus the knowledge that we get from the sentence “This is That Devadatta” is perception only. The word ‘This’ generally denote to an object which is very close by and that we are perceiving through our eyes. In the same way, “Tat Tvam Asi” is also perception. Here subject itself becomes the object and are in the present. Thus the knowledge is perception only.
Prostrations to All.
Thanks,
Rajesh
Wednesday, February 20, 2008
Sunday, December 23, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 10
Hari aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Similarly, although the mind and its attributes, etc, are objects of the witness alone, yet, as we assume mental states in the form of those, the definition mentioned above applies there also, and hence it is not too narrow. It cannot be urged that if the mind an d its attributes etc. are assumed to be objects of mental states, it will contradict the assumption that they are cognized by the witness alone; for, being cognized by the witness alone does not mean that they are objects of the witness without the presence of mental states but that they are the objects of the witness without the activity of the means of knowledge, such as the organs and inference. Hence the Acharya, in his gloss, in the passage dealing with egoism, has admitted a mental state in the form of the ego. Hence also, in the case of an illusory piece of silver, a state of nescience in the form of the silver has been admitted by the traditional interpreters. So the definition of which the mental states as the limiting adjuncts are a factor, applying to the mind and its attributes, etc. which are cognized by the witness alone, it is not too narrow. Therefore the gist of the matter is this: An object is said to be cognized by perception when it is capable and is devoid of any existence apart from that of Consciousness associated with the subject, which has for its limiting adjunct a mental state in the form of that object.
Dharmaraja previously explained that modification of the mind of the object is not perceived by another modification of the mind, whereas that Vritti is the object of itself. Here Dharmaraja explains about the witness as well. All the modifications of the mind and its attributes are the objects of witness, and cognition by witness alone does not mean that there are no modifications of the mind corresponding to the cognition, but it only means that it doesn’t require any activity like sense organ etc for its cognition. Self, which stays as the witness, witnesses all the activities of the mind without requiring anything to make it to cognize the mind and its attributes. The acharya which Dharmaraja is referring is Prakashatman. In the Prakashatman’s Vivarana, it is mentioned that Ahamkaram or Ego is a Vritti in the mind. This Vritti of ahamkara or ego is cognized by witness only. When a illusory silver is seen on the nacre, a Vritti is formed in the form of ignorance as silver is an illusion in the Nacre, which is also cognized by the witness. Thus on both the levels of reality, Vyavaharika level and Prathibasika level, it is witness which cognizes the Vritti without requiring any activity to cognize.
With this explanation he summarizes the second cognition type which we are learning, that perception from the standpoint of the object. For an object to be perceptible,
1) It should have the capability to be perceived
2) Its reality status is not other than the reality status of the Consciousness associated with the subject
When we perceive an object that has the capability to be perceived and has the same reality status same as the subject then by the conjunction of mind with the object through the sense organs forms a Vritti in the form of the object which makes the object perceptible.
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Similarly, although the mind and its attributes, etc, are objects of the witness alone, yet, as we assume mental states in the form of those, the definition mentioned above applies there also, and hence it is not too narrow. It cannot be urged that if the mind an d its attributes etc. are assumed to be objects of mental states, it will contradict the assumption that they are cognized by the witness alone; for, being cognized by the witness alone does not mean that they are objects of the witness without the presence of mental states but that they are the objects of the witness without the activity of the means of knowledge, such as the organs and inference. Hence the Acharya, in his gloss, in the passage dealing with egoism, has admitted a mental state in the form of the ego. Hence also, in the case of an illusory piece of silver, a state of nescience in the form of the silver has been admitted by the traditional interpreters. So the definition of which the mental states as the limiting adjuncts are a factor, applying to the mind and its attributes, etc. which are cognized by the witness alone, it is not too narrow. Therefore the gist of the matter is this: An object is said to be cognized by perception when it is capable and is devoid of any existence apart from that of Consciousness associated with the subject, which has for its limiting adjunct a mental state in the form of that object.
Dharmaraja previously explained that modification of the mind of the object is not perceived by another modification of the mind, whereas that Vritti is the object of itself. Here Dharmaraja explains about the witness as well. All the modifications of the mind and its attributes are the objects of witness, and cognition by witness alone does not mean that there are no modifications of the mind corresponding to the cognition, but it only means that it doesn’t require any activity like sense organ etc for its cognition. Self, which stays as the witness, witnesses all the activities of the mind without requiring anything to make it to cognize the mind and its attributes. The acharya which Dharmaraja is referring is Prakashatman. In the Prakashatman’s Vivarana, it is mentioned that Ahamkaram or Ego is a Vritti in the mind. This Vritti of ahamkara or ego is cognized by witness only. When a illusory silver is seen on the nacre, a Vritti is formed in the form of ignorance as silver is an illusion in the Nacre, which is also cognized by the witness. Thus on both the levels of reality, Vyavaharika level and Prathibasika level, it is witness which cognizes the Vritti without requiring any activity to cognize.
With this explanation he summarizes the second cognition type which we are learning, that perception from the standpoint of the object. For an object to be perceptible,
1) It should have the capability to be perceived
2) Its reality status is not other than the reality status of the Consciousness associated with the subject
When we perceive an object that has the capability to be perceived and has the same reality status same as the subject then by the conjunction of mind with the object through the sense organs forms a Vritti in the form of the object which makes the object perceptible.
Thanks,
Rajesh
Sunday, December 2, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 9
Hari aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for taking a long break. My prayers to Guru so that there are no more breaks in learning in future.
Objection: Even then, in the case of perception, “A colored jar”, the size etc of the jar would be the object of perception, for since the Consciousness limited by the color is one with that limited by size etc., and the former is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, therefore the Consciousness limited by size etc. is also not different from (that associated with) the subject, and hence the existence of size etc. is not apart from that of (the Consciousness associated with) the subject.
Reply: No, for the fact of having as limiting adjuncts the mental states in the form of those particular objects is also a qualifying attributes of the subject. Thus, when the mental state has the form of color, there is no mental state in the form of size etc. Hence size etc. not having an existence same as that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state in the form of size etc. is a limiting adjunct, (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend (to the size etc.)
Now Dharmaraja raises another question. When we see a big red pot, we are actually the jar with two attributes, red color and the size of the jar. When we see the red color of the jar, Consciousness limited by Red color will be same as the Consciousness limited by the size as they are the attributes of the same object and as explained earlier the Consciousness limited by subject is not different from the Consciousness limited by the object. As explained Dharmaraja earlier, the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. Now the question is if we perceive the color of the pot, then existence of the size of the pot becomes implied even if we don’t see the object and hence that contradicts the earlier condition of non-existence of the object without the existence of subject.
As an answer to this question Dharmaraja puts forth another condition for this cognition i.e when we perceive an object only that form which we are seeing in the object alone forms the Vritti in the mind. To understand this through the example, if we are seeing the color of the pot, there is only Vritti of the color and there is no cognition of size at the time of cognition of pot. Thus when we see color of the pot, there is Vritti in the form of the color of the pot and there is no Vritti of the size of the pot. Thus Dharmaraja puts an end to the wrong extension of the previous condition. When we see the color of the pot, the object here is the color of the pot, Consciousness limited subject is not different from the color of the pot and the existence of color of the pot is not different from the existence of the subject. Thus the Vritti of color of the jar is different from the Vritti of the size of the pot and hence there is no over pervasion.
Objection: In that case the definition will not extend to the mental state, for, since for fear of a regressus in infinitum you do not admit that a mental state can have for its object another mental state, the definition stated above will not apply there, as one of its factors is that the mental state in the form of the object – here, the mental state itself – is a limiting adjunct (of the Consciousness associated with the subject)
Reply: Not so, for although in order to avoid a regressus in infinitum a mental state is not admitted to be the object of another mental state, yet it is assumed to be its own object, and hence, even in the instance cited, there is the Consciousness associated with the object, that has an existence not different from that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state, with itself as its own object, is the limiting adjunct.
Here Dharmaraja raises another question. Dharmaraja explained previously that the mind which goes out through the sense organs takes the form of the object which is the Vritti of the object. Now the question is this definition cannot be extended to Vritti itself. This Vritti can be perceived by the another Vritti in the form of the Vritti of the object itself which might go into infinite regression. Thus the definition above is not extended to the Vritti of the Vritti of the object as it is leading to anavastha dosham or fault of infinite regression. To this Dharmaraja answers saying, Vritti of an object doesn’t become an object of another Vritti. The Vritti of object is not perceived by another Vritti. That Vritti of the object is the object itself and thus there is no Anavastha Dhosham.
Prostrations to All
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for taking a long break. My prayers to Guru so that there are no more breaks in learning in future.
Objection: Even then, in the case of perception, “A colored jar”, the size etc of the jar would be the object of perception, for since the Consciousness limited by the color is one with that limited by size etc., and the former is not different from the Consciousness associated with the subject, therefore the Consciousness limited by size etc. is also not different from (that associated with) the subject, and hence the existence of size etc. is not apart from that of (the Consciousness associated with) the subject.
Reply: No, for the fact of having as limiting adjuncts the mental states in the form of those particular objects is also a qualifying attributes of the subject. Thus, when the mental state has the form of color, there is no mental state in the form of size etc. Hence size etc. not having an existence same as that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state in the form of size etc. is a limiting adjunct, (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend (to the size etc.)
Now Dharmaraja raises another question. When we see a big red pot, we are actually the jar with two attributes, red color and the size of the jar. When we see the red color of the jar, Consciousness limited by Red color will be same as the Consciousness limited by the size as they are the attributes of the same object and as explained earlier the Consciousness limited by subject is not different from the Consciousness limited by the object. As explained Dharmaraja earlier, the existence of the object is not apart from the existence of the subject. Now the question is if we perceive the color of the pot, then existence of the size of the pot becomes implied even if we don’t see the object and hence that contradicts the earlier condition of non-existence of the object without the existence of subject.
As an answer to this question Dharmaraja puts forth another condition for this cognition i.e when we perceive an object only that form which we are seeing in the object alone forms the Vritti in the mind. To understand this through the example, if we are seeing the color of the pot, there is only Vritti of the color and there is no cognition of size at the time of cognition of pot. Thus when we see color of the pot, there is Vritti in the form of the color of the pot and there is no Vritti of the size of the pot. Thus Dharmaraja puts an end to the wrong extension of the previous condition. When we see the color of the pot, the object here is the color of the pot, Consciousness limited subject is not different from the color of the pot and the existence of color of the pot is not different from the existence of the subject. Thus the Vritti of color of the jar is different from the Vritti of the size of the pot and hence there is no over pervasion.
Objection: In that case the definition will not extend to the mental state, for, since for fear of a regressus in infinitum you do not admit that a mental state can have for its object another mental state, the definition stated above will not apply there, as one of its factors is that the mental state in the form of the object – here, the mental state itself – is a limiting adjunct (of the Consciousness associated with the subject)
Reply: Not so, for although in order to avoid a regressus in infinitum a mental state is not admitted to be the object of another mental state, yet it is assumed to be its own object, and hence, even in the instance cited, there is the Consciousness associated with the object, that has an existence not different from that of the Consciousness associated with the subject, of which the mental state, with itself as its own object, is the limiting adjunct.
Here Dharmaraja raises another question. Dharmaraja explained previously that the mind which goes out through the sense organs takes the form of the object which is the Vritti of the object. Now the question is this definition cannot be extended to Vritti itself. This Vritti can be perceived by the another Vritti in the form of the Vritti of the object itself which might go into infinite regression. Thus the definition above is not extended to the Vritti of the Vritti of the object as it is leading to anavastha dosham or fault of infinite regression. To this Dharmaraja answers saying, Vritti of an object doesn’t become an object of another Vritti. The Vritti of object is not perceived by another Vritti. That Vritti of the object is the object itself and thus there is no Anavastha Dhosham.
Prostrations to All
Thanks,
Rajesh
Sunday, October 28, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 8
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
The perceptuality of objects such as a jar, however, consists in their not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) subject.
Objection: How can a jar etc. be one with the Consciousness limited by the mind, since it contradicts our experience of difference, as when we say, “I see this”?
Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject does not indeed mean identity it means having no existence apart from that of the subject. To be explicit, since a jar etc. are superimposed on the Consciousness limited by them, their existence is but the existence of the Consciousness associated with the object, fro the existence of what is superimposed is not admitted to be something over and above that of its substratum. And since the Consciousness associated with the object is, in the manner described above, but the Consciousness associated with the subject, the latter Consciousness alone is the substratum of a jar etc., and hence their existence is but that of the subject, and not something else. So the immediacy of a jar etc. is proved. But in case of inference etc., since the mind does not go out to the space covered by the fire etc., the Consciousness limited by the fire is not one with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and therefore the existence of the fire etc is distinct from that of the subject. So (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend to such cases.
After the analysis of the knowledge being perceptual, now he starts his analysis on the object being perceptual. For the object to be perceptual, the object is not different from that of the subject. After giving the condition, he raises a question how jar is one with the subject? When we say “I see this”, it clearly shows that the object is different from us, so how object be one with the subject. To this he answers that, by saying object is not different from subject, it doesn’t mean identity. It only means that the object cannot have an existence apart from the existence of the subject. The existence of the object is same as the existence of the subject.
As explained by Dharmaraja earlier, when we see a pot the mind goes out through the sense organs and takes the form of the pot. Thus we have Consciousness associated with the object and the Consciousness associated with the mind of the subject. As he said earlier, the Consciousness associated with object is not different from the Consciousness associated with the mind, and here from the perspective of object, Consciousness associated with the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject. Thus Consciousness is the substratum of both subject and the object. Pot cannot have any existence apart from the substratum of Consciousness to which it is associated with because the pot is superimposed on the Consciousness associated with it and since the Consciousness associated with the pot is same as the Consciousness associated with the subject, the pot is perceptual. Thus the existence of the pot is same as the existence of the subject.
In the case of inference, as in fire in the hill example, the fire is not perceived through the sense organs. Since Vritti is not formed through the sense contact, the Consciousness associated with fire is different from the Consciousness associated with subject and thus the existence of fire is different from the existence of the subject. Therefore fire is not the object of perception.
Thus the first criterion for object to be perceptual is that, the reality status of the object is not different from the reality status of Consciousness associated with the subject.
Objection: Even then, in the case of an inference regarding righteousness and unrighteousness, the latter would be objects of perception, because the Consciousness limited by them not being distinct from the Consciousness associated with the subject, the existence of righteousness etc. is not apart from that of the subject.
Reply: No, for capability of perception is also a qualifying attribute of the object.
Similar question was answered by Dharmaraja in the earlier analysis as well. The question is, in case of regarding oneself to be righteous or not, we have righteousness or unrighteousness as object and the consciousness limited by righteousness being not different from Consciousness limited by the subject, righteousness becomes an object of perception which in reality is not. To this as before, Dharmaraja answers that righteousness or unrighteousness doesn’t have the capability to be perceived and hence there is no problem at all.
Thus the second criterion for the object to be perceptual is its capability of being perceived.
We will continue with the analysis the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
The perceptuality of objects such as a jar, however, consists in their not being different from the (Consciousness associated with the) subject.
Objection: How can a jar etc. be one with the Consciousness limited by the mind, since it contradicts our experience of difference, as when we say, “I see this”?
Reply: The answer is this. The absence of difference from the subject does not indeed mean identity it means having no existence apart from that of the subject. To be explicit, since a jar etc. are superimposed on the Consciousness limited by them, their existence is but the existence of the Consciousness associated with the object, fro the existence of what is superimposed is not admitted to be something over and above that of its substratum. And since the Consciousness associated with the object is, in the manner described above, but the Consciousness associated with the subject, the latter Consciousness alone is the substratum of a jar etc., and hence their existence is but that of the subject, and not something else. So the immediacy of a jar etc. is proved. But in case of inference etc., since the mind does not go out to the space covered by the fire etc., the Consciousness limited by the fire is not one with the Consciousness associated with the subject, and therefore the existence of the fire etc is distinct from that of the subject. So (the definition of perception) does not wrongly extend to such cases.
After the analysis of the knowledge being perceptual, now he starts his analysis on the object being perceptual. For the object to be perceptual, the object is not different from that of the subject. After giving the condition, he raises a question how jar is one with the subject? When we say “I see this”, it clearly shows that the object is different from us, so how object be one with the subject. To this he answers that, by saying object is not different from subject, it doesn’t mean identity. It only means that the object cannot have an existence apart from the existence of the subject. The existence of the object is same as the existence of the subject.
As explained by Dharmaraja earlier, when we see a pot the mind goes out through the sense organs and takes the form of the pot. Thus we have Consciousness associated with the object and the Consciousness associated with the mind of the subject. As he said earlier, the Consciousness associated with object is not different from the Consciousness associated with the mind, and here from the perspective of object, Consciousness associated with the mind is the Consciousness associated with the subject. Thus Consciousness is the substratum of both subject and the object. Pot cannot have any existence apart from the substratum of Consciousness to which it is associated with because the pot is superimposed on the Consciousness associated with it and since the Consciousness associated with the pot is same as the Consciousness associated with the subject, the pot is perceptual. Thus the existence of the pot is same as the existence of the subject.
In the case of inference, as in fire in the hill example, the fire is not perceived through the sense organs. Since Vritti is not formed through the sense contact, the Consciousness associated with fire is different from the Consciousness associated with subject and thus the existence of fire is different from the existence of the subject. Therefore fire is not the object of perception.
Thus the first criterion for object to be perceptual is that, the reality status of the object is not different from the reality status of Consciousness associated with the subject.
Objection: Even then, in the case of an inference regarding righteousness and unrighteousness, the latter would be objects of perception, because the Consciousness limited by them not being distinct from the Consciousness associated with the subject, the existence of righteousness etc. is not apart from that of the subject.
Reply: No, for capability of perception is also a qualifying attribute of the object.
Similar question was answered by Dharmaraja in the earlier analysis as well. The question is, in case of regarding oneself to be righteous or not, we have righteousness or unrighteousness as object and the consciousness limited by righteousness being not different from Consciousness limited by the subject, righteousness becomes an object of perception which in reality is not. To this as before, Dharmaraja answers that righteousness or unrighteousness doesn’t have the capability to be perceived and hence there is no problem at all.
Thus the second criterion for the object to be perceptual is its capability of being perceived.
We will continue with the analysis the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Tuesday, October 9, 2007
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 7
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
Next Dharmaraja attacks two more concepts of Nyaya which we will in the next day.
It cannot be urged that if we thus admit both mediacy and iommediacy in the same knowledge, they would not be generic attribute (Jati); for we accept this objection, because technical terms regarding something being a generic attribute or characteristics other than that (Upadhi) are unsupported by any means of knowledge, and as such are unauthorized. Perceptions such as, ‘This jar’, are a proof of the existence of the attribute ‘jarhood’, for instance, but not of its being a generic attribute as well for since the thing to be established, viz, generic attribute, is something fictitious, the inference that establishes it also has no room. Moreover, since inherence is unfounded, and the whole universe, which is other than Brahman, is transitory, the definition of a generic attribute, which is based on its being eternal and inherent in many things, cannot apply to jarhood etc. Exactly in a similar way, the fact of being a characteristic other than a generic attribute may also be refuted.
Previously Dharmaraja refuted anuvyavasaya and alaukikam pratyaksham. Now Dharmaraja refutes another theory, Jati. Nyaya system accepts generic attribute called Jati. Jati is eternal and is inherent in many things. For example, Jarhood is the generic attribute as it is present in all the jars. It is eternal because this generic attribute of jarhood is present even if there is no jar. Inherence is an eternal relation in Nyaya system which relates generic to specific.
There are certain cases for which generic attribute is not accepted, they are
Unity of the substratum – etherhood is not accepted as generic attribute because, the substratum ether is only one, there are no two ethers.
Equality of extension – if the two attributes correspond to the same substance then both are not considered as generic attribute. Example jarhood and some other attribute of jar, both cannot be considered as generic attribute.
Cross-division – two attributes are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. For example, materiality and limitedness are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. Materiality is present in Earth, water, fire, air and ether but not present in mind. Limitedness is present in Earth, water, fire, air and mind, but not in ether. Hence there cannot be any Jati in these two.
Infinite Regression: If we assume that ghatvam or jarhood has another generic attribute ghatvatvam, then there will not be any end. Thus generic attribute of generic attribute is not accepted.
In the previous example Dharmaraja said that knowledge of Sandal wood is immediate and fragrance of the sandal is mediate. Now, since there is both mediacy and immediacy in the same knowledge they will not be Jati as there is cross-division. Mediacy and immediacy are exclusive to each other and hence it cannot lead to the generic attribute because of cross-division. This is the objection raised by the Nyaya system.
Dharmaraja welcomes such an objection and refutes Jati. According to Nyaya system, in case of Jar, ghatatvam or Jarhood is the Jati and it is eternally inherent in the Jar. When we perceive a jar, we don’t perceive the jar directly, we only perceive the jarhood and we relate the jarhood with the jar cognitively and infer that “This is Jar”. But Vedanta doesn’t accept Jati at all. In case of Jar, Jarhood is not a Jati but only an Upadhi or attribute which distinguishes it from some other substance. This cannot be considered as generic attribute because there cannot be any proof of Jarhood being a Jati. Jati or generic attribute can never be proved by any means of knowledge and hence such a concept is only a fictitious concept. Also according to Vedanta, Brahman alone is eternal there is nothing else other than Brahman which is eternal. Thus Dharmaraja proved that there is no room of having a Jati at all and the inference that we get by relating to the substance which is related through Inherence is also not possible at all.
In sentence like, “The hill has fire”, since the mental states are admitted to be different in respect of the hill and the fire, their distinguishing characteristic also are different, and hence there is no contradiction in mediacy and immediacy being together in the same Consciousness. So knowledge that is limited by mental states in the form of particular objects, is a perception in respect of such knowledge, when it is no different from the Consciousness limited by objects that are present and are capable of being apprehended by particular organs.
In this para, Dharmaraja concludes the analysis of knowledge being perceptual knowledge. In the case of fire in the hill example, the knowledge of hill is got by the conjunction of eye with the hill. Thus the Consciousness limited by the hill and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti formed in the mind are one and the same. Therefore, the knowledge of the hill is the perceptual knowledge. The fire in the hill is not seen but only inferred through the perception of smoke in the hill. Therefore, the Consciousness limited the fire is different from the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the fire as there is no sense conjunction. Therefore, the knowledge of fire is not a perceptual knowledge.
Thus the following are the conditions for knowledge to be perception:
Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence Consciousness limited by object is same as Consciousness limited by the Vritti in the present.
Object of perception should have the capability of being perceived.
We will see Dharmaraja’s analysis on the object being perceptual the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All.
Next Dharmaraja attacks two more concepts of Nyaya which we will in the next day.
It cannot be urged that if we thus admit both mediacy and iommediacy in the same knowledge, they would not be generic attribute (Jati); for we accept this objection, because technical terms regarding something being a generic attribute or characteristics other than that (Upadhi) are unsupported by any means of knowledge, and as such are unauthorized. Perceptions such as, ‘This jar’, are a proof of the existence of the attribute ‘jarhood’, for instance, but not of its being a generic attribute as well for since the thing to be established, viz, generic attribute, is something fictitious, the inference that establishes it also has no room. Moreover, since inherence is unfounded, and the whole universe, which is other than Brahman, is transitory, the definition of a generic attribute, which is based on its being eternal and inherent in many things, cannot apply to jarhood etc. Exactly in a similar way, the fact of being a characteristic other than a generic attribute may also be refuted.
Previously Dharmaraja refuted anuvyavasaya and alaukikam pratyaksham. Now Dharmaraja refutes another theory, Jati. Nyaya system accepts generic attribute called Jati. Jati is eternal and is inherent in many things. For example, Jarhood is the generic attribute as it is present in all the jars. It is eternal because this generic attribute of jarhood is present even if there is no jar. Inherence is an eternal relation in Nyaya system which relates generic to specific.
There are certain cases for which generic attribute is not accepted, they are
Unity of the substratum – etherhood is not accepted as generic attribute because, the substratum ether is only one, there are no two ethers.
Equality of extension – if the two attributes correspond to the same substance then both are not considered as generic attribute. Example jarhood and some other attribute of jar, both cannot be considered as generic attribute.
Cross-division – two attributes are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. For example, materiality and limitedness are partly exclusive and partly coexistent. Materiality is present in Earth, water, fire, air and ether but not present in mind. Limitedness is present in Earth, water, fire, air and mind, but not in ether. Hence there cannot be any Jati in these two.
Infinite Regression: If we assume that ghatvam or jarhood has another generic attribute ghatvatvam, then there will not be any end. Thus generic attribute of generic attribute is not accepted.
In the previous example Dharmaraja said that knowledge of Sandal wood is immediate and fragrance of the sandal is mediate. Now, since there is both mediacy and immediacy in the same knowledge they will not be Jati as there is cross-division. Mediacy and immediacy are exclusive to each other and hence it cannot lead to the generic attribute because of cross-division. This is the objection raised by the Nyaya system.
Dharmaraja welcomes such an objection and refutes Jati. According to Nyaya system, in case of Jar, ghatatvam or Jarhood is the Jati and it is eternally inherent in the Jar. When we perceive a jar, we don’t perceive the jar directly, we only perceive the jarhood and we relate the jarhood with the jar cognitively and infer that “This is Jar”. But Vedanta doesn’t accept Jati at all. In case of Jar, Jarhood is not a Jati but only an Upadhi or attribute which distinguishes it from some other substance. This cannot be considered as generic attribute because there cannot be any proof of Jarhood being a Jati. Jati or generic attribute can never be proved by any means of knowledge and hence such a concept is only a fictitious concept. Also according to Vedanta, Brahman alone is eternal there is nothing else other than Brahman which is eternal. Thus Dharmaraja proved that there is no room of having a Jati at all and the inference that we get by relating to the substance which is related through Inherence is also not possible at all.
In sentence like, “The hill has fire”, since the mental states are admitted to be different in respect of the hill and the fire, their distinguishing characteristic also are different, and hence there is no contradiction in mediacy and immediacy being together in the same Consciousness. So knowledge that is limited by mental states in the form of particular objects, is a perception in respect of such knowledge, when it is no different from the Consciousness limited by objects that are present and are capable of being apprehended by particular organs.
In this para, Dharmaraja concludes the analysis of knowledge being perceptual knowledge. In the case of fire in the hill example, the knowledge of hill is got by the conjunction of eye with the hill. Thus the Consciousness limited by the hill and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti formed in the mind are one and the same. Therefore, the knowledge of the hill is the perceptual knowledge. The fire in the hill is not seen but only inferred through the perception of smoke in the hill. Therefore, the Consciousness limited the fire is different from the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the fire as there is no sense conjunction. Therefore, the knowledge of fire is not a perceptual knowledge.
Thus the following are the conditions for knowledge to be perception:
Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence Consciousness limited by object is same as Consciousness limited by the Vritti in the present.
Object of perception should have the capability of being perceived.
We will see Dharmaraja’s analysis on the object being perceptual the next day.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Vedanta Paribhasha - Pratyaksham - 6
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for the long break in the learning Vedanta Paribhasha.
Therefore knowledge such as, “The hill has fire”, is also mediate so far as the fire is concerned, and immediate in respect of the hill; for the Consciousness limited by the hill etc. is not different from that limited by the state of the mind that has gone out, but in respect of the fire, since the mind doesn’t go out to form a state, the Consciousness limited by the fire and the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge are different from each other. Thus the experience takes the form, “I see the hill”, and “I infer the fire”. But in the system of logic the apperception would be of the form “I infer the hill”.
When we see an object the mind through the openings of the sense organs goes out towards the object and takes the form of the object. This modification of the mind is called Vritti. For the perceptual knowledge, the anthah karana Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence the Consciousness limited by both anthah karana Vritti and Consciousness limited by the object are one and the same. The Vritti and the object should not only occupy the same space but also same time and not only that, the object should have the capability to be perceived.
Thus the conditions are
Anthah Karana Vritti and the object should occupy same space and same time.
The object should have the capability to be perceived.
After giving the conditions for the knowledge to be perceptual knowledge, he then through an example differentiates perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge. When we see smoke in the hill, we infer that the hill has fire. The hill is perceived clearly and fire not seen at all. The anthah karana Vritti of the hill and the hill occupy the same space in the present and hence the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the hill and the hill are the same and hence we get the perceptual knowledge that “I see the hill”. On the other hand, the mental modification in the form of fire and the fire doesn’t occupy the same space because there is no sense contact at all. The mental modification is through the inferential knowledge that there should be fire in the hill as there is smoke. Thus we have the knowledge “I see the Hill” and “I infer the fire”.
According to Nyaya system, when we see a jar, we don’t get the knowledge immediately that “This is jar”. First when the eye contacts the jar, only the quality of being Jar or the jarhood is perceived. This knowledge is called Vyavasaya (Primary knowledge). From this primary knowledge comes the knowledge that “I know the Jar” by relating this Jarhood to the Jar cognitively. This reflective knowledge is called Anuvyavasaya. Thus we see the jarhood and infer that it is a jar. In the same way when the hill is seen, according to Nyaya System, through Anuvyavasaya we get the knowledge that “I infer the Hill”.
Nyaya system accepts two cognitions first the knowledge about the quality of the object and then the knowledge about the object by relating cognitively the quality with the object. Vedanta doesn’t accept two cognitions in perception. When we see an object knowledge about the object is got directly. The problem with anuvyavasaya of Nyaya system is that, for the first cognition to give knowledge we require second cognition, also the second cognition may require a third cognition for the knowledge and so on thus going to Infinite regression. The perceiver will be standing staring at the object with infinite thoughts running in the mind to know finally that “This is such and such object”JJ.
In an inferential knowledge, however, in which the subject is not in contact with the organ, the knowledge is wholly mediate. Knowledge such as, “A fragrant piece of sandal”, is also immediate in respect of the piece of sandal, and mediate in respect of fragrance, because the latter being incapable of apprehension by the eye, the definition, mentioned before, based on capability of being perceived cannot apply here.
Here Dharmaraja criticizes another concept of Nyaya on the grounds of perception. According to Nyaya, there are two types of perception, Laukikam and Alaukikam.
Laukikam is of two kinds, External perception where the sense organs comes into contact with the object and the Internal perception where mind comes into contact with the modification of the mind in the form of external cognition, happiness, pain etc.
Alaukikam is of 3 kinds.
Samanyalakshana (Knowledge based on a common feature) – Whenever we see a jar, through the conjunction of the eye with the jar the jarhood is only seen first and then from that comes the knowledge of the jar.
Jnanalakshana (knowledge based on previous knowledge) – When we see an object say a rose, we say that “I see a fragrant rose”. Though the expression should have been “I see a rose”, still since through earlier experience of fragrant smell of rose we say that “I see a fragrant rose”.
Yogaja – Perceptual knowledge of seeing the past, future etc through Yogic power.
Now here in the example given by Dharmaraja, we are seeing a Sandal wood. According to Nyaya System, the perceptual knowledge would be “I see a fragrant sandal wood” as through sense contact sandal wood is known and through the past experience the fragrance of sandal wood is known. Thus even the fragrance also becomes part of the perception. But according to Vedanta, sandal wood alone is perception as it is in contact with the eyes. The knowledge of fragrance is not a perceptual knowledge because fragrance doesn’t have the capability of being perceived through eyes.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Pardon all for the long break in the learning Vedanta Paribhasha.
Therefore knowledge such as, “The hill has fire”, is also mediate so far as the fire is concerned, and immediate in respect of the hill; for the Consciousness limited by the hill etc. is not different from that limited by the state of the mind that has gone out, but in respect of the fire, since the mind doesn’t go out to form a state, the Consciousness limited by the fire and the Consciousness associated with the means of knowledge are different from each other. Thus the experience takes the form, “I see the hill”, and “I infer the fire”. But in the system of logic the apperception would be of the form “I infer the hill”.
When we see an object the mind through the openings of the sense organs goes out towards the object and takes the form of the object. This modification of the mind is called Vritti. For the perceptual knowledge, the anthah karana Vritti and the object should occupy the same space and hence the Consciousness limited by both anthah karana Vritti and Consciousness limited by the object are one and the same. The Vritti and the object should not only occupy the same space but also same time and not only that, the object should have the capability to be perceived.
Thus the conditions are
Anthah Karana Vritti and the object should occupy same space and same time.
The object should have the capability to be perceived.
After giving the conditions for the knowledge to be perceptual knowledge, he then through an example differentiates perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge. When we see smoke in the hill, we infer that the hill has fire. The hill is perceived clearly and fire not seen at all. The anthah karana Vritti of the hill and the hill occupy the same space in the present and hence the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of the hill and the hill are the same and hence we get the perceptual knowledge that “I see the hill”. On the other hand, the mental modification in the form of fire and the fire doesn’t occupy the same space because there is no sense contact at all. The mental modification is through the inferential knowledge that there should be fire in the hill as there is smoke. Thus we have the knowledge “I see the Hill” and “I infer the fire”.
According to Nyaya system, when we see a jar, we don’t get the knowledge immediately that “This is jar”. First when the eye contacts the jar, only the quality of being Jar or the jarhood is perceived. This knowledge is called Vyavasaya (Primary knowledge). From this primary knowledge comes the knowledge that “I know the Jar” by relating this Jarhood to the Jar cognitively. This reflective knowledge is called Anuvyavasaya. Thus we see the jarhood and infer that it is a jar. In the same way when the hill is seen, according to Nyaya System, through Anuvyavasaya we get the knowledge that “I infer the Hill”.
Nyaya system accepts two cognitions first the knowledge about the quality of the object and then the knowledge about the object by relating cognitively the quality with the object. Vedanta doesn’t accept two cognitions in perception. When we see an object knowledge about the object is got directly. The problem with anuvyavasaya of Nyaya system is that, for the first cognition to give knowledge we require second cognition, also the second cognition may require a third cognition for the knowledge and so on thus going to Infinite regression. The perceiver will be standing staring at the object with infinite thoughts running in the mind to know finally that “This is such and such object”JJ.
In an inferential knowledge, however, in which the subject is not in contact with the organ, the knowledge is wholly mediate. Knowledge such as, “A fragrant piece of sandal”, is also immediate in respect of the piece of sandal, and mediate in respect of fragrance, because the latter being incapable of apprehension by the eye, the definition, mentioned before, based on capability of being perceived cannot apply here.
Here Dharmaraja criticizes another concept of Nyaya on the grounds of perception. According to Nyaya, there are two types of perception, Laukikam and Alaukikam.
Laukikam is of two kinds, External perception where the sense organs comes into contact with the object and the Internal perception where mind comes into contact with the modification of the mind in the form of external cognition, happiness, pain etc.
Alaukikam is of 3 kinds.
Samanyalakshana (Knowledge based on a common feature) – Whenever we see a jar, through the conjunction of the eye with the jar the jarhood is only seen first and then from that comes the knowledge of the jar.
Jnanalakshana (knowledge based on previous knowledge) – When we see an object say a rose, we say that “I see a fragrant rose”. Though the expression should have been “I see a rose”, still since through earlier experience of fragrant smell of rose we say that “I see a fragrant rose”.
Yogaja – Perceptual knowledge of seeing the past, future etc through Yogic power.
Now here in the example given by Dharmaraja, we are seeing a Sandal wood. According to Nyaya System, the perceptual knowledge would be “I see a fragrant sandal wood” as through sense contact sandal wood is known and through the past experience the fragrance of sandal wood is known. Thus even the fragrance also becomes part of the perception. But according to Vedanta, sandal wood alone is perception as it is in contact with the eyes. The knowledge of fragrance is not a perceptual knowledge because fragrance doesn’t have the capability of being perceived through eyes.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Vedanta Paribhasha – Pratyaksham - 5
Hari Aum
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Objection: In that case the recollection of the happiness etc. abiding in oneself would be a perception in respect of the happiness etc.
Reply: No, for there the happiness that is being recollected being a past event, and the mental state in the form of recollection being a present event, the two limiting adjuncts in the mind belong to different times, and hence the two Consciousnesses limited by them are different; for the criterion of the unity of the substratum having the limiting adjuncts is that the two limiting adjuncts must occupy the same space at the same time. If, however, the criterion of that unity be occupation of the same space alone, then in order to prevent from unduly extending to a recollection such as, “I was happy before” the object must be qualified by the idea of presence.
In the case of perceptual knowledge, we have 3 entities,
pramata, the subject
Prameya, the object
Pramana, the mind which stretches out to the object.
When a person sees a pot in front of him, the mind goes out through the openings of the eyes and takes the form of the pot. This modification of mind in the form of pot is known as Vritti. The consciousness qualified by the Vritti is same as the consciousness qualified by the object because the space occupied the Vritti and object is one and the same. Thus, the person gets the knowledge that “This is pot”. Thus, the first criterion for the knowledge to be perceptual is that the object and the Vritti formed in antah karanam should occupy the same space. After explaining about the perception of external objects, he also told that the knowledge that “I am happy” is also a perceptual knowledge as the internal object happiness and the modification in the form of happiness occupy the same space.
Now Dharmaraja raises a question. If the knowledge “I am happy” is a perceptual knowledge on account of happiness and vritti occupying the same space, then the knowledge that “I was happy” should also a perception as in this case also the object and the vritti may occupy the same space. He dismisses this question by saying that the object of recollection of happiness and its Vritti belong to different time. The experience of happiness is in past and the recollection is in present. Since both the object and the Vritti belong to different time, the Consciousness qualified by them is different. Thus he brings forth the second criterion for perceptual knowledge that along with the same space which the object and the vritti occupy, they should also be present at the same time. Dharmaraja at the very beginning itself differentiated between the valid knowledge and the remembrance. In this context, the happiness is an experience in the past and that experience is remembered in the present and hence is not a valid knowledge. The reason for this not being a valid perceptual knowledge is that they both belong to different time. Finally, he finishes the explanation of this criterion by saying that if we are to consider only same space criterion, then the object should be in present.
Objection: Even then, when the present righteousness and unrighteousness relating to one are known through verbal testimony and so forth, the definition unduly extends to such verbal comprehension etc because there the Consciousness limited by righteousness and unrighteousness and the Consciousness limited by the mental state in the form of those are one.
Reply: No, for capability of perception also must form a qualifying attribute of the object. That in spite of their being equally attributes of the mind, some are capable of being perceived while others are not, can be explained only by a reference to the inherent of things, which we want assume on the basis of the actual result. Otherwise, even in the Nyaya system, righteousness and unrighteousness would inevitably be matter of perception like happiness etc, because they are equally attributes of the Self.
Now Dharmaraja raises a question. Dharma and adharma can be known only through Verbal Testimony. When somebody says that “You are righteous”, such verbal testimony at the present gets extended to be perception also because the consciousness limited by dharma or adharma and the consciousness limited by the Vritti of dharma or adharma will be same. Thus there is overpervasion of extending into perception. To this he answers that, for an object to be perceptible, the object should have the capability of being perceived. If an object doesn’t have the capability then there cannot be any perceptual knowledge at all. Here ones own dharma or adharma doesn’t have the capability to be perceived and hence there is no over pervasion.
Also he says that such a question cannot be put forth by Nayayikas because, for them dharma and adharma are the qualities of the Self. Nyaya system talks about 24 qualities dharma, adharma, sukha, dukha are few among the 24 qualities. Therefore even according to Nyaya system, dharma and adharma cannot be perceived as then it would lead us to say that Sukha and dukha are also perception as they are also qualities like dharma and adharma. But according to Nyaya system, Sukha and Dukha can be known through Inference only.
Thus, the third criterion for knowledge to be perceptual is Capability of object to be perceived.
It cannot be urged that even then, while happiness is present, the knowledge arising from sentences such as “You are happy”, would be a perception; for we accept this view, inasmuch as in sentence like, “you are the tenth man”, which refer to objects that are in contact (with the organ), we admit immediate or perceptual knowledge even from verbal testimony.
Dharmaraja anticipates a question that if somebody says when there is happiness in the present “You are happy”, whether the knowledge out of that verbal testimony is perception or not. He says that it is perception knowledge the object which is happiness is present and when the anthah karanam senses this object, the person gets the clear knowledge that “I am happy”. ‘Happiness’ is an internal object, when it is present the Consciousness qualified by happiness and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of happiness is one and the same and hence the knowledge that “I am happy” is perceptual knowledge. Dharmaraja quotes an example for the same, the 10 fool example which is a very familiar example for everyone. When the passer-by told the person who counted others “You are the tenth man”, he gets the clear knowledge that “I am the tenth man”.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
Prostrations to Guru. Prostrations to All
Objection: In that case the recollection of the happiness etc. abiding in oneself would be a perception in respect of the happiness etc.
Reply: No, for there the happiness that is being recollected being a past event, and the mental state in the form of recollection being a present event, the two limiting adjuncts in the mind belong to different times, and hence the two Consciousnesses limited by them are different; for the criterion of the unity of the substratum having the limiting adjuncts is that the two limiting adjuncts must occupy the same space at the same time. If, however, the criterion of that unity be occupation of the same space alone, then in order to prevent from unduly extending to a recollection such as, “I was happy before” the object must be qualified by the idea of presence.
In the case of perceptual knowledge, we have 3 entities,
pramata, the subject
Prameya, the object
Pramana, the mind which stretches out to the object.
When a person sees a pot in front of him, the mind goes out through the openings of the eyes and takes the form of the pot. This modification of mind in the form of pot is known as Vritti. The consciousness qualified by the Vritti is same as the consciousness qualified by the object because the space occupied the Vritti and object is one and the same. Thus, the person gets the knowledge that “This is pot”. Thus, the first criterion for the knowledge to be perceptual is that the object and the Vritti formed in antah karanam should occupy the same space. After explaining about the perception of external objects, he also told that the knowledge that “I am happy” is also a perceptual knowledge as the internal object happiness and the modification in the form of happiness occupy the same space.
Now Dharmaraja raises a question. If the knowledge “I am happy” is a perceptual knowledge on account of happiness and vritti occupying the same space, then the knowledge that “I was happy” should also a perception as in this case also the object and the vritti may occupy the same space. He dismisses this question by saying that the object of recollection of happiness and its Vritti belong to different time. The experience of happiness is in past and the recollection is in present. Since both the object and the Vritti belong to different time, the Consciousness qualified by them is different. Thus he brings forth the second criterion for perceptual knowledge that along with the same space which the object and the vritti occupy, they should also be present at the same time. Dharmaraja at the very beginning itself differentiated between the valid knowledge and the remembrance. In this context, the happiness is an experience in the past and that experience is remembered in the present and hence is not a valid knowledge. The reason for this not being a valid perceptual knowledge is that they both belong to different time. Finally, he finishes the explanation of this criterion by saying that if we are to consider only same space criterion, then the object should be in present.
Objection: Even then, when the present righteousness and unrighteousness relating to one are known through verbal testimony and so forth, the definition unduly extends to such verbal comprehension etc because there the Consciousness limited by righteousness and unrighteousness and the Consciousness limited by the mental state in the form of those are one.
Reply: No, for capability of perception also must form a qualifying attribute of the object. That in spite of their being equally attributes of the mind, some are capable of being perceived while others are not, can be explained only by a reference to the inherent of things, which we want assume on the basis of the actual result. Otherwise, even in the Nyaya system, righteousness and unrighteousness would inevitably be matter of perception like happiness etc, because they are equally attributes of the Self.
Now Dharmaraja raises a question. Dharma and adharma can be known only through Verbal Testimony. When somebody says that “You are righteous”, such verbal testimony at the present gets extended to be perception also because the consciousness limited by dharma or adharma and the consciousness limited by the Vritti of dharma or adharma will be same. Thus there is overpervasion of extending into perception. To this he answers that, for an object to be perceptible, the object should have the capability of being perceived. If an object doesn’t have the capability then there cannot be any perceptual knowledge at all. Here ones own dharma or adharma doesn’t have the capability to be perceived and hence there is no over pervasion.
Also he says that such a question cannot be put forth by Nayayikas because, for them dharma and adharma are the qualities of the Self. Nyaya system talks about 24 qualities dharma, adharma, sukha, dukha are few among the 24 qualities. Therefore even according to Nyaya system, dharma and adharma cannot be perceived as then it would lead us to say that Sukha and dukha are also perception as they are also qualities like dharma and adharma. But according to Nyaya system, Sukha and Dukha can be known through Inference only.
Thus, the third criterion for knowledge to be perceptual is Capability of object to be perceived.
It cannot be urged that even then, while happiness is present, the knowledge arising from sentences such as “You are happy”, would be a perception; for we accept this view, inasmuch as in sentence like, “you are the tenth man”, which refer to objects that are in contact (with the organ), we admit immediate or perceptual knowledge even from verbal testimony.
Dharmaraja anticipates a question that if somebody says when there is happiness in the present “You are happy”, whether the knowledge out of that verbal testimony is perception or not. He says that it is perception knowledge the object which is happiness is present and when the anthah karanam senses this object, the person gets the clear knowledge that “I am happy”. ‘Happiness’ is an internal object, when it is present the Consciousness qualified by happiness and the Consciousness limited by the Vritti of happiness is one and the same and hence the knowledge that “I am happy” is perceptual knowledge. Dharmaraja quotes an example for the same, the 10 fool example which is a very familiar example for everyone. When the passer-by told the person who counted others “You are the tenth man”, he gets the clear knowledge that “I am the tenth man”.
Prostrations to All.
Hari Aum
Thanks,
Rajesh
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